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## CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI

### EDITORIAL

Challenge to Democracy.....	5
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### ARTICLES

Economic Warfare Tactics, <i>by Lowell M. Pumphrey</i> .....	7
Age and Field Command, <i>by Alfred Vagts</i> .....	13
The Princeton Program of Military Studies, <i>by Edward Mead Earle</i> .....	21
How Strong is Japan? <i>by Kurt Bloch</i> .....	27
Battle of the Frontier, <i>by Max Werner</i> .....	69
Monetary Problems of Military Occupation, <i>by Harry H. Bell</i> .....	77
Unoccupied France and German War Economy, <i>by Jean Montry</i> .....	89
Records Administration and the War, <i>by Emmett J. Leahy</i> .....	97
Economic Factors in Military Action, <i>by Edward S. Mason</i> .....	133
The Federalization of Our Army, <i>by H. A. De Weerd</i> ....	143
Moltke's Strategical Concepts, <i>by Hajo Holborn</i> .....	153
The Background of Geopolitics, <i>by Jean Gottman</i> .....	197
Pre-War Democratic Control of Military Affairs, <i>by Wilson K. Doyle</i> .....	207
Communications and Strategy, <i>by Stefan T. Possony</i> .....	219

HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE .....	36, 109, 169, 225
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### THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Book Reviews .....	40, 111, 171, 229
Other Recent Books .....	52, 122, 183, 240
Recent Periodical Literature.....	56, 125, 187, 243

### NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

Use of Records of the Last War Today, <i>by E. G. Campbell</i> .....	63
The INSTITUTE's Opportunities in Wartime, <i>by Robert Greenhalgh Albion</i> .....	130
Records of War Administration, <i>by Harry Venneman</i> ....	191
War Department Records in The National Archives, <i>by Elbert L. Huber</i> .....	247
United States Campaign Medals, <i>by Hugh M. Flick</i> .....	254

INDEX TO VOLUME VI .....	257
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# CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY

## AN EDITORIAL

The United States is now openly and completely at war; since December 7 there has been no choice. The magnitude of the task confronting us can scarcely be envisaged at this stage, but that it will dwarf all previous American efforts in the field of force is already apparent. Never have we faced enemies so numerous, so well prepared, so efficient. Victory—indeed survival—will require out-thinking as well as out-building and out-fighting the Axis. We must not fall victim to a new complacency arising from impressive totals, both present and future, of production and manpower. Tanks and planes and men alone are not enough; there must be equally impressive achievements in the intellectual realm. That is the challenge to democracy.

Our ultimate military potential can be achieved only as the meaning of total war becomes generally understood and as a comprehensive body of solid military thought is created. As a nation we stopped even thinking about war, except as something to avoid, at the end of the last one. We cannot simply pick up now where we left off then. We have twenty years—twenty years of intensive, constructive, daring thought on the part of our enemies—to catch up on before the American people can be expected to understand the ramifications and comprehensiveness of modern warfare and the parts they must play in it. Toward this end MILITARY AFFAIRS will continue to publish articles and call attention to books which will assist its readers to grasp the significant developments of this period, but much more is needed.

Solid military thought is not built upon the sudden interest of those untrained in the study of war. The economist who knows nothing of governmental organization, the political scientist who knows nothing of strategy, and the soldier who knows nothing of economics cannot be as capable of directing the war effort as the specialist who has learned the relationship of all of these things. As we have said before, "The study of war must be an *integral* field of study, not coordinate with any one or two already recognized studies, but coordinate with the sum total of *all* recognized studies." Some steps have been taken in this direction, but they are not sufficient. Some men are now learning by experience, but this is too slow. A College of National Defense is needed to develop specialists in war administration.



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# ECONOMIC WARFARE TACTICS

BY LOWELL M. PUMPHREY

In a previous article the writer proposed a double differentiation of economic warfare operations according to whether or not they are tactical or strategic in character and to whether or not their successful performance requires the use of professional soldier-economists or can be fulfilled adequately by civilian specialists working in conjunction with the military.<sup>1</sup> It was pointed out that in areas of broad strategic planning the best results have hitherto been achieved by the utilization of mixed staffs of specialists from both military and civilian pursuits. This is especially likely to be true in the higher spheres of policy advice, where the extremely broad provinces of knowledge involved normally recommend the resort to mixed specialist groups, all the members of which, however, have the common denominator of an understanding of the broad principles of military strategy.

The marked developments of the tactical phases of economic warfare in recent years, such as the German extension of economic warfare into the actual theater of military operations, warrants a more detailed consideration of some of the problems and implications of these developments. The most obvious of the implications of effective economic warfare tactics is the vast improvement in the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the total-war economic effort that can be accomplished thereby. A less obvious but nonetheless potentially highly significant implication, of the German developments in particular, is the possibility such developments hold forth of a far greater fusion of the intellectual disciplines relevant to total war than has been deemed possible in the recent past.

The development of an effective system of organization for the implementation of the strategic economic-warfare decisions affords the possibility of tremendous gains, particularly in the case of successful offensive military operations. It has been estimated, for example, that the Third Reich acquired the equivalent of thirty-six billion dollars of *matériel*, supplies, and usable property as a direct result of its operations during 1940.<sup>2</sup> Although we cannot, of course, estimate the net

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<sup>1</sup>"Planning for Economic Warfare," *Military Affairs*, V (Fall 1941), 145-51.

<sup>2</sup>Thomas Reville, *The Spoil of Europe* (New York, 1941).

gains directly attributable to the superior military-economic organization of the Third Reich, we have no reason to doubt that a considerable fraction of the above gains would have been foregone if it had not been for the efficient German tactical organizations and the carefully laid-out plans for the confiscation and utilization of the *matériel* acquired in the occupied territory.

The gains from a rigorously conceived and efficiently administered tactical-economic organization are illustrated as well in the negative sphere by the "scorched earth" policy of the Soviet Union in the present Russo-German conflict.<sup>3</sup> Here, the efficient Soviet preparations and organization for the destruction of usable *matériel* by retreating Soviet military and civilian forces meant that the *Wehrmacht* failed to reap material gains from conquest similar to those it reaped in the Low Countries and France where no such carefully conceived plans were put into effect. A far less important, but nevertheless enlightening, case occurred in September 1939. The German *Wehrwirtschaftsstab*—the War Economy Staff of the High Command—prepared and carried out the evacuation of all the key movable equipment in the Saarland when it was feared that the advancing French Armies would occupy that district. Upon the subsequent withdrawal of the advance French units to the Maginot Line, the equipment was promptly restored and the Saarland resumed normal production early in October. (The French Army, it should be noted, failed to carry out the obvious operation of shelling the key factories before withdrawing to the Maginot Line—a significant reflection of the sterility of the mental processes of the French High Command.) This small-scale affair illustrates the limit to which the German Army was prepared to go to prevent the enemy from realizing upon its offensive successes.<sup>4</sup>

In the sphere of tactical administrative effort in connection with military operations, therefore, one can distinguish two obverse phases:

1. *Offensively*, the problem is to prepare for the prompt sequestration and harnessing of *matériel* acquired in the overrun territory.

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<sup>3</sup>The failure of the British Far Eastern Command to carry out destruction of valuable economic resources and equipment in Malaya provides an interesting contrast. Students of total war will find it difficult to understand why sufficient shipping was left intact in the harbor of Penang to provide the Japanese with equipment for making landings on the west coast of Malaya.

<sup>4</sup>The Saarland operation contrasts markedly with the French failure in July 1940 to carry out the destruction of the French plants and not with the wholesale destruction carried out by the Soviet Armies in 1941. The "scorched earth" policy of the latter was necessitated by the inability to carry out complete evacuation of equipment because of an inadequate transport system; *i. e.*, strategic necessity rather than incompetence dictated the policy.



2. *Defensively*, the problem is to prepare for the removal or destruction of such *matériel* to prevent its falling into enemy hands in the case of a successful invasion.<sup>5</sup>

Strategically, the problem is to maximize the economic gains from conquest or, conversely, to minimize the economic losses from retreat and defeat. The advantages arising from an efficient, as distinct from an inefficient, implementation of this broad economic strategic goal of military campaigns have received such vivid illustration within the past year as to need little consideration in the present article. These advantages, of course, furnish the ultimate justification for major efforts being made to establish an effective tactical organization for dealing with the problem on a nation-wide scale. In this connection, two principal points will be considered briefly: (1) the special problem of the relationship of a specialist body of officer-economists to the achievement of the tactical goals; and (2) the intangible long-run gains inherent in an improved scheme of military-economic organization.

The success of Germany in developing a body of soldier-economists, soldier-psychologists, *etc.*, since the first World War represents an almost unique achievement in the sphere of fusion of comparatively unrelated intellectual disciplines during an era in which the trend in the social sciences and in military science has been towards increased specialization. The reasons for and the advantages realizable from specialization in intellectual disciplines are so well known as to require no comment. Extreme specialization contains within itself, however, some major disadvantages for the pursuit of modern total war which are becoming increasingly evident in this country and Britain.

From the point of view of the individual, the intensity of concentration of effort required to master single disciplines has tended in modern society to produce a group of men who, in general, are characterized by a relative narrowness of outlook and an inflexibility in dealing with new and unusual problems. Such specialists generally lack the ability to undertake the broad syntheses so essential in the strategic phases of a war effort. In a democratic society characterized by an extremely high degree of specialization and differentiation of disciplines, however, the guidance of the nation in the various strategic spheres is normally en-

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<sup>5</sup>The achievements of the U. S. S. R. in this negative sphere are as impressive as those of the Third Reich in the positive sphere. The recent reports in the American press of the wholesale transfer of the plant equipment and the labor force of key factories located in the threatened Western areas of the Soviet Union to places of safety behind the Urals illustrate the extraordinarily advanced character of the *defensive* economic-warfare methods perfected by the U. S. S. R. The magnitude of the total gain to the Allied cause from the Russian combination of scorched earth and strategical-plant withdrawal operations is almost incalculable.

trusted to the most successful specialists. The result almost inevitably is a characteristic phenomenon of a democratic power at war—a succession of failures of eminent business men, economists, army officers, and others chosen to carry out tasks for which they lack the necessary aptitude. These men, discredited through no fault of their own, are the unwitting victims of an inherently inefficient system of selection of high personnel.

From the point of view of broad-scale organization, the existence of myriad specialists in very narrow fields compels the resort to complicated arrangements of liaison and coordination to achieve some degree of cooperation between the specialists. The resultant system of coordination via horizontal liaison is generally characterized by an excessive degree of cumbersomeness in the outward forms of organization and a perpetual series of harmful clashes of narrow group interests and opinions. Since the coordination and liaison functions are placed in the hands of men who are specialists themselves, the net result is frequently merely to pile Pelion upon Ossa. The complexities and confusions involved in an organizational system of this character place a premium on bureaucratic competence; *i.e.*, the particular type of competence that is comparatively rare in the Anglo-Saxon world. The United States and England, by their persistent failure to undertake administrative simplifications in their war economic activity, place themselves at a further comparative disadvantage with the totalitarian powers, which, although enjoying a relatively greater degree of bureaucratic ability, have made the greatest strides towards alleviating the inherent disadvantages in the modern system of specialization.

The establishment of nuclei of trained soldier-economists, soldier-psychologists, *etc.*, within the armed forces of a nation offers the possibility of eventually overcoming some of the disadvantages inherent in the modern system of specialization. The objection will immediately be raised that the task of fusion of disciplines is in practice impossible of achievement, especially in countries which have difficulty even in recruiting a sufficient personnel of competent soldiers. A determination of the validity of this objection calls for a consideration of the type of specialized competence in economics, psychology, and the like required by the professional soldier.

Since we are dealing in this article with *economic warfare*, we shall consider the type of economic training that would be required of officer-economists specializing in military-economic problems. Military-economic operations in the theater of actual warfare fall into three



classes: (1) front-line operations; (2) rear echelon operations in the zone of military operations; and (3) administrative operations in occupied territories. In all three cases, the officer-economist will be confronted with practical problems which fall into the province of technological rather than theoretical economics. As a result, the task of recruiting for such specialized tactical pursuits should be comparatively simple. Industrial engineers, regular staff officers trained in supply work, and line officers with a thorough training in business administration should be able to acquire the specialized economic competence required for the tactical duties in the course of a few months' rigorous training in economics.

In the fields of policy and strategic planning, however, the need is for officer-economists who possess a broad outlook and grasp of economic principles that is not often to be found among the average business economist and industrial engineer. This necessity has, as we have seen, compelled resort in the past to mixed groups of civilian and military experts when dealing with such problems. The development of army officers, who are also economists of a professional caliber, affords the possibility of achieving a vastly superior coordination of military and economic considerations. The potential gains from a fusion of military and economic disciplines are thus most marked in the vital sphere of the grand strategy of economic warfare.

What are the requirements in the way of military training for the officer-economist detailed for tactical economic operations? Officers used in front line duty with specialist economic units must clearly be skilled professional soldiers. In the case of liaison officers attached to regular army staffs, they must be trained staff officers as well as skilled technical economists.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, commanders of specialist mining, chemical, and engineering units and the like should possess the same military competence as a commanding officer in a regular line outfit.

In the case of officers detailed for administrative duty, whether in the rear zones of military operations or in an occupied territory, the need is for men who understand business administration and plant management rather than men who are well trained in army staff and

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<sup>6</sup>This fact can be illustrated by postulating a typical problem confronting such an officer attached to divisional headquarters. On the basis of reports received from the central economic staff headquarters, he knows that plant X near city Y is regarded as a prime economic objective. He learns that an enemy battery is situated by the plant, and the divisional artillery officer maintains that the battery should be silenced even at the risk of destruction of the plant. The economic officer is called upon to make a recommendation as to whether or not the economic importance of the plant justifies taking the risk of by-passing the battery. It is obvious that only the most skilled and highly-regarded staff officer could carry weight in recommending that such a gamble be taken.

command functions. Since normally these positions will comprise the majority of tactical military-economic posts, the task of recruiting a group of officer-economists is further simplified.

If the arguments presented in this and the preceding article are sound, the economic character of modern war has rendered it imperative that a fraction of the higher military personnel become prepared to cope with the wide variety of military-economic problems that arise in modern total war. The potentialities of economic warfare methods extend from the highest spheres of grand strategy to administrative and tactical problems of the most specialized character. The experience of the Third Reich and the U. S. S. R. suggests that skilled amateurs and combinations of civilians and soldiers are very unlikely to achieve an efficiency in dealing with these problems comparable to that obtainable with a well-trained officer-economist personnel. Although the difficulties in the way of creating such a personnel are profound, the past two years have afforded a vivid illustration of the incalculable gains realizable from an achievement of the goal. The science of modern total war must move steadily towards the goal of flexibility and adaptability and away from the rigidity and formalism that has been the great curse of the military profession in the past.



# AGE AND FIELD COMMAND

BY ALFRED VAGTS

Even a superficial analysis of the reasons advanced for the employment of generals of long experience and advanced age will reveal a variety of non-military motives. A general may be retained out of sheer conservatism, to which democracies, as de Tocqueville once warned, are as likely to succumb as are absolutisms. "Leave well enough alone," the governors think; "success has clung to this soldier." Very likely their high opinion of him is traditional and without new tests of his abilities. Bothersome military innovators are displeasing to civilians, parliamentary and otherwise, who prefer to have the unpleasant business of war management run smoothly along accustomed lines. It is often held that military experience can be accumulated, even though war is itself both changed and changing without pause. Finally, it seems "only just" to civilians and soldiers alike that past performance should be recognized and that only under the harsh experience of defeat should a government abruptly discard a once deserving officer.

Has military experience in its accumulation through age and prolonged service proved its worth in the past? A few generals of advanced age have indeed achieved victories, the great and misleading example being that of the elder Moltke; others who come to mind are the Prussian Blücher, the Russian Suvarov and the Austrian Radetzky. All three were chosen and retained (by governors civilian and military) because of the patriarchal nature of the systems of government and authority prevailing in their respective countries. The presence of elderly officers in the field and at the head of armies could always be pointed out to the *Landwehr* and other higher age groups in the rank and file of these armies as a justification for their own field service while in their thirties and forties. The long-range record of military history speaks clearly against the army leader of advanced years, though, of course, not absolutely in favor of youth—youth does not safeguard against military folly. In general the great field commanders of history have been middle-aged at most, and so have the military organizers of victories and the reorganizers of armies. The following summary, divided into periods, shows that in many cases the initiative which brings victory is associated with relative youthfulness.

1. *Antiquity.* Themistocles was 26 at Salamis, Leonidas 21 at Thermopylae, and Alexander 22 when he set out for the conquest of Asia. Hannibal was 30 at Cannae. Caesar was 42 when he began the conquest of Gaul, but Marius was past 60 when he struggled with Sulla for leadership in the war against Mithridates.<sup>1</sup>

2. *The Middle Ages.* Theoderic the Great fought his great battles and founded his empire before he was 40. Genghis Khan crossed the Great Wall of China at 54, conquered Peking at 60, and kept on fighting successfully until just before his death at 72. At Poitiers the Black Prince was 26, and Jeanne d'Arc was 17 at Orléans. The fact that the latter was something of a military "miracle" and was burned at the stake at 19 (something which does not happen to "regular" generals) may detract from her value as an example. The average age of the "fighting" Kings and Emperors of Medieval Germany up to the 16th century was 48.

3. *Europe in the 17th Century.* Gustavus Adolphus' victorious career terminated when he was only 38. Wallenstein was 51 when murdered. Turenne became Marshal of France when 33 and was killed in battle at 64. Condé was scarcely 22 at Rocroi when he beat the Spanish, up to then the best infantry in Europe. Cromwell, who took up soldiering late in life, was 45 at Marston Moor and 52 at Worcester.

4. *Europe in the 18th Century.* At Blenheim, Prince Eugene was 41 and Marlborough 54. Charles XII of Sweden was only 18 at Narva where he won, 27 at Poltava where he lost, and 36 when he was killed. The Maréchal de Saxe took Prague when 45. Frederick the Great was 29 at Mollwitz, the first battle of the three Silesian Wars, and 51 at the end of the Seven Years' War. Wolfe's successful career was terminated at Quebec at 33; Clive, the "military outsider," was 32 at Plassey.<sup>2</sup>

5. *The American Revolution.* Washington took over command at 43. The generals under him (with the exception of Isaac Putnam, who was 58 in 1776 and soon retired) were decidedly young. Arnold was

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<sup>1</sup>Marius possessed, as Plutarch writes, "an ill-timed ambition and madness for fame, which never grew old. Though now unwieldy in his person and obliged, on account of his age, to give up his share in the expeditions near home, he wanted the direction of foreign wars." Marius took up exercises with the Roman youth on the Field of Mars, a spectacle which moved some Romans to pity and others to derision.

<sup>2</sup>Aside from revolutionary periods high birth assisted generals in reaching important commands at a relatively early stage. The "born" youthful leader, however, was often assisted by an old aide. Schwerin, who was killed at Prague at the age of 73, won the battle of Mollwitz for the inexperienced Frederick.

born in 1728; Steuben in 1730; Schuyler in 1733; Gates in 1741; and Greene, their Benjamin and probably the best general after Washington himself, in 1741. In Lafayette, born in 1757, the type, if type it was, of the youthful high-born military leader of Absolutism transferred itself to the American scene.

6. *The French Revolution, Napoleon, and the Wars of Liberation.* Bonaparte was 27 at Arcole and 46 at Waterloo. To mention a few marshals' ages at the time of the battle which is considered "their own": Moreau, though not properly speaking a marshal, was 37 at Hohenlinden; Lannes, 31 at Montebello and 40 when killed at Aspern; Ney, 36 at Ulm; Davout, 36 at Auerstedt when Brunswick was 71; Bernadotte, 46 at Wagram.

By the time the French Army was half way through its glorious career, the leadership of the *Grande Armée* was still young. In August 1805, at the eve of Austerlitz, the youngest of its 141 general officers was 29; the oldest was 58. Their average age was 41, and more than one-fourth of them were between 32 and 37. The average of the colonels at that time was a little under 39; that of the chiefs of battalions  $39\frac{1}{2}$ ; that of the captains nearly 39; the lieutenants, many of them privates under the *ancien régime*, were often older than the officers of higher rank.

To examine the age of Napoleon's marshals in still another way, the average age at the time that they were made marshals was 44. Leaving aside two marshals who were created for political rather than military reasons, the average age was only 42. The most important among them were usually also the youngest—Davout, Marmont, Ney, Bernadotte, Lannes, Soult, Suchet. The Napoleonic wars brought out for the first time the phenomenon of the wearing out of military leaders. Napoleon put an end to the leisurely kind of warfare of the 18th century with its custom of going into winter quarters; campaigns were fast and frequent, the occasions for resting few and not regarded with favor by the Emperor. He knew how to reward his marshals materially, but he did not know how to rest them. Several were definitely war-tired by 1812 or 1813, and there were a few mental crack-ups, such as that of Junot, who died insane, and Berthier, who committed suicide.

On the side of the powers allied against Napoleon, Wellington was 40 at Talavera and 46 at Waterloo; Scharnhorst was 52 when he began the Prussian army reform and 58 when killed in 1813. Gneisenau, Blücher's chief of staff, was 46 when starting on "the Reform" and 53 in 1813. Even the Austrians, who liked their leadership old

except in desperate moments, had in Schwarzenberg, 42 in 1813, and Radetzky, his chief of staff at 37, one of the youngest leadership arrangements in their history, which in its worst periods abounds with old age.

7. *The 19th Century.* Down to 1861 there was a period of superannuation in military leadership. Raglan was 66 at the outbreak of the Crimean War; both he and St. Arnaud, who was 53, died of so-called natural causes during the war. Wrangel was 80 in the Danish War of 1864; Radetzky, 82 at Custoza and Novara; Winfield Scott, 75 at the outbreak of the American Civil War; Moltke, 66 in 1866. Without overlooking the military genius of Moltke, it should also be remembered that 1866 was a seven weeks' war and that the war of 1870-71, in which the Prussians enjoyed the advantages of planned initiative, was, comparatively speaking, a "restful" war, being divided into convenient campaigns with plenty of time for recuperation and recreation. The Duke of Cambridge was able to function, or so it was thought by Victoria and many others, as commander-in-chief of the British army until he was 76.

Compared with most of the European wars of that time, the American Civil War was long-drawn, strenuous, and hard on the military leaders. In 1861 the ages of men who were or who became Union and Confederate commanders were as follows: Grant, 39; Sherman, 41; Hooker, 47; Sheridan, 30; Banks, 45; Buell, 43; Burnside, 37; Ferrero, 30; Franklin, 38; Hunter, 59; McDowell, 43; Meade, 46; Ord, 43; George H. Thomas, 45; Robert E. Lee, 54; "Stonewall" Jackson, 37; A. P. Hill, 36; D. H. Hill, 40; Early, 45; A. S. Johnston, 58; Joseph E. Johnston, 54; Longstreet, 40; Forrest, 40; Morgan, 36; Stuart, 28; Kirby-Smith, 37; Leonidas Polk, 55. At Appomattox, Lee was 58, Grant was 43, and Sherman was 45. In May 1865 the commanders of corps and divisions under Sherman were: Howard, 34; Logan, 39; Hazen, 34; Davis, 37; Slocum, 37; Mower, 37. By the end of the Civil War, the average age of corps and divisional commanders was not much above 30.<sup>8</sup>

8. *The First World War, 1914-1918.* There was a tendency toward superannuation of military leadership after 1865 and 1871. Joffre was 62 in 1914, Moltke was 66, Kitchener was 64; among the later comers was Cadorna, 65 in 1915. The three leaders of the important right wing of the German army on the Western Front in 1914,

<sup>8</sup>B. H. Liddell Hart, *Defence of Britain* (New York, 1939), p. 351.



Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen, were all 68. It was considered thorough "rejuvenation" when Falkenhayn became Moltke's successor in September 1914 at the age of 55. Elderly German generals such as Hindenburg, 67, were typically harnessed together with much younger chiefs of staff, such as Ludendorff, 49, Seeckt, 48, Hoffmann, 45, and Groener, 37. Much the same arrangement prevailed in France, where Joffre, Foch, Castelnau (all aged 63 in 1914), Pétain, Nivelle, and Sarrail (all 58) had chiefs of staff of the age-group to which Debeney, 50, Weygand, 47, and Gamelin, 42, belonged.

By comparison, the generals of the B. E. F. were not over-age in 1914. Sir John French was nearly 62 at the beginning of the war, but his successor, Haig, was 53. The holders of the four top home commands in Britain (Haig, Grierson, Smith-Dorrien, and Plumer) averaged 55, which was none too low since Grierson collapsed and died before the outbreak of actual hostilities. General Sir Archibald J. Murray, chief of staff to the B. E. F., was 54 in 1914, but the strain of the retreat soon told on him. The average age in August 1914 of the eight generals who eventually became army commanders (Haig, Smith-Dorrien, Plumer, Allenby, Monro, Rawlinson, Gough, and Byng) was 52.

The generals of the A. E. F. in Europe and the Far East were in their fifties. Pershing was 57 in 1917; so was Leonard Wood, his competitor. The age of the American generals in the field varied from 58 in the case of Henry Allen to 51 in the case of Harbord. Theodore Roosevelt was 59 when his offer to go to France with a division was turned down by Wilson—not entirely for political reasons it seems, for Roosevelt died very early in 1919. Pershing's five chiefs of section were: Nolan, 46; Fiske, 46; W. C. Connor, 44; Fox Connor, 43; and Moseley, 43. Frank R. McCoy, 43; MacArthur, 38; Foulis, 38; and Marshall, 36, are examples of Pershing's desire for young commanders in field and staff positions.

Irregular military leadership in the First World War was on the whole young. Pilsudski was born in 1867, both Trotsky and Stalin in 1879. General Monash in 1865, Colonel Lawrence of Arabia in 1888, and Tukhachevski in 1894.

9. *The Post-War Period, 1919-1939.* After 1918 the chiefs of staff frequently took over command, and for a time generalship was young. Weygand, Debeney, Gamelin in France; Seeckt, Schleicher, Fritsch in Germany; Devereux, Gathorne-Hardy, and Ironside in England all provided relatively youthful leadership. Most nations provided for

the compulsory retirement of generals and other ranks. This program ran counter to a tendency to make use as long as possible of general officers with war experience in high positions, preferably in important staff positions. Those governments whose military policies were looking back to the last war, rather than forward to the next, tended to retain generals of advancing years. In England in August 1937 the four first-class home commands were held by men fully seven years older on the average than in August 1914; at the same time the five commands of division were held by men averaging eleven months older than those of 1914. In the United States, the average age of major generals was 60 on November 11, 1936; that of brigadier-generals was 58½, with George C. Marshall as the youngest in age and rank. In England the retirement ages were drastically reduced in 1937 under the somewhat stormy secretaryship of Hore-Belisha, who laid down rules for retirement and actually applied them. Measures of a similar drastic character were not undertaken in the United States until September 4, 1941. At that time the age limits for various ranks were set as follows: major generals, 62; brigadier generals, 60; colonels, 55; lieutenant colonels, 52; majors, 47; captains, 42; first lieutenants, 35; second lieutenants, 30. The motive for the reduction was officially given as "purely a matter of vigor."

The French army in particular suffered from superannuation. At the beginning of the Second World War Gamelin was 67 and Weygand was 72. The *Conseil Supérieur de Guerre* was composed exclusively of *Généraux d'Armée* who no longer held field commands. They were practically on the retired list, but after the outbreak of war, they received command of armies and army-groups. Their average age in every case was very high. Without taking any responsibility for the absolute exactness of the following figures, the limits appear to have been: *général de brigade*, 59; *général de division*, 62; *général d'armée et membre du Conseil Supérieur de Guerre*, 65. Most of the *Conseil* were kept on active duty through enactment of special laws. Gamelin, Georges, Giraud, Huntziger, Requin, Corap, and Besson were all at least 63. Blanchard, Bilotte, and Bourret were not under 60.

That France was reluctant to lower substantially the age limits of higher officers even after the collapse of 1940 is revealed in the legislation which followed the defeat. The retirement age of army commanders was set at 62, corps or divisional commanders at 60, brigadier generals at 58, colonels at 56, lieutenant colonels at 54, majors at 52, and junior officers at 45. The same general age level was maintained

in naval commands. Higher commands in the air force retired six years younger on the average.<sup>4</sup>

The prominent generals of the *Wehrmacht* in 1939 were von Bock, 59; von Brauchitsch, 58; Keitel, 57; and von Reichenau, 55.<sup>5</sup> All of them were ten to fifteen years younger than Hindenburg in 1914 but slightly older than Ludendorff. The *Wehrmacht* has not been pedantic about retirement ages; if it is thought that a general is still young enough in his sixties, he is retained in the service. Runstedt is now 65 and Leeb is 67. Technicians like Guderian and Sperrle were 49 in 1939; Goering was 46.

There is little available information about the distribution of age groups among corps, divisional, and army commanders in the Red Army, but it would seem important to emphasize the fact that its rejuvenation is not one of age-groups so much as one that draws on all the strata of a newly organized society. In some respects the "purges" achieved a rejuvenation in the Red armies, at the head of which stand men still remote from ripe old age—Voroshilov, 46; Timoshenko, 47; and Zhukov, 48.

Though little exact information is at hand regarding the age of Japanese military leaders, the *seniores priores* principle—in fact, the whole *Genro* system—survived in military affairs as in other branches of government until the death of Prince Yamagata in February 1942 at over 80 years of age. Up to that time reforms long overdue had to wait, since younger army officers did not "wish to do anything likely to injure the feelings of those to whom they owed a debt of gratitude."<sup>6</sup> In due time, the hideous "youth movement" in the Japanese army arose with its program of assassinating civilian elders at home and invading foreign lands for the purposes of "co-prosperity." It was led by such active proponents of the "new order" in the East as General Yamashita, the conqueror of Singapore, born in 1885.

Though no definitive conclusions can be drawn at this stage of the present war about the ability of certain age groups of commanders to endure the strain of modern warfare, certain interesting observations can be made. Defeat condemned the French high-age hierarchy. The British have undertaken several *revivements* during the past year. Auchinleck, 54, was placed in command of the Middle East on July

<sup>4</sup>*La France Militaire*, August 7, 1940.

<sup>5</sup>The case of Reichenau is a peculiar one. He is said to have swum across the Vistula during the Polish campaign and to have carried his concept of the "strenuous life" to the point of an early death by apoplectic stroke in January 1942.

<sup>6</sup>Malcolm D. Kennedy, *Military Side of Japanese Life* (Boston, 1924), p. 109.

1, 1941; Ritchie, 44, was made commander of the 8th Army; Brooke, 58, became chief of the Imperial General Staff on December 25 with Nye, 45, as vice-chief. Reverses in the field have frequently been followed by transfers involving the appointment of younger commanders. For example, Air Marshal Brooke-Popham, 63, was replaced by Pownall, 54; McLeod, 56, was replaced in Burma by Hutton, 51. The victorious Germans made no important changes in command until December 1941. Not only has military victory favored the German officer, he has also been favored by the installment character of the war—two months of Poland in 1939; two months of Norway in 1940; three to four months in the Netherlands and France. Thus, there was always the possibility of rest between campaigns for even the military leader of fairly low rank. Only after prolonged campaigns in North Africa and in Russia has there appeared anything resembling fatigue or over-fatigue and tension. There are clear symptoms of it in the shifts which Hitler dramatically and "pathologically" announced in December 1941.

These observations raise the question of whether or not modern conditions of warfare make it imperative to rest or retire a successful general, either because victory has used him up, or because he should be spared for a later campaign. This would give him an opportunity to rest, to think, to prepare himself for a likely new theater of war. The case of General Wavell's transfer to India at the age of 58 on July 1, 1941, may be an unintentional example in point. Such retirement should carry no derogatory implications even though the general public may not at once understand the honorable and thoroughly rational motives of the act. The public should be made aware of the strain imposed on army commanders by modern war methods. The thoroughgoing Germans lay special emphasis on the problem of fatigue of the high command. Rules have elaborated to show commanders and medical officers how weariness can be avoided. Ludendorff's nervous breakdown in 1918 was due to overstrain and fatigue, while Foch's successes in 1918 were at least partly due to a rest of eighteen months during a period of temporary retirement. Modern war makes tremendous demands on the mental "elasticity" of commanders, and diminishing elasticity is closely linked to advancing age.



# THE PRINCETON PROGRAM OF MILITARY STUDIES

BY EDWARD MEAD EARLE

It is a striking paradox that, although military defense has been a perennial problem of the American people, there has been until recently no conscious, integrated, and continuous study of military security as a fundamental problem of government and society. It is another paradox that, although we live in a warlike world, have been participants in large-scale wars, and are now engaged in a vast inter-continental war, there has been almost no systematic consideration by American scholars of the rôle of war in human affairs. This is despite the transparent truth, however deplorable, that war is a recurrent phenomenon which from time to time transcends all other human activity. As democracy is based upon belief in the power of public opinion and other moral sanctions, we have understandably given great weight to the problem of collective security, frequently at the cost of foregoing essential precautionary measures of a military and naval character. Now it is necessary, without decreasing our interest in post-war problems of political and economic reorganization, to restore a balance as between such studies and studies of national power. Indeed, there can be no permanent security for us unless the nation and its statesmen understand the rôle which controlled and socially directed military force must plan in the maintenance of order and stability.

Political and social scientists have not heretofore concerned themselves seriously with problems of defense and strategy. American colleges and universities have, with only rare exceptions, avoided or ignored the man-sided problems of security. An examination of contemporary textbooks on politics, economics, history, geography, and international relations reveals that, at best, military affairs have been treated in a casual or incidental fashion.

Although writers on politics since the days of Aristotle and Plato have given some attention to military subjects, and although Machiavelli, Sir Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin, among others, have shown an acute understanding of the rôle of military power in statecraft, the treatment of national strategy throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been left, on the whole, to soldiers writing for soldiers rather than civilians

writing for civilians. Foreigners rather than Americans have had the fullest realization of the contributions to strategy and tactics of the American Civil War, and, until recently, it was Englishmen rather than Americans who wrote the outstanding biographies of certain of our military leaders. Few civilian societies actively interested themselves in national defense, except where their aims were those of the propagandist or the antiquarian.

The most successful professional writing on military and naval subjects has heretofore been done in the United States by men like Mahan and Upton, who were members of the armed forces. It is only recently that military criticism has become a feature of American journalism; military commentators are few in number, and not all of them possess an adequate knowledge of history, economics, psychology, and politics, nor should they be expected to possess such knowledge in a profession which, in general, calls for different skills. But the avidity with which military journalism is read is an indication of the potentialities which exist for more adequate treatises on war, written in accordance with the canons of scholarship.

In the past our apparent invulnerability, combined with the balance of political and economic forces in Europe and the Far East, made a coherent military policy discretionary rather than imperative. However, as the conditions of American security undergo fundamental change, it is essential to the national interest as well as to the cause of learning that social scientists assume a position of leadership and responsibility in the process of planning the national defense. Otherwise, we shall lose some of the values which it is essential to retain; and we shall, in the end, be the less rather than the more secure.

It is imperative that we return to an earlier tradition, which treated military problems as an inherent element in the science of government and politics, as well as a factor in a broader education. And in view of the integrated character of the modern world, they must now be regarded as one of the most important concerns of economics, geography, and social psychology as well. Rapidly changing military technologies and the shifting balance of power have compelled us to adopt new points of view regarding the place of the army, the navy, and the air force in the life of the nation. The grand strategy of American security demands that the foreign and military policies of the United States be formulated with reference not merely to our history, tradition, and aspirations but to the demands of an advancing, revolutionary, military technology as well.

The study of military affairs should not be regarded as an emergency matter, although the outbreak of war gives it added importance and urgency. What is required is a long-term program of research and teaching which will enable the United States in times of peace as well as in times of war to build up and utilize a body of expert knowledge essential to the formulation of public policy and to the understanding of military problems and potentials. A reserve of trained scholars who have devoted any considerable portion of their lives to problems of strategy would be of inestimable service to the nation now that the Army War College has been closed for the period of the emergency.

With these considerations in mind, a seminar in the military and foreign policies of the United States was established at the Institute for Advanced Study in the autumn of 1939. The seminar has included in its membership scholars both from the United States and from abroad and has benefited from the active cooperation of interested members of the faculty of Princeton University, whose writings on foreign policy and on naval and military affairs have achieved a nationwide reputation. It has been composed of students of history, economics, and political science whose major interest is the clarification of the several phases of national policy and a unified concept of Grand Strategy. The result is that there has been created in the Princeton community a *centre d'études militaires* which is not concerned with immediate technical military and naval problems but rather with broad questions of national strategy, military security, the elements of military and economic power, and the rôle of the United States in world politics.

The seminar has the important quality of continuity, although its personnel is constantly changing. This brings to the individual effort the benefit of previous group experience and lends a permanent character to what otherwise might be the transitory and incoordinate activity of the individual. As scholars who have participated in the projects of the seminar go back to their academic posts, they carry with them new concepts of national problems and international relations. The free interchange of ideas with other mature scholars, the emphasis upon qualitative work, the critical and introspective character of seminar discussions, the absence of departmentalization—these and other factors will, it is believed, contribute to real and long-term influences on academic thinking and research in the social sciences.

Among the subjects which have received detailed consideration in the discussions of the seminar (which meets ordinarily once a week for two hours throughout the academic year) are the following: the ele-

ments of sea power and the balance of power in Europe and the Far East, not only as a phenomenon in itself, but as a factor in the defense of the United States; the "military potential"—that is to say, the basic factors in military strength; war as a social and economic institution; strategic factors in the foreign policies of the Great Powers, including the United States; the impact of war upon the economic and social structure; the meaning of terms like "security," "strategy," "defense," and "sea power," which are commonly used but not always with exactitude; *Wehrwirtschaft* and economic warfare; the spread of geo-political doctrines in Europe, especially since 1919; changing power relationships in the Atlantic area and in the Pacific; the historical origins and development of the American doctrine of isolationism and non-entanglement; the European background of early American foreign policy; theories and practice of diplomacy; the rôle of the army in a democratic society; comparative methods of recruitment and discipline of military personnel; the concept of hemispheric defense and hemispheric solidarity; the historical development of American military policy; non-political—especially psychological—aspects of warfare.

The study of the foregoing has not been viewed as an examination of isolated and unrelated topics but rather has been conducted with a view to a single unifying objective: American security, its basic assumptions, its changing conditions, and its present imperatives. As the strategic factor has heretofore been underemphasized or, indeed, largely overlooked by scholars in the treatment of American foreign relations, a study of American security involves among other things new problems in historical interpretation.

The members of the seminar have likewise been concerned with the relation of their studies to American education and American public opinion, because they believe that during a "total war" basic research has a special relation to theoretical politics. They have collaborated with a group of scholars at Columbia University in the preparation of a syllabus which was completed during the summer of 1940 and published in January 1941.<sup>1</sup> They are likewise engaged in editing a book of readings to be used in connection with the syllabus and they have in preparation, in collaboration with the American Military Institute, a scholarly bibliography on war and defense. Dr. Werner B. Ellinger

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<sup>1</sup>Grayson Kirk and Richard P. Stebbins, eds., *War and National Policy: A Syllabus* (New York Farrar and Rinehart).



(former bibliographical assistant to the seminar and now on the staff of the Library of Congress) has compiled a selected analytical bibliography of books and periodical articles on "Problems of Sea Power in the Pacific," covering the period 1936 to 1941. This bibliography with critical annotations by Dr. Herbert Rosinski (member of the seminar in 1940-41) will soon be available. A tentative bibliography on "Modern War—Its Economic and Social Aspects" has been completed and is now being distributed to a selected list of teachers of international relations. Members of the seminar have assisted scholars in several American universities in the organization of courses in military affairs, and in some cases have been appointed to academic posts for the specific purpose of conducting such courses. The personnel of the current seminar, as well as past members, are contributing in every way they can to the present military effort of the United States, sometimes on their own initiative and not infrequently at the request of civilian or military officials. It is not unfair to say also that, by means of their writings for professional and non-professional journals, the members of the group have contributed to an understanding of the fundamental issues of the present crisis.

It is hoped that the facilities of the Princeton community for the study of military affairs will be steadily improved. Already substantial progress has been made, through collaboration of the librarians of the Institute for Advanced Study and of Princeton University, in building up a valuable collection of published works, manuscripts, and archives dealing with naval affairs, military history, American foreign relations, and power politics. Although, for the immediate present, funds are available for the purchase of most current publications, there is still much work to be done in acquiring books, periodicals, and official records long since out of print.

Although military studies have been the neglected stepchild of American scholarship in the past, the gravity of the perils now confronting our nation should assure a more intelligent concern for them in the future. There are encouraging signs that competent scholars, working principally as individuals in various universities, have come to recognize and assume their responsibilities in the sphere of military problems. Mention can be made in passing of only a few: Professors Lindsay Rogers of Columbia, Pendleton Herring of Harvard, Ralph Gabriel and Nicholas Spyckman of Yale, and Hugh M. Cole of Chicago. In the past year several colleges and universities have inaugurated formal courses in military studies. These are certain to increase

during the present war and should provide a sound basis for future development.

It is imperative, for example, that scholars and statesmen place appropriate emphasis upon strategic factors in the formulation of armistice and peace terms, as well as upon the rôle which socially controlled military force must play in any stable world order. Professor Douglas Johnson, the eminent geographer of Columbia University, has recently demonstrated that popular misconceptions concerning the rôle of force in the maintenance of peace were a major factor in allowing the totalitarian states to bring us to the verge of ruin.<sup>2</sup> Popular and official indifference to, or ignorance of, the demands of strategy account, in large part, for our present plight in the Pacific: our acquisition of the Philippines and Guam in 1898, without the islands (the Carolines, Marianas and Marshalls) which were essential to the defense of the former; our failure in 1914 and again in 1919 to prevent Japanese acquisition of the archipelago approaches to the Far East; our unwillingness to fortify the Philippines and Guam while Japan was turning the mandated islands into submarine bases and "permanent aircraft carriers"—in fact, our tragic inability to formulate a Far Eastern policy which was capable of military sanctions when necessary. After victory over Japan it is imperative that we make up our minds whether we are going to get out of the Far East or whether we are going to take those portentous measures, military and political, which will assure our position in the western Pacific. In other words, there must be reasonable coincidence between our diplomatic and our strategic commitments and policies. Shibboleths like "isolation," "no entangling alliances," and "hemispheric defense" must be subjected to the most careful scrutiny to determine their relevance to the harsh conditions of the modern world. Economic *laissez-faire* which permits us to arm our enemies and—almost to the moment they attack us—furnish them with the sinews of war must be recognized for the insanity it has proved to be. War, or warlike intentions, by anyone, anywhere, must be the concern of everyone, everywhere. "Remember Pearl Harbor" must be not a slogan of revenge but a reminder that eternal vigilance is the price of security and liberty. No peace can last which is not, in truth, "indivisible" and which is not based upon determined and forceful repression of lawlessness and aggression, immediate or threatened.

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<sup>2</sup>"The Next Armistice—and After," *International Conciliation*, no. 375 (December 1941), pp. 715-20.

# HOW STRONG IS JAPAN?<sup>1</sup>

BY KURT BLOCH

Japan, by her treacherous attacks on Hawaii, the Philippines, and Malaya, has made a last desperate effort to escape from the consequences of her four-year war in China. By taking the offensive she has gained important initial successes and made the task of the nations resisting her vastly more difficult. Her success, like that of Germany, demonstrates how dangerous and erroneous it is for us to estimate an enemy's fighting power purely in terms of economic analysis. Nevertheless it is equally misleading to ignore the economic factors, especially in the case of a nation like Japan so basically deficient in the industrial resources of modern war and already badly strained by her struggle in China and by the cutting off of much of her essential external trade. Despite her initial victories Japan (far more than Germany) will now increasingly feel the strangulating effects of both internal and external economic pressure.

The problem of Japan's "economic strength" formed a favorite topic of Japanese economists during the years 1938 and 1939. Subsequently, it lost its attractiveness. This literary development reflects rather faithfully a course of economic events which has not as yet formed the subject of extensive analysis in Japan or abroad. One of the reasons for this omission is a growing scarcity of economic data. A thickening fog of secretiveness has descended upon the world's and Japan's store of official and private statistics. Accordingly, the economic analyst is now forced to rely, to an ever increasing extent, upon symptoms of the Japanese economic process rather than upon the customary series of statistical data. This requires interpretation which, since it must necessarily be based on hypothesis, can only be proven conclusively by the future course of events.

The customary interpretation of Japanese economic developments contemplates recent Japanese history as a continuation of pre-war developments. Yet, there can be no doubt that during the first year of the Sino-Japanese war decisive changes occurred in Japan's social life, changes which constituted a break in rather than a continuation of the

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<sup>1</sup>Through the kindness of Dr. Bloch and the Institute of Pacific Relations we are able to reprint in this revised and abridged form his timely and important article "Guns and Butter in Japan" which appeared in the December 1941 issue of *Pacific Affairs*. (Ed.)

previous economic history of Japan. All these changes pointed in one direction—Japan attempted to substitute “guns” for “butter.”

In this respect, Japanese war economy did not differ from the war or defense economy of other nations. However, under the peculiar conditions of Japan, and owing to the relatively long duration of the Japanese war effort, certain aspects of the “guns-for-butter” economy have become more apparent in the Far Eastern island empire than in other areas of the world. In Japan, as elsewhere, the problem of “guns” for “butter” arose only after full employment had been reached. But Japan differed from other countries in that her economy was in a state of virtually full employment at the very time that the Sino-Japanese war began. Therefore, the newly-emphasized preference for guns could be translated into economic reality in 1937 only through restrictions of “butter” consumption at the very start. Moreover, while the preference for guns required a general increase of production, the cause of this preference, *i.e.*, the Sino-Japanese war, reduced the man-power basis of Japan’s total production. There was no period of grace during which, on the basis of depression, unemployment and peace, Japan’s economic life could be adapted to the requirements of war.<sup>2</sup>

Possibly still more important were the structural differences between Japanese and Western societies. The bulk of Japanese industrialization had been directed to the development of export markets. Even the output of industrial equipment goods largely served the needs of Japanese export industries. The pre-war development of heavy industries had served in the ’thirties principally to replace such imports as had, during the ’twenties, been paid for with the proceeds of silk exports and foreign loans, rather than to supply the needs of a growing domestic market. While “real” national income increased from 1932-1937, its growth was rather slow. Nor did it reach the point where an increasing consumers’ demand for a widening range of durable con-

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<sup>2</sup>This statement may be doubted by those who believe that the shift from light to heavy industries, in the deflation period of 1932-1937, was principally due to military motives and served military ends. But any detailed analysis of this period will show that this transition could be fully explained in economic terms, and so-called rearmament played a very minor rôle. Most of the investment in the so-called heavy industries resulted from the relative cost advantages gained by the depreciation of the Japanese yen, which was not followed by a corresponding increase in prices and wages. Accordingly, Japan was able to initiate the development of industries which, on the previous parity of the Japanese and international price levels, would have been unprofitable. The same price and cost factors accounted for the Japanese export boom from 1932 to 1937. The very volume of the industrial development in pre-war Japan, during the deflation period from 1932 on, belies the thesis according to which economic militarization is said to have been the prime mover of Japan’s industrial progress. Even in 1936, *e. g.*, ordnance production in private factories (not including airplanes) was only about 50 million yen worth.



sumers' goods supplied the basis for mechanized mass production. To a large extent, Japanese industrialization consisted in a skillful and profitable adaptation of native man-power to the output of manufactured goods, with mechanization lagging behind.<sup>3</sup> As the general rise in Japanese labor productivity had been relatively slow and there had been little change in the Japanese standard of living, there was comparatively little "butter" ready for conversion into "guns" when Japan's war economy was organized.

Owing to the limitations imposed by Japan's economic status, only a seemingly low proportion of Japan's national income could be diverted for military purposes. The available data, though incomplete, indicate that, after four years of war economy, total direct defense expenditure in Japan could not be raised beyond one-fourth of the national income. This figure compares unfavorably with the relative weight of defense expenditure in the national incomes of Britain, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Even in the United States, as of September 1941, after only one year of its defense effort, defense expenditure is close to 20 per cent of the national income, and likely to reach 25 per cent early in 1942.

From this relatively low proportion Japanese economists have concluded that Japan was very far from having reached the limits of an all-out effort. Actually, however, the extent of Japan's war effort indicates the limit beyond which her economic system cannot be geared for war. All the available evidence points to the fact that the level of "real"—as opposed to "nominal," namely monetary—expenditure for defense purposes, has been stabilized since 1939, with serious risk of a downward trend in 1941 and subsequent years.

In this respect Japan is probably no longer so unique as appeared a year ago. Yet Japan would still seem to be the most interesting living experiment in the now world-wide laboratory of modern war economy, insofar as it has clearly demonstrated the cyclical character of economic life, following upon the choice of "guns for butter." To the "man on the street" it may appear obvious that privations imposed on the civilian population of a country can be utilized for an increase of defense production, if the defense effort is managed efficiently and intelligently. However, in this way of thinking, the spheres of production and consumption are subjected to an abstract and unrealistic separation which

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<sup>3</sup>For example, Japan's output of electrical power roughly equals the Canadian output, although Japan's population is five times as large as that of Canada.

does not apply in reality. A nation's standards of consumption and production are closely related and generally interdependent. For example, stimulants like caffeine and nicotine are obviously "luxuries" from any purely physiological point of view; yet no modern society where the bulk of the working population has come to depend upon such stimulants, can expect without caffeine and nicotine to operate with the same efficiency and output as formerly achieved with their aid. The process by which financial resources, labor, raw materials and equipment formerly utilized for civilian supply, are diverted into a national defense effort, carries with it the serious risk of cutting civilian standards below the level needed for the maintenance of production.

The level of consumption required for the maintenance of maximum production differs from nation to nation. Moreover, for each individual nation, this level is not merely determined by purely economic factors. In period of war or near-war the effects of the latter may be modified or accentuated somewhat by the trend of national "morale."

In the case of Japan, the level of consumption began to decline in 1938, and dropped precipitously in 1939. For the end of 1940, Japanese economists<sup>4</sup> have assumed that the Japanese standard of living had fallen by 40 per cent from the level reached in 1936. Foreign observers affirm that present Japanese standards are lower than those reached before the outbreak of the First World War. As for the movement of production, there are no reliable data available. But there can be little doubt that agricultural production has been on the downgrade ever since 1937. The same is true of fishing and forestry. Industrial and mining production rose until the autumn of 1939. For the last two years, however, industrial production has been declining, and this decline continues to the present, even though its statistical evidence has been suppressed under censorship rules.

Within this general framework a number of significant developments have taken place. Possibly the most important effects of the general limitations imposed upon Japanese war economy have been realized in Japanese war finance. Consistently, Japan's economic authorities have sought to escape from these material limits by increasing the monetary purchasing power allotted to the fighting services. This was done in Japan's expanding budget and principally through supplying the fighting services with the funds procured by government borrowing. This process naturally produced inflation, especially as gov-

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<sup>4</sup>Cf. Seichi Kojima, quoted in the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 16, 1941.

ernment borrowing was possible only through inflation of currency and bank credit. The result was, therefore, not the intended diversion of a larger share of Japan's annual product to the defense effort, but its inflationary opposite. The nominal (monetary) size of Japan's national income was determined by the amount spent for war and rearmament, paralleling its increase in a proportion of roughly four to one. Thus, in 1939 war and rearmament expenditure of about 6.5 billion yen corresponded to a national income of about 25.5 billion yen, and in 1940 war and rearmament expenditure of 7.5 to 8 billion yen produced a national income of about 30 billion yen.<sup>5</sup> But nearly all the available data suggest that the "real" annual output of armaments, as distinct from the "nominal" expenditure of money, reached its peak in 1939 and could not be increased significantly since.

This inflationary process produced great uneasiness in Japan, as the price level rose rather sharply. Accordingly, Japan adopted nearly all possible forms of price control including, in October 1939, the Japanese version of the Baruch plan.<sup>6</sup> However, these measures proved largely ineffective.<sup>7</sup> Law-breaking grew so extensive that it was definitely harmful to national morale. The gap separating legal maximum and illegal black market prices was so great that it reflected upon the competence of the national authorities.

Still more important was the failure of Japanese control measures to stabilize wages. The Japanese Baruch plan applied to wages as well as to prices. However, the Japanese labor market has nearly always been a "free" market, trade unions playing a minor part and collective bargaining being almost unknown. Accordingly, there was no stabilized employer-employee relationship, nor did any competent authority exist which could control the labor market and its wage stipulations. Therefore, all attempts at wage regulation and stabilization failed completely. The only partial exception was an attempt to freeze juvenile wages,

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<sup>5</sup>Japan's national income for 1940 has been placed at 25.5 billion yen by J. Ahlers in various comments published in the *China Weekly Review* and by the *London Times*, and at 25.6 billion yen by The Chinese Council for Economic Research [*Japan's Economy Under War Strain* (Washington, 1941), p. 8]. The higher estimate has recently been confirmed in press dispatches from Tokyo. Moreover, the assumption of a lower figure cannot be reconciled with the phenomenon of continuous currency inflation.

<sup>6</sup>By ordinances issued in October, 1939, prices, wages and rents were frozen on their September 18, 1939, level, in accordance with the program of a universal price ceiling repeatedly advocated in the United States by B. M. Baruch.

<sup>7</sup>The best that could truly be said of them would seem to be that they reduced somewhat the full impact of continuous currency inflation; the growth of illegal markets, which could not be stopped, produced a retrogressive development in the technique of payments; cash payments were substituted for cheque payments (which could be traced and serve as documentary evidence of law-breaking), thus slowing down the velocity of monetary circulation.

which succeeded at least in slowing down the rate of increase. In the free Japanese labor market, however, the reaction to this relative success of the government's policies was a shrinkage of supply. Juvenile employment in Japanese industries grew stagnant and ceased to increase. The upward wage movement meant that the "frozen" or "ceilinged" prices became unreasonable and subject to continuous revision. At present, there are nearly 50,000 price stipulations by the national authorities of Japan, apart from local price stipulations which of course are much more numerous.

Despite its failure, the attempt to freeze wages and prices could not be abandoned, as no government dared admit its inability to carry through established policy, and the public clamored for protection. There was only one way out of the price-fixing difficulties. This was to grant government subsidies in lieu of the proceeds of increased prices, to assist producers who could not go on paying rising wages and charging stable prices. The last step along this road was recently taken, when the government agreed to pay subsidies amounting to 7 yen per koku for rice sold by Japanese peasants and landlords, raising their revenue from 43 yen to 50 yen per koku. Clearly a complete vicious circle has been established. To finance war and rearmament, the government practices inflation; through price control, it attempts to curb the evidence of inflation; unable to enforce this control effectively, and virtually powerless in the labor market, the government is forced to admit that its own maximum prices are too low; it therefore pays subsidies to the producers; but to pay such subsidies, the government must borrow additional funds which can be secured only by additional currency inflation.

Discussions of the Japanese war potential have generally stressed that Japan was dependent upon foreign countries for large and important parts of its supply of such raw materials and finished products as are indispensable in modern war. Japanese wartime economic policy aimed not only at preserving sufficient foreign exchange to buy such materials in the future, but also at ending or at least reducing Japanese dependence upon such foreign supplies. Accordingly, Japan's wartime industrial policies were aimed not only at expending the production of armaments but also the output of such essential materials as were purchased abroad. The result was the installation of numerous industrial establishments built primarily to replace imports. This attempt to reach self-sufficiency was spread over very large industrial sectors of Japan. It also included the so-called "yen bloc" territory of



Manchuria and North China. The production resulting from this effort failed to reach expectations. With few exceptions, the degree of Japanese dependence on overseas supplies has not significantly been changed. At the same time the effort required large amounts of imported materials which would not have been needed otherwise. Japan's authorities banned importation of goods vitally needed to preserve a level of consumption indispensable for the maintenance of production; yet they granted import permits needed to carry through an expansion of industrial productivity which ultimately could not be achieved. Thus Japan's authorities were all too willing to follow foreign example and "commonsense," and unwilling to adapt their policies to the very subsistence needs of the Japanese people, *i.e.*, if these subsistence needs are understood not as a physiological minimum (although even this minimum may not have been safeguarded) but as the minimum required for the mere maintenance rather than the expansion of production.

Mistaken as this policy was in conception and in many details, it was partly induced by Japanese confidence in the future. Japan's leaders assumed that what access they had always been granted to foreign supplies would be available to them indefinitely. In this confidence, they felt confirmed when even the outbreak of war in Europe failed seriously to disturb the movement of supplies to Japan. Paradoxically, however, the great military successes of Japan's ally, Germany, in the summer of 1940, shook to its very foundation Japan's war economy. Nazi victories produced the United States defense program and the increased need for and destruction of British, Allied and neutral shipping space. These results of Germany's conquest of France combined gradually to reduce the flow of foreign supplies to Japan. A net of export prohibitions in British territory and in the United States slowly tightened an economic blockade around Japan. Although this blockade was incidental to, rather than the objective of, these restrictive measures, it was nonetheless real. It culminated in the "economic sanctions" taken in response to Japan's occupation of southern Indo-China. Japan's dream of an autarchic future now gave way to a sad disappointment in the present. What resources Japan was able to get, through the first four years of war, she had largely wasted in unprofitable and half-completed investments. Gold and foreign exchange which she had husbanded for so long, at the expense of her people's well-being and productivity, had largely lost their usefulness. The process of economic decay, slow-moving for nearly two years, threatened to quicken. Japan was forced to seek a way out of her economic difficulties. As political and military

considerations added their weight to the pressure of economic developments, Japan remembered a conveniently unanswered note of December 1938<sup>8</sup> and resumed negotiations with the United States, ostensibly for a peaceful settlement.

Moreover, political and military factors were directly affected by the results of Japan's economic experience. Space does not permit an elaboration on more than two aspects of this interrelationship of economic, military, and political considerations.

One of the basic assumptions underlying Japan's diplomacy and war economy was its self-sufficiency in food. Actually the empire of pre-war Japan tended, on balance, to be a food exporting rather than a food deficit country. Under the impact of war, however, agricultural production in Japan declined, partly because of the labor shortage, partly because import restrictions reduced the supply of phosphate fertilizers, partly because the decline of the annual fish catch cut into the supply of organic fertilizer. For the last two years, Japan has been the world's largest importer of rice. The bulk of this foreign rice is imported from the three rice surplus countries of Southeastern Asia. This means that Japanese food deficiency has created a definite Japanese interest in the maintenance of peaceful commerce in the South China Sea through which her rice ships must pass. If geography, rather than political affiliation is taken into account and Formosa included in the southern area from which Japan is drawing rice now, at least half the rice supply of Japan's cities is now dependent upon the southern shipping lanes.

On the other hand, however, Japan's defense industries have developed along the lines of least resistance. Accordingly, the emphasis on Japan's rearmament has been placed upon the supply of weapons which Japanese industry could produce most easily. Motorized army equipment and military airplanes, however, require a high a degree of technological development. While Japan has been able with foreign aid to produce such modern military equipment, its output is still severely limited by the quantitative and qualitative backwardness of Japan's machine tool industry. Accordingly, Japan's current output

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<sup>8</sup>This note, reserving "all rights of the United States as they exist" and withholding "assent to any impairment of any of those rights," also states: "The Government of the United States has . . . always been prepared, and is now, to give due and ample consideration to any proposals based on justice and reason which envisage the resolving of problems in a manner duly considerate of the rights and obligations of all parties directly concerned by processes of free negotiation and new commitment by and among all the parties so concerned. There has been and there continues to be opportunity for the Japanese Government to put forward such proposals. This Government . . . continues to be willing to discuss such proposals, if and when put forward, with representatives of the other Powers, including Japan and China . . . at whatever time and in whatever place may be commonly agreed upon." (Department of State, *Press Releases*, December 31, 1938, pp. 490 ff.)


of military training and combat airplanes has been estimated at little more than 250 airplanes per month, about one-seventh of this country's present output, and probably less than the combined Canadian and Australian output.

Japan's claims to be a first-class world power used to rest on the strength of her navy. However, in the vital task of protecting Japan's rice supply coming through the "narrow" South China Sea, the Japanese Navy is now faced with potentially hostile air power, shore-based and probably superior to what aerial protection the Japanese Navy could enjoy. Thus technological backwardness and decay of agricultural production have fatefully combined to face Japan with a serious threat to her southern life-line, which has turned out to be not a mere argument for political aggradizement but a very real life-line which must be safeguarded, if the Japanese people are to be fed.

In the military and political consolidation of Southeastern Asia air power has played a decisive part in giving defensive unity to the whole region. Simultaneously, however, air power challenged Japan's naval power in this area, at the very time that the results of Japan's economic policy dangerously extended the wartime tasks of the Japanese Navy. Thus, the gyrations of Japanese diplomacy in the autumn of 1941 were rooted in the economic consequences of Japan's ill-fated attempt to organize its war economy along the expansive lines demanded by the ambitions of Japanese imperialism.

By a daring coup against the United States Pacific fleet—which would have been deemed impossible before it was undertaken with a large measure of success—Japan tried to sever the trans-Pacific life-lines of the territories in Southeastern Asia in which the United States and the British Empire hold vital interests. Japan's attack against these territories was launched in the form of concerted raids which apparently succeeded in paralyzing at least temporarily a portion of the American-British-Dutch forces assembled in this area for operations against the Japanese "rice line" in the South China Sea. By these offensive operations Japan tried to cut the sea-lanes to the Far Eastern theater of war. In this way, Japan's leaders hope to prevent the combined industrial war potentials of the British Commonwealth and the United States from making their continuous contribution to the Far Eastern theater of war.





## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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There have been many changes among the officers and trustees of the INSTITUTE since the last issue of the journal. Vice Admiral William L. Rodgers, President since 1938, was forced to offer his resignation because of the state of his health. On December 15 the Board of Trustees elected Dean Robert G. Albion of Princeton University to fill this important position. Dr. Albion, who has been an active member of the INSTITUTE from its beginning and a Trustee since 1940, is the author of *Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy* (1926), *Introduction to Military History* (1929), and *The Rise of New York Port, 1815-60* (1939). As a token of appreciation for Admiral Rodgers' valuable services in the past, the Board of Trustees has elected him President Emeritus.

Dr. James Brown Scott, who has served as Vice-President during the past year, likewise found it necessary to relinquish his post. Major General Frank R. McCoy was elected his successor by the Board of Trustees at its annual meeting held in Princeton on February 21. General McCoy has been President of the Foreign Policy Association since 1939 and is the author of *Principles of Military Training* (1918).

And Captain Frederick P. Todd is in the Army—Air Staff Intelligence. Secretary of the society since 1935, founder and first editor of this journal, Captain Todd's enthusiastic and devoted service to the INSTITUTE will be missed greatly. The Board of Trustees elected Dr. Harold Sprout as the new Secretary on February 21, and he entered upon his duties immediately. Dr. Sprout, as the readers of his "Frontiers of Defense" in the last issue will remember, is Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University and co-author of *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (1939) and of *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922* (1941). His address is 2 Dickinson Hall, Princeton, New Jersey.

The terms of three members of the Board of Trustees—Hoffman Nickerson, Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, and Colonel John W. Wright—expired at the end of 1941, and two others found it necessary to resign—Admiral Rodgers and Colonel John R. M. Taylor. To fill these five vacancies the Board elected Dr. Ralph Henry Gabriel, Colonel Thomas M. Spaulding, Captain Todd, Dr. Alfred Vagts, and Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell.

The places of residence of the new officers mean a shift in the headquarters of the INSTITUTE. Whereas most of them have been in Washington since 1938, they will now be divided between Princeton and Washington. The President, Secretary, and Editor form one nucleus at Princeton, while the Provost, Treasurer, Managing Editor, and Librarian remain in Washington. An attempt is now being made to find a suitable place for the library in Washington, and it is hoped that an announcement concerning it can be made in the next issue.

There have also been some changes in the staff of MILITARY AFFAIRS. Major Paul W. Thompson of the Engineer Corps became an Associate Editor soon after the publication of the last issue. Major Thompson is the author of *Modern Battle: Units in Action in the Second World War* (1941). Dr. Richard P. Stebbins, our present book review editor, has announced that the pressure of his official duties with the Office of the Coordinator of Information will prevent his continuing in that capacity after the Summer issue. Aaron Bell, formerly of the University of Chicago and the Chicago Institute for Military Studies, joins the staff as Associate Editor with this issue and will be responsible for book reviews and notes beginning with the Fall issue. Mr. Bell was one of the assistant editors of *Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War*, recently published by the Committee for National Morale.

The changes in paper and format to be seen in this issue have been made in an attempt to save paper and, at the same time, to make the journal more readable. By changing from offset to letterpress printing we believe that we can give you a better looking magazine, and reprints will be considerably less expensive for those contributors who wish to obtain them. It is planned to publish the annual index hereafter as part of the Winter issue. The title-page and table of contents will continue to be issued separately but will be distributed with the

Winter issue so that those who wish to bind the volume may do so promptly.

There will be no change in the policy of the magazine other than that the emphasis for the present, as indicated in our editorial, will be on current problems. This means, for example, that the publication of articles and notes of primarily historical or antiquarian interest will have to be delayed until a more auspicious time. And speaking of delays, the editor in charge of the Recent Periodical Literature section, Robert G. Ballentine, wishes to announce that the reason for the appearance of so many foreign titles which are not "recent" is that the foreign periodicals are coming in very late. It has seemed better to include them tardily than to ignore them completely.

The annual joint session of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE and the American Historical Association was held in Chicago on December 30. About two hundred persons attended the meeting, and the papers read provoked lively discussion. Professor Allan Wescott's presentation, "American Naval Policy since Mahan," created a particularly profound impression on the audience. "The old segregation of land, sea, and air warfare is tending to break down," he said. "In forming military or naval policy, what is needed is not separate land, sea, and air policies, each tugging at the nation's energies and purse strings, but a sound comprehensive policy, which will provide the best weapons for our needs, whatever those weapons may be." Professor Wescott suggested a staff, or military council, that "would necessarily include military, political, and industrial representation. . . . Ideally, it should be capable of the rapid shifts of policy which crisis may demand."

The American Political Science Association and the American Society for Public Administration held their annual meeting at the same time in New York. Many of the topics discussed were of vital importance to the study of military affairs. A round table meeting led by Professor E. Pendleton Herring on "Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy," another on "Administration of Food Production and Distribution in National Defense," and a third on "National Defense Administration" brought forth considerable discussion by officials and others responsible for these phases of our war effort. Other events of interest included a meeting on "War Financing," an address by Hanson W. Baldwin on "The War Today," and a session on "The Grand Strategy of National Defense."



The growing interest in military problems among the academic group is also apparent in the courses and lectures now being offered in a number of this country's institutions of higher learning. At Princeton and Dartmouth, for instance, courses in military geography, defense problems, and modern war strategy have been made a regular part of the curriculum. At the University of Minnesota a series of interpretive lectures on America and the war have been given during the winter and spring.

An *Alphabetical List of Federal World War Agencies, 1914-21* (124 pp.) will be issued by The National Archives in May and is to indicate the records of these agencies which are to be found in that depository. This publication is preliminary to a Handbook of Federal World War Agencies which will contain information concerning the organization, activities, and records of about 3,500 governmental units that participated in defense, wartime, or post-war activities. These and other finding media issued by The National Archives are in response to the research needs of present war agencies and are closely related to the problems discussed by Dr. Campbell on pages 63-68.

#### *Contributors to This Issue*


Dr. Lowell M. Pumphrey, who submitted his present article for publication shortly before entering the military service, was formerly an economist with the Bureau of Research and Statistics, Office of Production Management.

Dr. Alfred Vagts, the author of *A History of Militarism* (1937), has been a regular contributor to the journal. His last article, "Battle-Scenes and Picture-Politics," was published in the Summer 1941 issue.

Another member of the Board of Trustees who writes for us is Dr. Edward Mead Earle, Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study. Dr. Earle started and leads the seminar on American Military Policy described in the text of his article.

Dr. Kurt Bloch is Associate Editor of *Far Eastern Survey* and was formerly economic and financial advisor to the Chinese government.

Dr. Edward G. Campbell is Associate Archivist in the War Department Division of The National Archives. A previous article by him, "The United States Military Railroads, 1862-1865," appeared in the Summer 1938 issue, and he is the author of *The Reorganization of the American Railroad System, 1893-1900* (1938).



## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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*Grand Strategy*, by H. A. Sargeaunt and Geoffrey West. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1941. Pp. 246. \$2.00.)

The message of this readable little book is that military strategy by itself is not enough to win this or any war unless it is a part of a grand strategy which can somehow hitch the military machine to those forces which are making for a new and more efficient society. "The basis of grand strategy is the reciprocal relationship existing between war and the society in which war occurs."

The authors adduce a very neatly-drawn historical picture of the evolution of grand strategy. Starting with the Napoleonic era, they trace the successive transformations which brought both military success and social progress to those nations whose leaders had the vision to discover the latest and most effective type of grand strategy. They cite Napoleon's use of the nation in arms, a popular force with which he could smash the old professional armies; Wellington's "strategy of persistence," admirably suited to the new liberal political structure of Britain; the ability of Bismarck and Moltke to use the full resources of their nation; and, finally, the "synchronized wave attack" based on "timed planning" to which the victories of the German army in the present war are credited. And the answer to this is a new type of grand strategy, a "sandbag" defense in depth, which means, briefly, creating a technique of combined military action, economic policy, propaganda, and morale which will be able to blunt and absorb the wave attacks. Planning is not enough. Dunkirk, which is cited as a fore-runner of the new strategy of which the authors give only hints, was a miracle not of planning but of improvisation and morale.

This will be a disappointing book to students of military strategy, for it treats this subject only casually. To students of the problems of world organization, it offers only the rather dubious theory that in increased national efficiency (*i.e.*, better grand strategy) on the part of each nation lies the greatest hope for the eventual elimination of war

from the world. Somehow the Darwinian process of selection by combat is to be transformed into a process of peaceful competition. Students of history will be struck by its tendency to make simple things complex and complex things simple. The analysis of changing warfare in a changing world says little more than that the greatest generals of the last century and a half of human history have been men who put to good use new techniques made possible by the industrial and social revolution.

This is, none the less, a work which shows real imagination and an understanding of the "totalness" of war which many people have not yet grasped. Perhaps it is a bit too imaginative. After all, we are now trying to construct a comprehensive war policy, which requires descending from the terminology of "synchronized waves" and "sandbag defense" to something more concrete. But the lesson of the book is clear and well put: Those nations which would win the war, and, more important, win the peace, must find somewhere a new grand strategy, "a national [or, we might add, supra-national] organization which will nullify Nazism by making it obsolete."

JOHN C. CAMPBELL

*Council on Foreign Relations*

*Sea Power*, by Captain Russell Grenfell, R. N. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1941. Pp. 244. \$2.00.)

Captain Grenfell is an unreconstructed member of that group in the British navy once known as the "blue water" school. Whether one agrees with his thesis or not, he has ably restated the principles of two centuries of British strategy. England's greatness, the "blue water" school believes, has always been due to sea power, and the huge conscript armies of the European continent are completely foreign to her nature. No one power, Hitler once argued in *Mein Kampf*, can be supreme on both land and sea; if Germany must concentrate on the land, Britain is irrevocably committed to the sea. The centuries of experience which were the hard core of Victorian policy had proved again and again that there "was no need to attack the enemy's armies on land. If they could not get across the Channel, it did not matter how numerous they were on the other side." The British army was simply a projectile to be fired by the British navy against exposed portions of the enemy's territories or to hasten the collapse of a tottering continental empire. Though this dependence on sea power can never insure a short war, it is extraordinarily economical of the only things really

worth fighting for, "the lives of British men" and British social institutions. The great land "victory" of 1918 weakened both the Empire and its institutions almost irreparably.

Though Captain Grenfell's historical ideas are sound enough, his success in proving that Britain can now withstand all continental assaults indefinitely is another question. The crux of that problem is the importance of air power, which he assumes simply reenforces Britain's defensive position. While the argument from Dunkirk may well be that adequate air power combines with sea power to make invasion as impracticable as ever, he never really meets the question of the long range bomber's part in industrial disorganization and commercial warfare. It has yet to be proved that an undisturbed Germany would not slowly suffocate England by long range bombing from the vast circle from Brest to Norway or that Britain could keep alive at all without American help.

Whether one agrees with the author or not, this brilliant book is at least a striking testimony to British political maturity. In spite of his opposition to almost everything Churchill stands for, from his military doctrines to his ideas of collective security, Captain Grenfell has never been branded either a Copperhead or a Nazi. Would that the discussion of fundamental American strategy had taken place in as clean an atmosphere, or that our own isolationists had stated their case as sharply and brilliantly.

THEODORE ROPP

Duke University

*The Economic Consequences of the Second World War*, by Lewis L. Lorwin. (New York: Random House. 1941. Pp. 510. \$3.00.)

The title of this book is doubly unfortunate. Apparently an attempt has been made to trade on the title of John Maynard Keynes' *Economic Consequences of the Peace*; but Mr. Keynes had a peace from which he derived his consequences, while Mr. Lorwin's consequences are still very much in the making. In the second place, the book is as much a catalogue of hopes and fears and exhortations as an analysis of the economic results of the present conflict.

The book is divided into five parts, of which two describe the political and economic theory and practice of the Nazi and democratic regimes. In the third part, "Consequences of a Nazi Victory," Mr. Lorwin is able to provide an interesting and lifelike account of Nazi plans for Europe since the German leaders have been vocal, specific,



and unanimous. It is clearly shown that Europe is not intended to become one great free trade area, for the Germans then would find it difficult to maintain a privileged position. The succeeding section on "Consequences of a Democratic Victory" presents no comparably organized plan. There are many voices suggesting this or that type of political federation or economic system; but, apart from the carefully vague "Atlantic Charter," there are no official directives.

Unless the Nazis win, therefore, Mr. Lorwin's consequences boil down to a list of alternative plans. He recognizes this, apparently, for in the final section he comes forth with an alternative of his own which he saddles with the title "A New 'Fourteen Points.'" These include the assurance of democratic freedoms and government, world-wide economic planning, and (No. 14 instead of No. 1) "The democratization of diplomacy and of international organization." It is remarkable that the plan does not even mention collective security, which was well described by Señor Cano, Delegate of Colombia at the Assembly of the League of Nations, in 1938 as "the single realistic solution which it is possibly to apply to the problem of peace."

BRYCE WOOD

*Columbia University*

*The Economics of American Defense*, by Seymour E. Harris. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 350. \$3.50.)

Writing books on topical problems today is a thankless undertaking. Events are moving so swiftly that even well-planned and scholarly studies cannot possibly keep up with them. Professor Harris completed his thorough and stimulating book in August 1941, and, although much water has gone over the dam since that time, many sections will be of durable value. There has been a definite scarcity of studies on the general economic aspects of modern warfare. A. C. Pigou's *Political Economy of War*, in its main parts, is over twenty years old, and Mendershausen's *Economics of War* is primarily a textbook.

Dr. Harris covers an enormous ground. While the bulk of his study is devoted to the defense economy of the United States, substantial sections deal with British experiences and international economic problems. The first part surveys the American economy of the New Deal period up to 1940, with ample statistical material on national production, the labor market, the balance of payments, *etc.* The author emphasizes that it was easier to mobilize unused resources than to divert

employed resources from non-essential industries and that the raising and allocation of defense funds is only a device for mobilizing real resources.

The second part analyzes the industrial defense potential of the United States, particularly its manufacturing output and industrial capacity. Dr. Harris points out that in wartime "regimentation, patriotism, or other non-economic factors may cause a reduction in the amount of voluntary idleness, with the result that the difference between technical and economic capacity is reduced." He discusses the rôle of priorities in directing the flow of capital and investment toward defense requirements, and the various techniques of curtailing private consumption.

Part III is concerned with the fiscal problems of the defense program. Here, of course, practically all figures and estimates have been rendered obsolete by developments since Pearl Harbor. However, Dr. Harris realized even at the time of writing that "the speed with which output is expanded is a vital consideration. . . . The greater the rush, the less the efficiency of adjustment." Many of his general conclusions—in particular, the necessity of working out an integrated tax-loan-control program—are still fully valid. As for price fixing and its attendant controls, he says that they "are a highly useful procedure under certain circumstances, but are not panacean."

In Part IV, the international aspects of war economics, especially the problems of foreign exchange, are analyzed. The author criticizes the British for having weakened their international economic position by their failure to impose rigid exchange controls at an early stage. This might perhaps be extended to the general criticism that Great Britain—like the United States—did not realize promptly enough the full scope of an all-out war effort. Dr. Harris analyzes extensively the American aid to Britain, and approves the lend-lease policy on well-considered economic grounds. Here again, of course, many of the underlying data have changed since the publication of the book. The author believes that the continued acceptance of gold by the United States in the last few years has been unavoidable and that it has given the American economy a lift, although the whole issue has now become secondary.

The fifth and last part gives a survey of the economic problems in the post-war world. Part of this discussion is still based on the assumption of a possible German victory over Britain alone, and is therefore out of date. So are probably all previous estimates of the American national debt after this war, though Harris goes so far as to assume a

debt of 250-300 billion in 1980. However, his main point, namely that the nations of the world will look to the United States for economic assistance and leadership, will find widespread assent. "On whether we re-enter the world with low tariffs and a purse bulging with gold or retreat again to economic provincialism a great deal of future history will depend."

The book is of a largely factual and critically descriptive character and does not pretend to analyze structural changes in economic institutions due to the war effort. It makes no easy reading, especially for the non-economist, but is a serious and valuable contribution to the discussion of one of the most crucial problems of this war.

ALBERT T. LAUTERBACH  
*University of Denver*

*Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars*, by H. A. De Weerd. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 378. \$3.50.)

The editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* makes it clear in the introduction to his series of twelve military portraits that instead of addressing primarily his fellow professors he is striving to reach a broader public. In these times, which require an intelligent civilian concern and interest in military affairs, the author has dedicated himself to arousing the non-military mind. Within the limits which he has set himself, he has done exceedingly well.

Schlieffen, for instance, appears as one of the great German military minds, a strategist who deserved better of the generals and diplomats who sought to carry out his brilliant concept. Hindenburg stands in a less favorable light; denuded of the legend that once enveloped him, he becomes a tragic figure who brought Germany great suffering by the defects of his qualities. Hoffmann, popularly remembered for the mythical fist-blow upon the tables of Brest-Litovsk, emerges with enhanced prestige as the only man of ideas on the Eastern Front. The story of Kitchener, by contrast, is that of a man with a fine reputation, but inadequate to meet the crisis of 1914-15. Lawrence, ever the gallant eccentric, loses some of the military qualities ascribed to him, but remains a genius and leader of men. The final place of Pershing remains to be determined, but his work already stands out as a remarkable administrative achievement.

Pétain, like Hindenburg, delivered his people to fascism, but Dr. De Weerd's analysis of the motivations for his policy deserves atten-

tive reading. Gamelin appears today like a man from another world, who with many others misjudged the extent of the social and military revolution in Berlin. The portrait of Churchill is a bold sketch in black and white, a refreshing contrast to some recent eulogies. Wavell, in spite of his Mediterranean defeats of the past year, stands out as a modern soldier, the first British equal of some of the Nazi commanders. Seeckt bridges the gap between two German military worlds as the man who moulded the *Reichswehr* into a highly trained, specialized army. The author justifies his inclusion of Adolf Hitler by pointing out the importance of the *Führer* in building German morale and in developing an amazing technique of psychological warfare and by establishing his reputation as a brilliant military administrator.

In the light of our present crisis, this study assumes considerable significance in its portrayal of the world-shaking military revolution that has occurred since 1918. The American civilian can only profit by taking every page of this volume to heart. He should not find that difficult, for the book is admirably written.

HENRY C. MEYER

*Library of Congress*

*Armies on Wheels*, by S. L. A. Marshall. (New York: William Morrow & Company. 1941. Pp. 251. \$2.50.)

Marshall's *Blitzkrieg* was well worth reading, but this study of mechanized campaigning since Dunkirk is a better book—more unified, more “composed” as a critic of pictures might say, hence easier to read and to remember.

It begins with a well deserved acknowledgment of the author's indebtedness to J. F. C. Fuller, who contributes a typically vivid preface contrasting the mechanical perfection possible to machines with the unpredictable nature of human thought. The steady and general increase in Fuller's reputation, which was at one time a little overshadowed by the journalistic skill of his pupil Liddell Hart, should gratify all close students of contemporary war. Marshall might have reinforced his apt quotations from *Lectures on F. S. R. III* by an occasional citation from Fuller's earlier *Tanks in the Great War*.

The volume benefits by its author's wide reading. His discussion of the tank *versus* anti-tank problem profits by his knowledge of the clash between the Macedonian Phalanx and the Roman Legion—it is well to be reminded that the relative claims of speed and handiness as



against solidity are by no means new. He has profitably read Newbigin on Balkan geography. Readers possessed of a bowing acquaintance with geology and paleontology may regret the dinosaur analogy on page 157, for apparently the little knowledge we have of the disappearance of the carnivorous reptiles seems to point to change of climate rather than to excessive size. The author himself calls his comparison "not altogether reliable."

There is another doubtful passage on page 177: "The infantry remains the principal arm, but not the arm of decision. It must be made complete by the tanks and aviation." Probably Mr. Marshall himself, if given more time, would have smoothed out this verbal inconsistency. How can the decisive arm not be the principal arm? Surely the author would be the first to agree that true infantry, *i.e.*, men fighting on foot with weapons which can be carried and fought by a single man, is almost wholly impotent against either tanks or planes, against which the only real defense is some sort of gun. Accordingly infantry, although of course an essential auxiliary, is no longer the principal arm either in offense or defense.

In general, however, the reviewer finds almost nothing else to blame and much to praise. Page 106 shows clearly why the tank is the soul of "lightning war." Page 116 effectively ridicules Liddell Hart's mechanical rule of thumb which imagines a three to one superiority necessary for successful offense. Area defense is indeed very different from linear defense. A little further on, on page 123 and 124, the analogy between mechanized war and area defense on the one side and the knight-and-castle campaigns of the Middle Ages is effectively developed. Still further, the return to military quality, through the increasing value of highly trained *élites*, is lucidly set forth. On page 133 we read: "To-day's soldiery is thirty-five per cent 'skilled labor'—a higher proportion than in almost any industry. A national army is a reflection of the intellectual and political condition of a nation, but must aim for a higher moral level, since the demands of modern warfare require a higher proportion of individuals capable of making decisions."

Recently this universal return to military quality has been illustrated by the example of Soviet Russia—of all countries! A Samara-Kubyshev dispatch in the *New York Times* of December 7, 1941, tells us: "The creation of new guards divisions, of which there are now almost twenty—including infantry, cavalry, tanks—initiates the distinction between the regular soldier and one who has proved himself exceptional."

The guards are composed of units designed to absorb eventually outstanding individual soldiers. They receive double pay, while the officers get a 50 per cent raise. After the war they will have special uniforms. The purpose is obviously to honor the bravest and to incite among other units admiration for them and a desire to achieve their rewards and benefits." There is another Medieval analogy here. On page 176 of volume III of Belloc's *History of England* we are told that in the army of Henry V which fought at Agincourt ". . . every archer got three times the wage of an artisan."

HOFFMAN NICKERSON

Oyster Bay, New York

*Total Espionage*, by Curt Riess. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1941. Pp. 318. \$2.75.)

The author of this book claims absolute reliability for the story he tells. He asserts that his narrative is based on "official documents" which have been inspected by him or by collaborators in whom he trusts implicitly. "All scenes described have been witnessed by at least one of those who informed me about them. All the facts contained in the book, whether or not they have been published before, have been carefully checked and rechecked." The author's evidence may have convinced the publisher, but the evidence presented does not convince the reviewer. If this book were taken as seriously by a gullible public as it has been by some reviewers, there would be a danger that it might contribute to espionage panics and to defeatist convulsions. There exists a tendency to overestimate the efficiency of German military intelligence and underestimate the Allied intelligence services.

Even the most gullible person will have his doubts as to the "inside information" Mr. Riess offers in connection with Rudolf Hess' flight. Nor will anyone with the slightest knowledge of German affairs be deceived by his endeavor to picture Hess as the chief of all German espionage and the real genius behind it. The confusion apparent in the author's mind is shared with the reader when we are told that Haushofer received all the confidential reports of Hess' organization for examination and analysis. Does this mean that Haushofer was the real espionage leader?

The author is unable to distinguish between "intelligence" and "secret service"—between espionage, propaganda, and geopolitics. He deals at length with the French *Deuxième Bureau* and ignores the real

function of that body. On the other hand, he claims to know the basic principles of German espionage and asserts that one of these is "Everyone can spy." He neglects, however, to tell us what kind of useful information "everyone" can acquire or how "everyone" can transmit information without technical knowledge of ciphering and of short-wave receiving and transmitting. How does "everyone" know to whom, when, and how information should be sent?

Here are some examples of Mr. Riess' reliability which can easily be checked by any person with general political information. We learn (p. 196) that Bonnet is the real power behind the scenes in Vichy. We read (p. 103) that the German ambassador to the Franco government went, of all places, to Madrid in 1937 to form the nucleus of German espionage for World War II. We are informed (p. 97) that Ribbentrop was "a popular figure in London society"; Laval (p. 111) belonged to the political circle of Weygand. We are told (p. 187) that France and England promised help to Holland and Belgium only on May 11, 1940, that Marshal Pétain went to the front on May 21, and that Weygand sent a courier to Paris on May 23 to warn the government that he could no longer guarantee Paris. If the author had taken the pains to check his stories in one of the numerous reliable narratives of the French catastrophe, he would have found out that Pétain was actually Weygand, that Weygand was in reality Gamelin, and that May 23 was in reality May 18.

Speaking of Hitler's great talent for deception, Riess says that he did not use his "super-tank" in the Polish campaign since his smaller tanks were sufficient. Super-tanks, in Mr. Riess' terminology, are tanks of eighty to one hundred tons. He probably did not know that the Germans themselves discovered the true potentialities of tanks only during the Polish campaign. There were no "super-tanks" on the western front in 1940; the heaviest German tank used on that front did not exceed fifty tons.

The information given (pp. 175-76) about the offices from which the French radio propaganda was sent out is false. He asserts that "in these editorial rooms information was available that could be found nowhere else." It happens that the reviewer worked in these rooms throughout the war, but the only information he found there was the regular news service of the *Agence Havas*. Other stories of dramatic occurrences in this building are pure fiction.

One could extend the list of inaccuracies almost indefinitely: his confused account of Major Pabst, his gullible acceptance of the Baron

Froehlichstal case, Dr. Zernatto's "secretary," M. Guerin's fantastic story of the German secret service photographing the "face" of every person (from behind?) who entered the *Deuxième Bureau*. But the chronicle of confusion is already too long. The fact that such a book could be published and widely accepted in the United States demonstrates the weakness of American publishers and readers for sensational books on espionage.

STEFAN T. POSSONY

*The Institute for Advanced Study*

*Bombs and Bombing*, by Willy Ley. (New York: Modern Age Books. 1941. Pp. 124. \$1.25.)

To the man of science, Willy Ley, "New Weapons" editor of the publication *PM*, needs no introduction. But those unfamiliar with the literature of the chemist, physicist, and ballistician may be interested to learn that this prolific author is at home in all these spheres, not to mention others equally recondite though unrelated. Vice-president of the German Rocket Society for a number of years prior to his emigration to America, his familiarity with missiles of all kinds is distinctly comprehensive. As a result, practically every one of the 124 pages of his little work contains information helpful to those anxious to winnow the real grain from all the chaff that has been written and spoken on the subject of bombs and bombing.

The volume, divided into six chapters, offers in the first four brief historical accounts of the introduction and evolution of gunpowder and of the higher explosives, incendiary missiles, the air bomb, and noxious gases. Many of the minutiae of "Bombing as a Fine Art" receive treatment in the fifth chapter, and in that which follows the perhaps perturbed reader may find consolation in acquaintance with modern measures of defense, active and passive, against gas and bomb. Tabulated figures are given on the effects of high explosive bombs of various sizes under given conditions. Although the effective radius of a ton bomb is twelve hundred feet, it is comforting to learn that simple steel shelters with inch and a half walls are proof against any but a direct hit and that, in the absence of steel, a two foot thickness of sandbags will suffice.

One of the most interesting chapters is that on war gases with its descriptive tables of these agencies. While the reader requires something more than a high school knowledge of chemistry to grasp its full pur-



port, he is nevertheless quite able to appreciate the fact that, in general, the deadliness of these substances has been overrated greatly. Indeed, the main effect of the perusal of this valuable little work should be to calm the fears of the hysterically apprehensive, at the same time making it plain that certain precautions can and must be taken if casualties from the skyborne missiles are to be held to a minimum.

CALVIN GODDARD

*Army War College*

*Descriptive Catalog of Maps Published by Congress, 1817-1843*, by Martin P. Claussen and Herman R. Friis. (Washington: published by the authors at P. O. Box 4672. 1941. Pp. 117. \$1.25.)

Product of the join scholarship of an historian-editor and a geographer-archivist, this first-rate little volume is an indispensable tool for every student interested in the early cartography of the United States. It lists in the order of publication, with complete description and citation, each of the 503 maps published in the first 429 volumes of the Congressional Series of public documents. A carefully prepared index to the areas, place names, and subjects shown on the maps and to the persons, government agencies, and institutions involved in compiling them serves as an adequate guide to the itemized entries. The use to which the military historian can put this reliable finding medium may be seen from such index entries as "Fort Winnebago, Wis. Terr., plan"; "Frontier defense plans"; "Lee, Robert E."; "Missouri: military barracks"; "Topographical Engineers: explorations in West"; and "War Department, maps, accomp. repts, on: arsenals, . . . fortifications."

The present volume is considered by the authors as the first of a number of catalogs planned to cover the entire Congressional Series. This is an enormous undertaking (there being perhaps 50,000 maps in the remaining 12,500 volumes), but it is more than a little encouraging to know that considerable progress has been made on the second volume to cover the period 1843-1861. Any one who has had occasion to attempt to ferret out some of the extremely valuable map material practically lost in the Congressional Series will agree that this project, especially in the hands of such capable craftsmen, should be encouraged in every way possible.

JESSE S. DOUGLAS

*The National Archives*

## OTHER RECENT BOOKS

## HISTORIOGRAPHY

- Early Military Books in the University of Michigan Libraries*, by Thomas M. Spaulding and Louis C. Karpinski. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1941. Pp. 61, with 37 plates. \$2.00.) A check-list of 372 titles published between 1493 and 1800 which deal with military science and art, including mathematical works containing sections on military science. There are photographic reproductions of the title-pages of about one-third of the volumes listed, many of which are the only known copies in the United States. This guide serves as a forceful reminder of the splendid collection of military sources available at the University of Michigan.
- A Bibliography of the Virginia Campaign and Siege of Yorktown, 1781: Being a Part of the Master Bibliography of Colonial National Historical Park, Yorktown, Virginia, as of September, 1941*, by the staff of the Historical Division, Colonial National Historical Park. (Yorktown: Colonial National Historical Park. 1941. Pp. 192. Mimeographed for limited distribution.) Arranged by classes of material such as diaries, newspapers, maps, etc.; most entries annotated.
- Modern War—Its Economic and Social Aspects: A Bibliography*, by Albert T. Lauterbach in collaboration with Robert A. Kann and Deborah A. Hubbard. (Princeton: Institute for Advanced Study. [1941.] Pp. 52. Mimeographed for limited distribution.) A tentative list of books and articles dealing with the economic and social aspects of modern war; arranged by country.
- War and National Policy: A Syllabus*, edited by Grayson Kirk and Richard Poate Stebbins. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1942. Pp. 131. \$.90.) A tentative outline for military studies at the undergraduate level, with bibliographies. Jointly produced by the Institute for Advanced Study and Columbia University.
- Bibliography of Military Geology and Geography*, prepared under the direction of W. H. Bucher. (New York: Geological Society of America. 1941. Pp. 18.) A bibliography issued by the Division of Geology and Geography of the National Research Council.

## INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

- War, Politics and Emotion*, by Geoffrey Bourne. (New York: Liveright Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. 110. \$1.25.) Tracing contemporary evils, including war, to improperly controlled emotion, the author urges a rational approach to political and social problems.
- War as a Social Institution: The Historian's Perspective*, edited for the American Historical Society by Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. 333. \$3.50.) Twenty-six essays by American historians.
- Fatal Partners: War and Disease*, by Ralph H. Major. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1941. Pp. 342. \$3.50.)
- War and the German Mind: The Testimony of Men of Fiction Who Fought at the Front*, by William K. Pfeiler. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. 349. \$3.25.) An examination of German novels of the First World War.
- Public Policy in a World at War*. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1941. Pp. 252. \$2.50.) Volume 218 of the Academy's *Annals*.

## NATIONAL WARFARE

- Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919*, by James Morgan Read. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1941. Pp. 319. \$3.50.)
- Censorship 1917*, by James R. Mock. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1941. Pp. 250. \$2.50.)
- Radio Goes to War: The "Fourth Front,"* by Charles J. Rolo. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1942. Pp. 293. \$2.75.)
- Education for Death: The Making of the Nazi*, by Gregor Ziemer. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. 208. \$2.00.) This well-written book by the former director of the American Colony School in Berlin shows how the instruction of German youth has been used to develop fearless devotion to the state.

## LAND WARFARE

- Modern Battle*, by Major Paul W. Thompson. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1942. Pp. 220. \$2.75.)
- Automatic Arms: Their History, Development and Use*, by Captain Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., and Charles T. Haven. (New York: William Morrow & Company. 1941. Pp. 344. \$4.50.)
- Signposts of Experience: World War Memoirs*, by Major General William J. Snow. (Washington: United States Field Artillery Association. 1941. Pp. 317. \$2.75.)
- Charles de Gaulle*, by Philippe Barrès. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1941. Pp. 260. \$2.00.) M. Barrès recounts the career of de Gaulle and explains his military ideas, showing how they were rejected in France but used and vindicated by the German armies in 1940. The latter half of the volume deals with the establishment of the Free French movement and with its development and prospects.
- Leadership for American Army Leaders*, by Major Edward Lyman Munson, Jr. (Washington: Infantry Journal. 1941. Pp. 96. \$1.00.)
- Preussens Freiheitskampf 1813/14: Eine Zeitgenössische Darstellung; Originale Wiedergabe der Ersten Feldzeitung der Preussischen Armee*, with a foreword by Kurt Hesse. (Potsdam: Hayn's Erben. 1940. Pp. 376. Rm. 5.50.) Contemporary material on the Prussian War of Liberation, together with the first field newspaper of the Prussian Army.

## SEA WARFARE

- The Destiny of Sea Power, and Its Influence on Land and Air Power*, by John Philips Cranwell. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 262. \$2.75.) The author argues that land and air power tend to conform to patterns already established by sea power.
- Waffe unter Wasser: Geschichte der Erfindung des Untersee-bootes*, by Gerhard Wiedemeyer. (Berlin: Kyffhäuser. 1940. Pp. 148. Rm. 3.30.)
- The Submarine at War*, by A. M. Low. (London: Hutchinson & Company. 1941. 10s.6d.)
- Fishermen at War*, by Leo Walmsley. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1941. Pp. 302. \$2.50.) A journalist's account of the English East Coast fishermen on mine sweeping patrol.
- Sea Shepherds: Wardens of our Food Flocks*, by Sir Herbert Russell. (London: John Murray. 1941. 9s.) The story of the convoy system.

## AIR WARFARE

- Mobilmachung, Aufmarsch und Erster Einsatz der Deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im August 1914*, by Elard Baron von Lowenstern. (Berlin: Mittler. 1939. Pp. 120. Rm. 8.) How the German air arm went into action in 1914.
- Aircraft Recognition*, by R. A. Saville-Sneath. (New York: Penguin Books. 1941. Pp. 175. \$.25.) The official text of the R.A.F. training schools.
- Aircraft Spotter*, by Lester Ott. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1941. Pp. 64. \$1.00.) Covers planes used by all major belligerents.
- Air Base*, by Boone T. Guyton. (New York: Whittlesey House. 1941. Pp. 295. \$2.50.) Life at a modern air base.
- Civil Defence: A Practical Manual Presenting with Working Drawings the Methods Required for Adequate Protection against Aerial Attack*, by C. W. Glover. (Brooklyn: Chemical Publishing Company. 3d edition, 1941. Pp. 794. \$16.50.)
- Civil Air Defense: A Treatise on the Protection of the Civil Population against Air Attack*, by Lieutenant Colonel Augustin M. Prentiss. (New York: Whittlesey House. 1941. Pp. 334. \$2.75.)

## NATIONAL FORCES

- The World Armaments Race, 1919-1939*, by N. M. Sloutzki. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. 129. \$.40.) A concise analytical summary of expenditures and national forces, by the former editor of the League of Nations' *Armaments Year Book*.
- The Atlantic System: The Story of Anglo-American Control of the Seas*, by Forrest Davis. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1941. Pp. 363. \$3.00.) Diplomatic history written in terms of naval strategy.
- Dakar: Outposts of Two Hemispheres*, by Emil Lengyel. (New York: Random House. 1941. Pp. 312. \$2.00.) A rather hastily-written, journalistic account of the development and strategic potentialities of Dakar and West Africa.

## Great Britain

- The History of the 3d Battalion 7th Rajput Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own)*, by H. G. Rawlinson. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. 324. 42s.)
- British Women in War*, by Peggy Scott. (London: Hutchinson & Company. [1941?] Pp. 324. 7s.6d.) An account of women's war organizations in Britain.

## United States

- Military Law and Defense Legislation*, by A. Arthur Schiller. (Saint Paul: West Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. 647. \$5.00.) The scope of this ample collection of source materials, illustrating the law which governs our military establishments, is much broader than the title suggests. Its usefulness is by no means limited to the sphere of military law proper; on the contrary, the most interesting chapters, which no student of American military institutions will wish to neglect, deal with the constitutional extent of military power and with the organization of the United States Army. Over 100 pages are devoted to interpretations of the conscription acts of 1917 and 1940.
- The Army Officer's Manual*, by Lieutenant Colonel A. C. M. Azoy. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1942. Pp. 366. \$2.50.) A convenient and up-to-date handbook of basic information.



- He's in the Army Now*, by Captain W. H. Baumer, Jr. (New York: Robert M. McBride & Company. 1941. Pp. 254. \$2.50.) Probably the best of the many recent books on life in the new Army.
- Plain Words about Venereal Disease*, by Thomas Parran and R. A. Vonderlehr. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1941. Pp. 226. \$2.00.) Revelations of the U. S. Public Health Service on conditions affecting the health of enlisted men.
- What the Citizen Should Know about Our Arms and Weapons*, by Major James E. Hicks, illustrated by André Jandot. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 252. \$2.50.)
- Transportation and National Defense*, by Joseph L. White. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1941. Pp. 91. \$1.50.) A well-documented survey of the position of the railroads, motor transport, and other modes of transportation in our national economic system.

#### MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

- Chronicle of the First Crusade*, by Fulcher of Chartres, translated by Martha Evelyn McGinty. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1941. Pp. 90. \$1.00.) The first volume of *Translations and Reprints*, Series 3.
- The Journals of Sir Thomas Allin, 1660-1678, Volume II*, edited by R. C. Anderson. (London: Navy Records Society. 1941. Pp. 257. 21s.)
- British Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832-1869*, by Grace Fox. (London: Kegan Paul. 1940. Pp. 227. 12s.6d.)
- The Delaware Continentals, 1776-1783*, by Christopher L. Ward. (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware. 1941. Pp. 620. \$3.75.)
- The Army of Tennessee: A Military History*, by Stanley F. Horn. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1941. Pp. 503. \$3.75.)

#### World War I

- History of the Great War, Military Operations: East Africa, Volume I*, compiled by Charles Hordern. (New York: British Library of Information. 1941.) A volume in the British official history, covering the period from August 1914 to September 1916.

#### World War II

- A Record of the War: The Sixth Quarter, January 1, 1941-March 31, 1941*, by Philip Graves. (London: Hutchinson & Company. 1941. 9s.6d.)
- Norway, Neutral and Invaded*, by Halvdan Koht. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1941. Pp. 253. \$2.50.) The account of Norway's exiled Foreign Minister.
- Belgium: The Official Account of What Happened, 1939-1940*. (London: Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1941. 5s.) A narrative of the Flanders campaign.
- From Gibraltar to Suez*, by Lord Strabolgi. (London: Hutchinson & Company. 1941. Pp. 224. 7s.6d.) The war in the Mediterranean theater, down to the retreat from Crete.

#### CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- Everybody's Medals*, by S. C. Johnson. (London: N. A. G. Press. 1941. Pp. 96. 1s.) British medals described and illustrated.
- Army Talk: A Familiar Dictionary of Soldier Speech*, by Elbridge Colby. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1942. Pp. 232. \$2.00.)

## RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

## HISTORIOGRAPHY

- "Vom Wesen der Wehrgeschichte," by G. Oestreich, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1940 (CLXII, no. 2, 231-57).
- "Clausewitz on the Defeat of the Jena-Auerstädt," in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1941 (XLIII, 109-21).
- "Moltke und die Kriegsgeschichte," by Dr. Eberhard Kessel, in *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, June 1941 (pp. 96-125). Analysis of Moltke's contribution to the history of warfare.
- "The Life of General Horatio Gates," by Robert Livingston Schuyler, in *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1941 (LVI, 600-607). A review article of *Horatio Gates: Defender of American Liberties*, by Samuel White Patterson.
- "Sociological Research and the Defense Program," by Werner S. Landecker, in *Sociology and Social Research*, November-December 1941 (XXVI, 103-13). New fields for research in a wartime society.
- "Books and National Defense: A Brief Survey of Some Library Sources of Geographical Importance," by Elizabeth T. Platt, in *Geographical Review*, April 1941 (XXXI, 264-71).

## INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

- "Der Krieg als Seinerhellung," by W. Steger, in *Deutsche Rundschau*, May 1941 (CCLXVII, 57-61).
- "An den Wurzeln des Konfliktes," by Virginio Gayda, in *Berliner Monatshefte*, November 1941 (pp. 681-87). A summary by the director of the *Giornale d'Italia*.
- "The Historical and Institutional Setting of the Second World War," by Harry Elmer Barnes, in *Social Science*, July 1941 (XVI, 230-36).
- "England und Deutsche Reichsgründung," by Werner Frauendienst, in *Berliner Monatshefte*, February 1941 (pp. 77-102). Analysis of the historical background of the contemporary Anglo-German conflict.
- "The Treaty of London," by Christopher Howard, in *History*, March 1941 (XXV, 347-55). Factors on Italy's entrance into World War I.
- "Der Fall Jugoslawien," by Joseph März, in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, May 1941 (XVIII, 245-51). The military collapse of Yugoslavia interpreted in terms of racial, political, and social disintegration.
- "Of the Illusion That War Does Not Change," by Clyde Eagleton, in *The American Journal of International Law*, October 1941 (XXXV, 659-62). The effect of the changing character of war on international law.
- "El Derecho Natural Internacional y la Guerra Legítima," by F. Chediak Ahuayda, in *Revista de Derecho Internacional*, June 1941 (XXXIX, 244-55).
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- "The South in a War Economy," by Ralph C. Hon, in *The Southern Economic Journal*, January 1942 (VIII, 291-308). Relation of the defense effort to the economic and social problems of this region.

## NATIONAL WARFARE

- "Die Geopolitische Dynamik des Weichselraumes," by Otto Schafer, in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, January 1941 (XVIII, 13-20). Historical analysis of the strategic advantages of a centrally located European power.
- "Defense and Technology," by Bernard Brodie, in *The Technology Review*, January 1941 (XLIII, 107-10 ff.).
- "Wirtschaftskrieg und Operative Kriegsführung," by Archivdirektor Dr. Pantlen, in *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, March 1941 (pp. 47-55). An account of the historical relationship.
- "Synthetic Rubber," by Frank A. Howard, in *Harvard Business Review*, Autumn 1941 (XX, 1-9). The historical background.
- "Chromium: A Strategic Material," by Arthur Kemp, in *Harvard Business Review*, Winter 1942 (XX, 199-212). Efforts to control the supply of this material.
- "Some Aspects of Price Control in Wartime," by Paul F. Hannah, in *Cornell Law Quarterly*, December 1941 (XXVII, 21-55). The legislative and legal background.
- "Rationing of Purchasing Power to Restrict Consumption," by J. J. Polak, in *Economica*, August 1941 (VIII, 223-38).
- "Compulsory Savings in Great Britain," by Sidely Weintraub, in *Harvard Business Review*, Autumn 1941 (XX, 53-64). A consideration of the ideas of John Maynard Keynes on war financing.
- "Dimensions of Propaganda: German Shortwave Broadcasts to America," by J. S. Brunner, in *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, July 1941 (XXXVI, 311-37).
- "The Radio Communication of War News in Germany," by Hans Speier, in *Social Research*, November 1941 (XIII, 399-419). Important analysis of Nazi radio techniques.
- "The Psychoneuroses as They Pertain to the Military Service," by Lieutenant Frank P. Pignataro, in *The Military Surgeon*, January 1942 (XC, 29-37).

## LAND WARFARE

## Combat

- "The Tactics of Blitzkrieg," by Major M. P. Huthwaite, in *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, February 1941 (LXXXVI, 34-43). A definition.
- "Tattici e Technici," by Pietro Ago, in *Revista di Artiglieria e Genio*, 1941 (XIX, 608-23).
- "The Evolution of German Infantry Tactics," by Captain W. R. Young, in *The Fighting Forces*, December 1941 (XVIII, 284-88).
- "Mobility Through Captures," by Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, in *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, October 1941 (LXVIII, 349-54). Account of the methods for the effective utilization of captured matériel.
- "Die Operation auf der Inneren und der Aussen Line im Lichte Unser Zeit," by General Ludwig, in *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 4, 1941 (pp. 7-10).
- "A Reply to 'Barrier Tactics,'" by Captain R. A. Barron, in *The Royal Engineers Journal*, December 1941 (LV, 428-38). Analysis of the strategies used against Panzer divisions.
- "Die Technische Veranlagung des Sowjetrussischen Soldaten," by General Ludwig, in *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 11, 1941 (pp. 34-37).

- "The Wedge and Kesel: German Tactics against the Russians," in *The Cavalry Journal*, November-December 1941 (pp. 2-9).
- "The German Armored Force," by Captain Carl T. Schmidt, in *Infantry Journal*, December 1941 (pp. 2-12). Organization, vehicles, and tactics.
- "Der Anteil des Motors am Deutsche Siege," by General Liebmann, in *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 4, 1941 (pp. 10-12).
- "Quelques Reflexions sur L'Armée Blindée," by Captain E. M. G. Schenk, in *Revue Militaire Suisse*, August 1941 (pp. 389-413).
- "Landkreuzer-Tanks-Panzerkampfwagen," by Hauptmann George, in *Die Wehrmacht*, February 12 (pp. 22-24) and 19 (pp. 10 ff.), 1941.
- "Glückhatte Division," in *Die Wehrmacht*, February 12, 1941 (pp. 7-9). Illustrated account of a *Panzer* division in action in France in 1940.
- "Irregular Warfare: The Role of Irregular Troops in Modern Conflict," by Hoffman Nickerson, in *Army Ordnance*, November-December 1941 (XXII, 381-85).
- "Army and Air Co-operation," by Lieutenant Colonel H. L. F. Dimmock, in *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, October 1941 (LXVIII, 378-81). A brief account.
- "Die Zusammenarbeit der Fesselballone mit den Anderen Waffen in Weltkriege, 1914-1918," in *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 18 (pp. 60-63) and 25 (pp. 94-97), 1941.
- "Defensa contra Aeronaves," by Enrique Flores, in *Defensa*, November 1941 (pp. 93 ff.).
- "Army Welfare and Education," by Major-General H. Williams, in *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May 1941 (LXXXVI, 246-60).
- "Gedanken über Erziehung in der Wehrmacht," in *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 4, 1941 (pp. 13-17).

### Weapons

- "Some Thoughts on Artillery Weapons and Organization," by Major R. B. Rice, in *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, October 1941 (LXVIII, 355-60). The non-technical results of the development of long range and heavier shells for artillery.
- "By Flame and Steel: The Nazi Army," by Ludwig Olson, in *The American Rifleman*, November 1941 (pp. 10-13). Weapons of the modern German army.

### Technology

- "Le Strade Militari del Romani," by Valter Giorgi-Alberti, in *Rassegna di Cultura Militare*, September 1941 (pp. 719-24).
- "La Guerra Quimica," by A. Ripoll, in *Defensa*, November 1941 (pp. 38-41 ff.).

### Economy

- "Motor Transport—Today," by Major General Edmund B. Gregory, in *The Quartermaster Review*, November-December 1941 (pp. 29 ff.). The basic types of motor vehicles for tactical purposes, by The Quartermaster General.
- "Notes on the Nazi Supply System," in *The Quartermaster Review*, November-December 1941 (p. 24). Excellent compact note.
- "Medicine at Valley Forge," by William Shainline Middleton, in *Annals of Medical History*, November 1941 (III, 461-86). Written from documentary sources.

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- "Bases del Poder Naval," by A. J. Aznar, in *Defensa*, November 1941 (pp. 18-25). A consideration of certain of Mahan's ideas.



- "The Armored Cruiser—Past and Present," by A. E. Sokol, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1941 (LXVII, 1544-52).
- "Naval Gunfire Support in Counterbattery," by Lieutenant Richard C. D. Hunt, in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1941 (pp. 21-22 ff.). In landing operations.
- "Naval Uses of Aerial Photography," by J. M. Haynie, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1941 (LXVII, 1267-74). An account of the functions aerial photography has served since World War I.
- "A Short History of Nautical Medicine," by Louis H. Roddis, in *Annals of Medical History*, May, July, and September 1941 (III, 203-47, 326-53, 418-47). Origin and development of naval medicine, with an excellent bibliography.

#### AIR WARFARE

- "The Truth about Air Power," by Keith Ayling, in *Harpers Magazine*, February 1942 (CLXXXIV, 225-34). Stresses the importance of the striking force of air power.
- "The Influences of Air Forces on the Course of the War," by Captain Norman MacMillan, in *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, February 1941 (LXXXVI, 44-53). Analysis of some of the major failures in British air strategy.
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## NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

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### USE OF RECORDS OF THE LAST WAR TODAY<sup>1</sup>

BY E. G. CAMPBELL

The Council of National Defense and the War Industries Board successively endeavored during the last war to shape the manufacturing economy of the United States towards the single end of winning the war. Particularly did the latter exercise a strict control over all production which impinged directly or indirectly on the war effort. Other industries were controlled by other super organizations. The Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation provided ships to carry men and materials to Europe. The Railroad Administration was responsible for transportation by rail within the country of those men and materials, getting raw materials to the factories, and moving the finished products to the ports for transshipment to ocean-going vessels. The Fuel Administration, the National War Labor Board, the War Labor Policies Board, the Housing Corporation, the Alien Property Custodian, and the Committee on Public Information played no less important rôles in the war effort. It was up to the Food Administration and its related organizations to feed both America and Europe. The list of emergency agencies could be extended indefinitely, but these were a few among the more important.

As quickly as possible after the Armistice most of these organizations terminated their activities. Within two years virtually all of them had disappeared or were fast liquidating their affairs. Almost invariably their old records were abandoned, even though the full story of America's first modern industrial mobilization was to be found only in them. Attics, warehouses, garages, basements, and other inaccessible corners became their abiding places, and insofar as availability for research purposes was concerned they might as well have been destroyed. Time and

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<sup>1</sup>This paper was read in somewhat longer form before the Federal Records Conference held by the Society of American Archivists in Washington, D. C., November 27, 1941.

again they were moved from one resting place to another. Each time the process took its toll, and confusion was compounded upon confusion. Few were the files which retained their original order and clarity throughout all this chaos. Five years ago their concentration in The National Archives was begun, and in the intervening period the records of all the agencies named and of many more have been transferred to that repository. When the Archives staff began to work on these papers few of them had been searched for years past, despite the obvious importance of their content. No administrator or scholar had been able to penetrate the dust and dirt and confusion, much though he might have wanted to. And in the emergency which then lay a scant four years in the future this very fact exercised an influence over the demands which would be made on these records. There were very few secondary sources available to reveal the mysteries of what actually happened in the industrial mobilization of 1917 and 1918.

Every history textbook included a roll call of the more important of the super World War agencies and of their general functions, but few, if any, of these actually came down to bed-rock and explained what those agencies' day-to-day jobs had been. Similarly, the final reports of the agencies themselves were not very revealing. In the general era of self-congratulation which followed the Armistice, none of these reports was very critical. All boasted of accomplishments, as well they might, but none was very eager to point out the mistakes and dangers which might be avoided next time. Outside criticism was plentiful, but most of it was so biased and so little of it was constructive that it offered little real information. As the general supervisors of industrial production during the World War, the Council of National Defense and the War Industries Board occupied hitherto unparalleled rôles in American history. Consequently, one might have expected their every act would have been dissected and analyzed a thousand times in the subsequent years. Actually, on the day when Germany marched into Poland in September of 1939, there was practically no printed material dealing with their activities.

Bernard Baruch had assembled a long final report on the War Industries Board which, in its entirety, had only been printed when the Nye Committee was investigating the munitions industry. And this report, although voluminous, was in many ways extremely sketchy. Its primary theme was the number of tons of steel, copper, coke, and other materials that had been produced; to what extent prices had risen; how much more efficient the next year of the war effort would

have been had it been necessary to carry hostilities into 1919. There was very little about the organic growth of the organization; sketches, perhaps, but little explanation of why changes had been necessary and even fewer conclusions as to their inevitability or avoidability. Such discussions must inevitably have led to dissection of personalities of men and of industries, and such scrutinies were in bad taste immediately after the Armistice. Yet such discussions were most important for the future. How avoid the mistakes of the World War? There was very little of the answer to this question to be found in the final report.

A few others had written about the War Industries Board and the Council of National Defense. Benedict Crowell, from the vantage point of his experiences, had published his version of what had happened, but not much can be told of such a vast undertaking in three hundred pages of fairly large print. True, Baruch had definite ideas, and he had expressed them time and time again before Congressional committees and in magazine articles, but his ideas had not been codified to make them available in convenient form. Great though his experience had been, his were only a single man's opinions. Too, the Nye Committee had compiled volumes of information relating to industrial mobilization, but it had approached the problems from such a definite bias that there was little constructive thought to be found in their pages.

Under the circumstances there was only one source of information. The records of the Council of National Defense and of the War Industries Board, which had lain dormant for nearly twenty years, suddenly became an everyday source of information. When the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense was formed in July of 1940, an increasing flood of calls for information as to the activities of its predecessors was launched. When the Office of Production Management assumed its duties a few months later, the search for information was redoubled. In general each office and each subdivision of an office asked the same questions: How was the parallel organization of 1917-18 organized? What changes did it undergo? Why? For the most part no printed sources revealed this information; only by searching in the correspondence and minutes of the bureau or section concerned could these questions be answered. Once organized, each present office wanted to know what had been the procedure of its predecessor. Assuming that the general duties of the office were like those of its forerunner, on the basis of past experience how best could it go about accomplishing its ends? Exactly what blank forms had been used to make priority applications in 1918? How had industrial in-

ventories been recorded and kept current? These and similar queries could be answered only by looking at the old records and by describing the files on which industrial inventories of the World War period are still preserved. These questions about organization and about office procedure were not asked once and then forgotten, but time and time again the same questions were repeated as each new section was formed.

As these two general types of inquiry gradually decreased in volume, a new question arose. What information was available about various functions performed by the Council of National Defense and the War Industries Board? Particularly was there a demand for knowledge about the administration of priorities and price control. How had the War Industries Board gone about solving the problems inherent in these functions? Specifically, what had been done? Who had written what to whom? How and by what authority had the actions of the War Industries Board been enforced? Similarly, in rapid succession came inquiries about the various aspects of problems involving industrial housing, labor relations, the operation and organization of War Service Committees, and, repeatedly, clearances and purchasing agencies, industrial facilities and their potential expansion, and conservation and standardization of manufactured products.

Usually such calls for information have been about some definite subject. The request may involve information about steel, copper, wool, chlorine, or any other product or group of products; after the preliminary period of questioning about organization and procedure, such subjects become most important. Sometimes war financing is the topic of interest. How were plant expansions financed in the last war? Or where were new plants located and why; did the Government influence plant locations? How did the plant amortization provisions of the World War tax acts operate? How were contracts let, and why was it done that way? Every phase of the World War industrial mobilization has been of interest. Within the past few months numerous studies have been issued by the Historical Price Research Section of the Labor Statistics Bureau concerning Government control of food during the last war, based primarily on the records of the Food Administration and allied agencies. Similarly, Government officials today have been delving into the records of the World War Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation, the War Labor Policies Board and the National War Labor Board, and other former super agencies.

On the basis of experience with the uses made of the records of World War emergency agencies during the past few months, certain



conclusions are inescapable. Frequently it has been impossible to answer questions in their entirety, or even in part, owing to the incomplete concentration of such records in The National Archives. As so frequently happens, it is the small number of missing records which seem time and again to be the only source of information. Many groups of papers are still so scattered as to make comprehensive reference to them impossible. War Trade Board records are still practically unavailable, and War Finance Corporation records are in almost the same state. Yet questions involving financial operations of the Government during the World War, including the all important one of Government subsidies to aid the rapid expansion of private industry's facilities, often depend on the records of the War Finance Corporation. Similarly, the records of the War Trade Board are frequently needed to supplement the information contained in those of the War Industries Board. Even at this late date there is definite need for the concentration of the records of all super agencies of the World War period in one place.

The absolute necessity which prompted the hasty compilation of finding media to permit rendering adequate service on the records already in The National Archives emphasizes another lesson. Before officials of the present war agencies can intelligently ask for information they must know what is available, and to that end a number of special lists and bibliographies have been compiled detailing the material available in The National Archives as a whole or in some special group of records. If, when the present emergency passes and the current emergency super agencies are liquidated, their records were promptly transferred to a permanent repository and into the care of a trained staff, much of the work which has been and is still being done under the inevitably haphazard conditions of emergency haste could be done with greater care and thoroughness. In that case the day of need in the future would not bring a repetition of the problems of today. If, instead of baling up correspondence and other files preparatory to pushing them into dark corners, they were at once permanently deposited and given careful attention, much valuable information which, insofar as the World War period is concerned, is now obtainable only after extended research or else is completely lost forever, could be preserved.

Finally, immediate care of these records could go one step further. If the services of trained personnel were available to give advice on many problems as they arose, much of the confusion characterizing the

records of World War agencies might be eliminated in the records of the super agencies of the present crisis. Recently a committee of the Society of American Archivists investigated the possibilities in this regard, and their report makes detailed recommendations and sketches a long term policy which, if put into operation as soon as practicable, would considerably ease the work of future record servicing. Documents of only transitory administrative value would not be intermixed with papers of permanent importance. Certain standardized finding media might be prepared at the same time that the files are created. Duplication of the same item time and again in file cases which stand side by side might be reduced to a minimum, and various other reforms could be instituted to make more available to administrators in some future crisis the lessons to be learned from the present one.

# BATTLE OF THE FRONTIER

BY MAX WERNER

When the German divisions hurtled across the Soviet border at dawn on June 22, 1941, the German high command clearly intended to attain the decisive victory in the very first battle. At the very least it expected to proceed immediately from this initial engagement to the decisive battle and victory. From the outset of hostilities the German army had laid down the fighting plan for the gigantic battle. It had the power of a coiled steel spring which is suddenly released. It was fighting close to its bases of operation; it was concentrated for the decisive blow; in attacking it took advantage of the element of surprise. In the Battle of the Frontier the operative superiority of the German army over the Russian army reached its peak.

This battle lasted twenty-six days, from the day of the invasion to the German occupation of Smolensk. It was followed by the great drawn-out Battle of Smolensk in the center, and by the German flanking operations in the north and the south. When it ended, the front ran approximately along the line Pskov-Smolensk-Zhitomir-Dniester. The easternmost German penetration during this period took place near Smolensk, about four hundred miles from the German border. In this first gigantic battle of the Russo-German war two powerful armies, two war plans, and two fighting methods came face to face.

The Battle of the Frontier played an important part in the plans of the German high command. German war *communiqués* and press accounts about the Russian campaign rarely gave an accurate picture of the real course of the battle. But they usually told what aims had been pursued in that battle. In German quarters the Battle of the Frontier has been depicted as a successful battle of annihilation, and it has been compared to the German victories at Kutno in the Polish campaign and to the victory in the Battle of Flanders. There has even arisen a German myth about a battle of annihilation and encirclement in the region of Bialystok-Minsk. The original version was given in the German army *communiqués*, to be further elaborated in the German press. When the Battle of the Frontier was over, the *Völkische Beobachter* wrote:

It is not this territorial gain which is essential for German strategy, but the annihilation of the enemy combat forces. The great battle of encirclement in the region of Bialystok and Minsk is the fourth one to be carried out with complete success by Ger-

man strategy, the others being the battles of Tannenberg in August 1914, of Kutno in the bend of the Vistula in September 1939, and of Flanders in May and June 1940.<sup>1</sup>

True, that was what the German high command had sought to accomplish in this first attack when it planned the war against the Soviet Union. The battles of Kutno and Flanders were not merely outstanding successes reflecting credit on German arms. They were battles that actually decided the issue—battles after which the liquidation of the enemy armies had been child's play. The Battle of the Frontier in the Russian campaign was similarly appraised. Colonel Soldan, one of the most influential of the German military writers, said, "The twin battle of Bialystok-Minsk, in contrast to that of Tannenberg, will, to reiterate the words of the German army *communiqué*, go down in history as a decision of world-wide historical importance. In it annihilation decided the issue."<sup>2</sup>

According to German reports, the struggle for the frontier was a glorious victory of German arms. At Bialystok-Minsk alone, said the *communiqué* of July 10, 1941, the German army took 323,898 prisoners and seized or destroyed 3,332 Soviet tanks and 1,909 guns. Total Russian losses were put at over 400,000 prisoners, 4,423 guns, 7,617 tanks, and 6,233 planes. But the really crucial importance of the battle, in the German view, lay in the fact that it was supposed to have opened the way to the heart of the Soviet Union, especially the way to Moscow. As early as July 1941, the direction of the next German offensives was indicated: "Three weeks of war in the East—and the issue in the East has already been settled. There are neither natural nor artificial barriers between Vitebsk and Moscow that could brake the German onslaught."<sup>3</sup> And a few days later, after the occupation of Smolensk, it was reported, "Smolensk is the last halt on the road to Moscow. The enemy capital is still more than 200 miles away. But the distance from Brest-Litovsk by way of Minsk to Moscow is only 600 miles. Thus it is evident that our troops have to traverse only a fraction of the distance they have already covered."<sup>4</sup>

The German high command was all set for Moscow at the end of the Battle of the Frontier. The conviction that the way to Moscow was open was based upon the fact that by the middle of July, after the

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<sup>1</sup>*Völkische Beobachter*, July 2, 1941.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, July 19, 1941.

<sup>3</sup>*Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 15, 1941.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, July 20, 1941.



frontier battle was over, the permanent Russian fortifications in the west, the so-called Stalin Line, had been stormed and pierced. "The entire system of the Russian field fortifications, so far as it consists of artificial installations, has been smashed," General von Westhofen wrote at the time. Amazingly enough, German military quarters made the mistake of measuring the Russian campaign by the standards of their campaign in Western Europe. They believed that moving into Russia was another Battle of Flanders, that the break through the Stalin Line would have the same effects as the break through the Weygand Line on the Somme. It was a kind of Maginot Line complex in reverse. In the French view the defense was secure as long as there was a strong line of fortifications. In the German view the offensive was successful once the fortified line had been pierced. Around the middle of July the German high command was obviously envisioning an irresistible advance into the heart of the Soviet Union along the entire front. The German Army *communiqué* of July 13, 1941, said that the German troops were already at the gates of Kiev and that the northern tank units were closing in on Leningrad.

The real course of the Battle of the Frontier was quite different. True, there had been a German offensive of tremendous force, but the results were another matter. It is now clear that in the conquest of France the German army used only a fraction of its full strength. A far greater force was used in Russia where, in the first twenty-six days, the German army waged its classic *Blitzkrieg*, advancing incessantly along a broad front against a first-rate opponent. The efforts and combat achievements of the German army during those twenty-six days far surpass those of the entire western campaign. The offensive capacity of the German army was revealed in this phase of the Russo-German war by the fact that, after almost three weeks of fighting and hundreds of miles of marching and offensives, it was still able in a few days to overrun the strong Stalin Line running from Pskov past Vitebsk, Oucha, and Mogilev to Zhitomir.

The Battle of the Frontier began with a surprise air attack, primarily at the Russian air-bases. Russian plane losses were considerable but not catastrophic. Their airfields were dispersed widely, over both the width and depth of the front. Russian practice is to station pursuit planes at least 120 miles behind the front line, medium bombers 200 miles, and heavy bombers 300 miles away. The *Blitzkrieg* itself was waged with accustomed virtuosity. There were moto-mechanized break-throughs and tank raids, especially on the central front in the

direction of Minsk, and cooperation between tanks and motorized infantry and between tanks and the air force formed the basis of the offensive. German tactics had been further perfected since the campaign in the West. With an intensity that by far surpassed the later phases of the war, the German air force attempted to disrupt the Russian rear and to attack marching columns and communication centers. The German infantry's marching performance in this battle represents a record for the whole Russo-German war. Measured by the brief span of time, its penetration in depth was extraordinary. The assault operations of the infantry and the pioneers, conducted at mobile warfare speed, culminated in the overrunning of the Stalin Line between Pskov and Zhitomir—a far greater achievement than the taking of the Franco-Belgian fortifications and the makeshift Weygand Line.

This German offensive developed, however, under singular circumstances. It was not face to face with a numerically strong opponent, and it did not encounter the bulk of the enemy forces. There were no Russian troop concentrations along the frontier and the frontier regions; for three or four days the fighting that occurred took place exclusively with Soviet border patrols. This was recorded not only by the Russian but by the German dispatches as well. To a certain extent the first gigantic German offensive was a blow delivered into a vacuum. At the beginning of the war the Russian forces were deployed in depth with the bulk of the Soviet army stationed far from the border, for the most part in the rear of the Stalin Line. For a major power this type of troop concentration unquestionably sets a precedent in modern military history and is widely at variance with the disposition of the German, French, and Russian armies in 1914 and with that of the German, Polish, and French armies in 1939.

This fact affords insight into the Soviet war plan. The units stationed between the Stalin Line and the frontier served merely as a screen—an *armée de couverture*. The Battle of the Frontier had been envisioned and planned by the German high command as the major, the decisive battle between the main forces of the two armies; to the Soviet high command it was but a large-scale advance skirmish. The Soviets used only limited infantry forces in the battle, probably considerably less than half the German infantry used—according to Soviet estimates the latter numbered about 140 divisions. The entire Battle of the Frontier saw no major infantry engagements, however. The Russians threw in strong tank forces to cover the infantry and to stave off the first onslaught of the German armored divisions. There were

major tank battles at Lutsk, where four thousand tanks participated according to Russian reports, and others north of Kovno and Minsk.

The crucial question regarding the course of the battle is whether or not the brilliant "twin battle of encirclement and annihilation at Bialystok-Minsk" with its tremendous Russian losses actually took place! Colonel Soldan described the pocket into which the Soviet forces were said to have fallen as an area measuring six hundred miles in circumference before it was compressed and tightened up. Such a pocket would have been more than three times the size of the pocket which trapped the Allied troops in Flanders and greater than the German army was capable of closing off. In Flanders the encirclement was conditioned by geography; since the Allies stood with their backs to the sea, the German army did not have to close the pocket from the north. In this battle, however, the Russian units in the direction of Minsk, where the encirclement allegedly took place, were by no means shut off from the east and south. Over the entire southern half of the front, south of Minsk, there were no German attempts at encirclement whatever. In this region are the swamps of Pinsk and Rokitno, into which the German army did not penetrate until late in August. On the southern front, in Galicia and the western Ukraine, the Russians were pushed back only in a frontal direction, without breaks-through and encirclements.

The only large-scale German attempt at encirclement was made, as mentioned before, in one direction, toward Minsk from the north. North of Kovno a strong German tank group pivoted to the south to deliver a blow by way of Vilna against Borisov, northeast of Minsk. Here, in the Minsk region, it met another strong German tank group which was to reach Slutsk and Bobruisk via Brest-Litovsk and Kobrin. This planned encirclement could not, however, have been either tight or complete. The Soviet *communiqué* of June 27 mentioned the destruction of three hundred German tanks north of Minsk, alleged to have been chiefly tanks of the 39th German Tank Corps which was repulsed during the attempted encirclement.

But there are other reasons why the German version of the victorious battle of Bialystok-Minsk does not ring true. According to German reports late in June, two Soviet armies were to have been encircled there. According to the German *communiqué* of July 10, 1941, the German army took 323,000 prisoners. Now Soviet armies have a smaller number of divisions than German armies for the sake of greater mobility. Two Soviet armies could not have much exceeded 300,000

men. Thus, they must have been taken prisoners to the last man; there could not have been any dead or wounded—if the German *communiqué* was correct. But German military experts themselves have denied this; they insisted that the Russian units in this encirclement did not surrender at all. Colonel Soldan stated categorically:

The essential difference between Hindenburg's victory [at Tannenberg] and the one attained here lies in the fact that in 1914 the encircled Russians surrendered, while in this instance they fought to the very end. That must be regarded as an amazing phenomenon, for in the Polish campaign as well as in the campaign in the West our enemies laid down their arms as soon as they realized that they were encircled and that further resistance was hopeless. We shall see later that the Bolsheviks, even in utterly hopeless situations, time and again hurled themselves against the German forces. The majority scorned capture.<sup>5</sup>

That is an outright denial of the official German version. An entire enemy army cannot be both destroyed in battle and taken prisoner at one and the same time. The much-publicized version of the "twin battle of Bialystok-Minsk" did not describe what actually took place; it told what the German high command was striving for. The great German victory that was reported was but a substitute for the decisive Battle of the Frontier for which the German high command had prepared and which it expected; it never actually took place.

In the real battle German *Blitzkrieg* tactics came face to face with Russian combat methods. For the first time the military techniques developed by Russia were demonstrated in a large-scale war. True, this first test of Soviet arms happened in retreat, in a delaying action, but this was deliberate. The Russians regarded the entire region they had but recently acquired as a buffer zone in which the power of the coiled German spring, the strength of the German offensive, was to be taken up and exhausted as much as possible.

Even this first phase of the Russo-German war revealed many of the Soviet army's fighting qualities, and it is interesting to note that the front-line dispatches of the German officers and soldiers who function as war reporters during the fighting—the so-called propaganda units—evaluated the quality of their opponents rather objectively and accurately from the outset. From the first day of the war they recorded the extraordinary violence of the fighting and the inconceivable tenacity of the enemy. House-to-house fighting in cities like Libau, Dvinsk, and Pskov—bitter hand-to-hand fighting of a type that the present war had

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<sup>5</sup>*Völkische Beobachter*, July 19, 1941.



not previously witnessed—amazed the average German soldier who until then had not been accustomed to enemy resistance on such a scale. For the first time the Soviet soldier showed his capacity for individual combat and for fighting in small units. One German front-line dispatch reported, "The Soviet soldiers fight as individuals, offering a holding resistance. They let the infantry through, only to resume fire on straggling columns or isolated vehicles hours later. Concealed in carefully camouflaged fox-holes behind shrubs and on roof tops, they wait for the infantry to approach within a few yards distance and then open fire."<sup>6</sup> Another report said, "The individual Russian soldier shows great skill in building earth fortifications, trenches, and fox-holes. He is especially well versed in the use of ruses and camouflage and in the utilization of terrain. Concealed in woods or behind other protective cover, snipers open fire in the German rear from trees or house tops."<sup>7</sup>

Such inadvertent German revelations show that the Soviet infantry fought chiefly in dispersed rather than massed formation. But fighting in small units, sly tactics, and camouflage represent only one aspect of the Soviet combat methods in the Battle of the Frontier. Another was extraordinarily active resistance—"offensive defense" as the German press puts it—and incessant counter-attacks with the most modern equipment even in retreat. One German military expert wrote:

In the latest engagements the Bolsheviks attempted to counter wedge by wedge, pincers by pincers; nor was this combat method mere improvisation. It was the result of many years of military training—training that covered not only the art of war in general, but also the attitude of the individual soldier. In the last few days there has hardly been a front-line dispatch that failed to stress the almost insensate tenacity of the enemy in the defense or in counter-thrusts.<sup>8</sup>

In this first battle the Russian army showed that it had achieved full mastery of all the modern weapons. The use of offensive weapons in the defensive, hitherto unknown, was demonstrated for the first time. Special importance should be attached to the counter-attacks of the Russian tank units in this connection; the *Frankfurter Zeitung* spoke about the "never-ending counter-attacks of the Soviet tanks." We may well question whether it was justifiable to hurl tank masses into action while the army itself was in retreat instead of conserving them for the great counter-offensive, but it would hardly have been possible to stem the gigantic German offensive even behind the Stalin Line without a

<sup>6</sup>*Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 4, 1941.

<sup>7</sup>*Der Neue Tag*, July 13, 1941.

<sup>8</sup>*Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 6, 1941.

Soviet tank defense of this scope. As for the Soviet air force, although its combat technique was later perfected, it also showed its effectiveness in the fight against the German tank divisions in the Battle of the Frontier. During this phase of the war Russian artillery had not yet come into full play, though it was active. Cooperation between the various arms while on the defensive was put to the test—as the Russian tactical counterpart to German arms cooperation on the offensive—and came through with flying colors.

The purpose of Russian fighting tactics at this point was not to hold the terrain or to defend individual points with relatively weak forces, but to inflict the highest possible losses on the enemy, to tire him out, and to limit his initial success. The initiative was continuously in German hands, and German territorial gains were large. Russian losses in men and *matériel* exceeded those of the Germans, and a number of vital strategic positions were lost. But the results of the Battle of the Frontier cannot be evaluated in terms of casualties; it must be judged by its strategic outcome. The decisive battle of annihilation for which the German high command was prepared did not take place at the frontier. The plan for the German offensive, as outlined for the first month of the war, failed. It was not the territorial gains of the German army that constituted the most important strategic aspect of the battle; rather, it was the fact that a protracted war followed. When the German army wanted to storm onward after taking the frontier, it found the road to Moscow blocked. The way for the success of the Soviet army in the Battle of Smolensk was paved by the tenacious resistance of those first twenty-six days.

# MONETARY PROBLEMS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION

BY HARRY H. BELL

We have come to recognize the importance of the economic side of total war, both on the civilian and the military fronts. Relatively little attention, however, has been devoted in this country as yet to the specifically monetary problems which are bound to arise in connection with the administration of occupied territory. It is true that, with the exception of Iceland, we now have no important foreign territories under our military control; but the overrunning of the Philippines has brought the unpleasant reality of military occupation to our own soil, and the time is coming when a considerable portion of our own military effort must be devoted to the non-tactical task of garrisoning areas taken from the enemy.

Whenever possible, matters involving financial policy should be left in the hands of appropriate civilian agencies—in our case, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve officials, and the civil governors of occupied areas. Nevertheless, circumstances can require the military command to take action in this sphere on its own responsibility, perhaps without adequate technical assistance. The Army is directly interested in the efficient payment of its personnel and the settlement of its current purchases and requisitions. Military authority must also take control over civil affairs, including monetary questions, in the theater of operations and during periods of disorder in the absence of established or reliable civil authorities. Finally, Army officers are usually detailed during occupations of enemy territory to enforce the decrees of the area commander and exercise general surveillance over local affairs. This was as true during the Allied occupation of Germany after World War I as it is in the Nazi military rule over occupied Europe today. In the latter case, however, the technique of control has undergone considerable development thanks to thorough planning on the part of the officer-economists in the *Wehrwirtschaftsstab* (War Economy Staff) of the German High Command.<sup>1</sup> Even though we do not wish to resort to the Nazi methods, our Army can well study Axis experience in this field.

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<sup>1</sup>See Lowell M. Pumphrey, "Planning for Economic Warfare," *Military Affairs*, V (Fall 1941), 145-51; and Thomas Reveille, *The Spoil of Europe* (New York, 1941).

### *Military Disbursements*

When troops garrison or fight in a friendly country, the supply of the local national currency (provided it is not more convenient to use the currency of the occupying power) is generally made available through the local central bank by agreement between the treasuries of the governments concerned. Such payments by the expeditionary force will probably help offset large purchases of *matériel*, foodstuffs, and raw materials in the opposite direction and tend to diminish any monetary and exchange disequilibria associated with the latter. This was the case during the last war, when payments made by the A.E.F. and the B.E.F. considerably reduced the amount of credit which had to be extended to France for her overseas purchases. The Army's procuring and disbursing services function in a friendly country practically the same as at home. Local expenditures should be timed in accordance with the convenience of the host country, but this is merely a question of inter-allied courtesy.

The occupation of enemy territory raises an entirely different set of problems. Not only will economic organization in the area be disrupted, but such local authorities as remain will be uncooperative. The occupying power will probably insist that the entire costs of occupation be borne by the victims as a sort of provisional down-payment on reparations. After World War I the Allies assessed occupation costs according to the effective strength of the garrison forces. During actual hostilities such a method would reveal too much information to the enemy. Present German practice, therefore, seems to be to charge the maximum the traffic will bear, as gauged roughly by the pre-invasion defense expenditures of the countries, regardless of the actual requirements of the Nazi troops.<sup>2</sup> In France, for example, the occupation costs were levied at the flat (though staggering) rate of 20 million marks per day. Only about half this amount was utilized, the remainder being left on deposit with the Bank of France for official German account. Effective May 10, 1941, after some 6 billion marks had been collected, the costs were reduced to 15 million marks per day.

To cope with the problems of occupation the German army has employed an ingenious device, the network of *Reichskreditkassen* (Reich Credit Agencies), to handle the payment of troops in Poland and, later, in other occupied countries. The Germans were not the first to use a specially created military currency. Beginning in 1938 the Japanese

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<sup>2</sup>Reveille, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.



army had disbursed large quantities of "military scrip"—yen notes exchangeable at par for Chinese National dollars but which could not be used in Japan proper or converted into foreign exchange. Fragmentary information indicates that the invaders are now spending similar *ad hoc* military currency in the Philippines, although these notes are printed in English and denominated in pesos rather than yen.<sup>3</sup>

The *Reichskreditkassen* are motorized banks of issue, which follow the invading German columns and establish themselves in the principal regional cities.<sup>4</sup> When first organized in Poland by a decree of September 23, 1939,<sup>5</sup> they seemed to have worked in particularly close conjunction with the army, the head office possibly having been attached to the military headquarters. Notes issued by the *Reichskreditkassen* were used again in the invasion of Denmark and Norway the following spring. On May 3, 1940, the system was reorganized by a new decree. A council of administration was set up in Berlin with representation from the Reichsbank, the Finance Ministry, the Economics Ministry, the High Command, and the Commander in Chief of the Army. The Reichsbank provided the greater part of the personnel of the *Reichskreditkassen* from its own staff, maintaining close administrative and technical connections.<sup>6</sup> As the principal cover of their note issue, they were authorized to extend a credit to the Reich of up to 3 billion marks (as compared with 1 billion under the earlier decree). In addition these emergency banks were permitted to invest in commercial bills and drafts and secured advances of a maximum term of six months; take non-interest-bearing deposits; hold deposits of securities and other objects of value; carry on all sorts of banking operations, other than the acceptance business; and, finally, regulate the flow of money and credit in general within the occupied territories.

The principal function of the individual agencies was the issue of notes (*Reichskreditkassenscheine*), in denominations of 50, 20, 5, 2, and 1 marks and 50 pfennigs, as well as 10 and 5 pfennig subsidiary coins, subject to a loose control on the part of the central administration. Before the war with Russia the total issue amounted to 1.7 billion marks, reached during the autumn of 1940. This figure has, no

<sup>3</sup>*Life*, April 20, 1942, p. 102.

<sup>4</sup>Lars Moën, *Under the Iron Heel* (Philadelphia, 1941), p. 28; *All Gaul is Divided* (New York, 1941), p. 23. Most of the information on German policy in occupied Europe has been taken from the following sources: the official *Verordnungsblätter* issued by the German authorities; files of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*; and the "Annual Report of the Bank of International Settlements," as reported in the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, November 1941, p. 1109.

<sup>5</sup>The writer has been unable to obtain details of this measure.

<sup>6</sup>"Annual Report of the German Reichsbank," *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, September 1940, p. 947.

doubt, been exceeded subsequently. The new currency, like the internal German mark, has no metallic coverage, although it is nominally "secured" by the credit to the German government and any other assets picked up by the credit agencies in their emergency banking transactions. It is endowed with absolute legal tender power concurrently with local currency, while in use within the area in which issued, at an exchange rate set by the Germans. The most important characteristic of the notes is that they cannot be redeemed in other Reich currency, although they are denominated in Reichsmark. There are strict regulations against their importation into Germany proper; likewise, they may not be taken from one occupied territory into another. Moreover, the use of ordinary German banknotes is strictly forbidden in the occupied territories, except those areas, such as Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Alsace-Lorraine, which are to be considered part of the Reich.

The fact that occupation notes may not be redeemed or utilized externally ensures that the entire burden of the occupation falls squarely on the country in which they are issued and that German stocks of commodities are not depleted, or German production diverted, by any unrestricted filtering-back of the notes to the Reich. At the same time, the German army quartermasters are adequately supplied with emergency means of payment. Temporarily the influx of the new money into circulation alleviates the shortage of local currency resulting from panic hoarding and the exodus of refugees from the area. This was particularly the case in Poland and Belgium, the central banks of which followed the established governments into exile, taking the note supply with them. In addition, the broad powers and loose organization of the *Reichskreditkassen* permit them to perform all kinds of emergency banking functions and facilitate the task of the German military-economic staff in synchronizing local trade and industry to their requirements.

The issue of occupation currency is considered by the Germans themselves as a temporary expedient and is apparently resorted to only in payment of the troops and in minor purchases. Larger requisitions and purchases are made with "certificates of receipt" redeemable at a later date. As soon as the occupation is consolidated and the Germans arrive at a satisfactory agreement with the existing central bank or establish a new one under the domination of Quislings, the issue of occupation notes can be suspended. Thenceforth, troops are paid in local currency made available through the central bank out of tribute instalments. *Reichskreditkassenscheine* in circulation then tend to dis-

appear, being taken in exchange against local currency by the central bank for account of the treasury of the occupied state. In addition to simplifying the transaction of business, such a unification of the means of payment has the advantage of increasing the control exercised by the monetary authorities of the occupied country over the total volume of the circulating media.

The *Reichskreditkassen* in the Governor-Generalship of Poland ceased to function some six and a half months after their institution, upon the founding of a new Polish bank of issue. In the meantime the German authorities themselves had replaced the greater part of the occupation currency with old zloty notes that had come into their hands. The occupation notes which had been issued in Denmark and Norway after April 10, 1940, were largely withdrawn from circulation during the early summer months after an agreement with the National Bank of Denmark and the rump Bank of Norway had been reached. In Holland the absorption by the Netherlands Bank was fairly well completed during the month of July 1940, some two months after the invasion. The situation was more difficult in Belgium because of the flight of the principal National Bank officials and because much Belgian currency had been taken into France by refugees. Finally, on July 15, on the basis of an order of the German military *Kommandantur*, a new central bank was set up to issue Belgian money until the remnants of the National Bank could be reconstituted. The conversion of occupation notes was then undertaken. *Reichskreditkassenscheine* remained in circulation very long in France because of the political and economic confusion resulting from the division of the country into several zones. According to a correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, writing in September 1940, more occupation notes circulated in the occupied zone of France at that time than French franc notes. Apparently they were not retired in quantity until about the beginning of 1941. The replacement of the mark currency by national currency does not, of course, necessarily mean decreased German control. The London *Economist* of February 21, 1942 (p. 261), suggests "that even the actual process of printing notes is now out of the hands of the Bank of France."

Attention should be called to the rates of exchange established between the mark and the currencies of the invaded countries. For convenience in reckoning, the ratios were fixed in round numbers where possible, although it can be seen below that they were nevertheless rather unwieldy in Norway, Holland, and Belgium:

1 Reichsmark =	{	2	Polish zloty
		1 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	Norwegian crowns
		2	Danish crowns
		3 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Dutch guilder (2 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub> prior to July 17, 1940)
		12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Belgian francs (10 prior to July 22, 1940)
		10	Luxemburg francs (8 prior to July 22, 1940)
		20	French francs <sup>7</sup>

Although in most cases the rates had a rough correspondence to the pre-invasion official rates for the mark, the theoretical value of German currency had been maintained only by virtue of a stringent exchange control and did not reflect the actual worth of the mark in terms of goods as compared with other currencies. The result was that frequently the German soldier (who could send back five kilos of goods a month free of charge) could get almost twice as much for his already fairly generous pay in the occupied country as he could have bought at home.<sup>8</sup> Besides, in most cases his pay did not cost his own government a pfennig. The occupied peoples, on the other hand, were doubly exploited. Trade between the invader and the invaded was overwhelmingly in one direction, leading to an export surplus which, under the circumstances, could hardly be called a "favorable" balance of trade. As German goods were either expensive or simply unavailable, the occupied countries frequently received little in return except blocked mark balances which would presumably be written off sooner or later against reparations and occupation charges.

Since Denmark did not offer resistance to the German forces, it was supposed to enjoy a relatively privileged status. The Reich appears to have assumed nominal responsibility for the occupation costs, but this did not relieve the Danish economy of the actual burden of thirty to fifty thousand German troops and large-scale fortification expenditures. In addition, Germans "purchased" whatever raw materials and foodstuffs they could lay their hands on. Crowns were placed at the Reich's disposal in return for marks which could only be utilized through the clearing mechanism for the purchase of German goods and certain other restricted purposes.<sup>9</sup> Relative purchasing power be-

<sup>7</sup>These are the rates applying in conversion of *Reichskreditkassenscheine*; clearing rates may differ.

<sup>8</sup>Moën, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29. However, on May 10, 1940, German soldiers and nationals were specifically ordered to "purchase only for their own momentary needs and then only against payment in cash." *Heeresgruppen-Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Gebiete*, I.

<sup>9</sup>Arrangements have been made for multilateral clearing of payments among the various countries under German control; i.e., countries can use their accumulated credit balances in Berlin for settlement of clearing debts to other countries in the "mark bloc." Although this constitutes a considerable step forward, it does not alter the basic fact that Germany exacts what are in effect large forced loans through her deliberate abuse of the clearing system.



ing as it was, Germany's net clearing and other debts to Denmark expanded by roughly 1.5 billion crowns during the first year and a half of the occupation.<sup>10</sup> Like the other victims, Denmark found itself divested of a large part of its stocks of commodities and productive resources without material compensation.

American policy need not copy the Axis practise of issuing special army currency in occupied countries, our situation not being parallel to that of Germany and Japan. Japanese military scrip is said to have been originally introduced in 1938 because of the strain placed on the regular yen by the severe depreciation of the national Chinese currency, with which it circulated at par.<sup>11</sup> In addition, the Japanese army's tendency to usurp the prerogatives of the civil branch of the government is well known. The Germans, as pointed out in the paragraphs above, found the occupation marks the most convenient means of foisting their war burden on the conquered nations. As it is more likely that our Army will occupy areas which are not actively hostile to us, we shall probably continue to pay our own bills. Some study might be devoted, however, to the advantages or disadvantages of having emergency banking facilities, such as those offered by the flexible system of *Reichskreditkassen*, at the disposal of some of our task forces.

### *Exchange Control*

The principal function of foreign exchange control since 1931 has been the prevention of capital flight and the conservation of the means of making necessary payments abroad. Exchange restrictions reached their most complete development in Germany, where every discoverable asset which could be turned into foreign currency was nationalized and utilized in feeding the war industries and laying up stores of food and raw materials for the war that was being prepared. Meanwhile, currency disorders and war fears in most of the other countries of Western Europe had started capital flowing to America in a series of waves that reached tidal proportions in 1938 and 1939. These countries held to monetary orthodoxy as long as they could; but when they were forced into the war, one after another, further retention of the individual's freedom to sabotage his country's currency would have been suicidal. All introduced exchange regulations. But in no case

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<sup>10</sup>*The Economist*, January 31, 1942, p. 155.

<sup>11</sup>*Foreign Commerce Weekly*, July 5, 1941.

was the control as harsh as that in Germany; and in the case of France, at least, there were considerable possibilities for evasion.

One of the Germans' first steps upon occupying an area was the institution of a military control over financial transactions and the exportation and importation of goods. Frontiers were hermetically sealed to transfers of money and valuables other than necessary traveling expenses of government and party agents. If existing national exchange regulations and machinery were insufficient, they were supplemented by decrees of the military commander, on the German model, pending the issue of new regulations by the puppet civilian authorities. When France was divided into occupied and unoccupied zones, the new frontier cut off all economic intercourse between the two sections. It was only in February 1941 that a limited exchange of foodstuffs was permitted, and then under the condition that values of the respective shipments should precisely balance.<sup>12</sup> The Germans were determined not to permit the loss of any resources, material or financial, that might be of value in the conduct of the war.

German supervisory boards were placed in charge of the banks in the occupied countries, and German representatives were given offices in the central banks. Even safe-deposit boxes of individuals had to be opened in the presence of German officials and their contents in foreign securities, Swiss and American currency, *etc.*, made available to the Reich. Violation of the regulations was punishable by imprisonment and heavy fines. The control appears to have been fairly efficiently run, with relatively little red tape considering that civilian authorities, the *Reichskreditkassen*, and the military *Devisenschutzkommando* (Exchange Protection Command) were made jointly responsible for enforcement. Through the inexperience of some of the administering officers or for other reasons, sizable amounts of funds are reported to have been spirited out, but this was inevitable. All in all, the German exchange control in the occupied countries apparently served its purpose well, although "black markets" in foreign currencies and securities continue to exist, and dollar notes—some possibly counterfeited by the Germans themselves—are reported to have been quoted at two to three times their official value.

The importance of exchange control, as far as the restriction of capital flight is concerned, has declined during the past year. Europe's scramble for the former "hard" currencies (*i.e.*, freely convertible and

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<sup>12</sup>Report dated March 7, 1941, from Vichy to the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

relatively stable currencies like the dollar) has ceased. Owing to the extension of the war and the President's executive orders blocking foreign funds in this country, the United States is no longer a satisfactory haven for "nervous money," while the cutting off of emigration and the German "success" in consolidating Europe have reconciled many to leaving their funds within the mark bloc. Even before our entry into the war, Germany and Italy had little use for oversea currencies, the blockade having made Continental self-sufficiency a practical fact.

It is unlikely that capital flight will embarrass the continental United States, but it might become serious in or near the theater of operations. Before imposing exchange control as a remedy for panic conditions, it should be considered whether the psychological effect of the prohibition would do more damage than outright subsidization of capital flight would cost. On the other hand, the prevention of unauthorized transactions might become necessary if, as is possible, we come to use some form of bilateral clearing or barter in our trade with certain countries.

One type of exchange control is always necessary in time of war. For political and military reasons, there must be an absolute ban on commercial and financial intercourse with the enemy. The executive order of April 11, 1940, freezing Danish and Norwegian assets, was our first measure against trade with the enemy during World War II. It was supplanted by further executive orders as the war developed, so that we now have a fairly complete exchange control administered by the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Banks and enforced by a system of bank reporting and by heavy potential penalties for evasion. If we occupy enemy or neutral countries, our Army might have to take over the provisional administration of this control over "financial contraband" in such areas.

### *General Monetary Policy*

In order to exploit the productivity of the area under its control in carrying on the war against other powers, an occupying army must keep the disruption of economic life at a minimum. "Business as usual" should be the keynote. This will also allay the dissatisfaction and rebelliousness of the conquered population and decrease the size of the garrison necessary to maintain order.

A financial panic will usually be the immediate concomitant of invasion. Each individual will strive to have as much liquid cash in his possession as he can, in view of the general uncertainty and the possibility of evacuation. Withdrawals from the banks, if unchecked,

will soon force suspension of payments, while the flood of security liquidations will play havoc with the capital markets. Effective interest rates will soar. Many firms will shut down entirely, giving rise to a serious unemployment problem.

It is probable that, some time before the invading army arrives, the defending authorities will already have taken some remedial action. Banking institutions will either have been closed or the withdrawal privilege will have been severely limited.<sup>13</sup> Security markets will have been closed or transactions will have been limited by minimum price rules, amounting to the same thing. A moratorium on private debts may also be provided, either before or after occupation.

In restoring some semblance of normalcy to the situation, sufficient cash must be made available for circulation, both to make up for the quantity of currency carried away by refugees or destroyed and to compensate for the lessened velocity of circulation resulting from hoarding and the curtailment of credit. At this point, expenditures of new currency—such as the *Reichskreditkassenscheine*—by the invaders fulfill a useful function in supplementing the supply of local money. If it is not possible or desirable to issue sufficient new currency, the authorities can encourage the use of barter, credit, and check transactions. Once the occupation is somewhat stabilized, banks and markets will be reopened, although the lifting of the restrictions may have to be undertaken gradually. Thus, trading in stocks was not resumed in Paris until nine months after the fall of France and then only subject to rigid controls. The danger of unemployment can be temporarily diminished by delaying demobilization of the defeated army and by forbidding firms to lay off workers without official permission.

Upon the disappearance of the deflationary crisis described in the paragraphs above, an inflationary situation is certain to develop within a conquered country. Contributing factors include the shortage of goods (setting off a vicious upward spiral of the cost of living and wages) and the increase in the volume and velocity of money. The latter factor arises out of the release of funds that had been tied up in inventories and out of deficit financing of extraordinary expenditures on the part of the local government and the troops of occupation. The francs placed at the disposal of the German authorities by the French government, for example, were derived, not from revenue and real saving, but from direct credits opened by the Bank of France in favor

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<sup>13</sup>Effective January 12, 1942, for example, the military governor of Hawaii restricted monthly withdrawals to \$200 for individuals and \$5,000 for firms, with a few exceptions.



of the state for this purpose. Authorizations for such advances total 150 billion francs—more than the entire French note circulation before the war. The inflationary effect of such an increase in purchasing power is obvious.

It is to the interest of the occupying power to hold inflation in check. Not only does the docility of the subject population depend upon its morale and well-being, but also, if the exchange rate remains fixed, a rise in prices and wages within the occupied country will decrease the buying power of the invaders. Inflation would only be inflicted deliberately in order to cripple the enemy's economy. When German occupation notes first flooded France, it was feared by many of the French that the Reich intended to take vengeance for 1923 by means of an unlimited dilution of the currency. Such pessimists forgot the important economic rôle France was scheduled to play in the New Order.

As a means of controlling inflation, the Germans have introduced in the occupied countries a remedy that was in use within Germany itself, the "price stop." Prices, wages, interest, and rent are frozen at the level existing just before the invasion, and increases are permitted only if "economically justified," as determined by the authorities. Price-fixing, even if enforced by the death penalty, cannot be effective while basic inflationary forces remain unchecked unless a strict system of rationing is also imposed. In proportion as normal consumption is artificially curtailed by such means, excess purchasing power seeks other channels of expenditure, preferably in "real" values. Real estate being generally considered a good hedge against inflation, the land boom may go so far that the authorities also find it necessary to subject transfers of real property to control.

Common stocks are another form of so-called "inflation-proof" investment. It is noteworthy that in every country occupied by Germany the markets for equities experienced phenomenal rises once the initial panics had been overcome. On the Brussels Bourse, stock quotations showed increases averaging about 100 per cent between the eve of the invasion and the end of 1940 and continued to rise during 1941. In most of the occupied countries the authorities saw fit to put brakes on the boom by dividend limitations, taxation of speculative profits, maximum limits to daily price fluctuations, and substitution of registered for bearer securities (the last-mentioned step in order to discourage dealings in the black market). Not all the post-occupation advance in stock prices, to be sure, was caused directly by inflation; a considerable in-

fluence must also be ascribed to the policy of German firms which bought participation in many industries in order to assure themselves the unquestioned economic hegemony of Europe after the war.

Price-fixing, rationing, exchange control, and similar measures may slow down the development of a runaway price spiral, but they are in themselves evidence that the inflationary pressure is there. That the most drastic penalties, including death, do not deter individuals from illegal transactions is shown by many reports from occupied Europe and Asia. Price increases have had to be permitted all along the line in spite of the price-stop policies.<sup>14</sup> Only if the restrictions actually increase the absorption of purchasing power by saving will they succeed in curbing the underlying trend. Other basic, long-run solutions include measures to raise the physical volume of production and increase the taxation of current income. It is particularly important that governmental deficits be covered by real savings (forced loans, if necessary) borne by the population itself rather than by means of bank credit and the printing press. Finally, all unnecessary outlays should be eliminated. This is presumably one reason why the Germans have not expended all the funds credited to them for the use of the armies of occupation.

Study of the practices of our German enemies leads to the conclusion that they have devoted considerable staff work to the economic side of their military and political strategy. Attributing their defeat in the last war in part to poor economic planning, they have since brought the science of *Wehrwirtschaft* to a high degree of development. Our problems, no doubt, require different solutions than those found by the Germans and the Japanese. It is to be hoped, however, that we shall not be less prepared or resourceful when our Army is faced with new responsibilities and opportunities as the result of eventual occupation of foreign soil.

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<sup>14</sup>*The Economist*, January 31, 1942, p. 143.

# UNOCCUPIED FRANCE AND GERMAN WAR ECONOMY

By JEAN MONTRY

The author has no intention of making a complete study of the rôle played by unoccupied France in the German war economy. He merely wishes to point out some facts, gathered from reliable sources and often from personal observation, which serve to reveal the extent of French economic aid to Germany. The extent of this aid, which is of great importance for the conduct of the war, is often unknown even to the local population most directly concerned.

That modern war utilizes everything is illustrated by the exploitation of defeated France by Germany. Not only in the occupied zone which is under the direct control of German authorities, but also in the unoccupied zone, all the wealth and the whole production of the country is utilized, regardless of the consequences to local economy. The plunder starts with sources of power, which is the basis of modern economic life. Although unoccupied France has but limited coal resources, the coal fields of Saint Etienne, Ales, and La Mure, which always fell short of local demands in peace time, were forced to send a large part of their output to Italy. This enabled the Germans to send less coal to their ally and relieved the strain on their railroad system. Almost the total output of La Mure's anthracite, the best coal in France, goes to northern Italy.

Though poor in coal, unoccupied France is very rich in hydro-electric power. Waterfalls in the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the *Massif Central* are now contributing to the German war effort. In September 1941 one-half of the total power produced in unoccupied France was supplied to Germany and sent not merely to northern France but to the Rhineland. The transmission of electric power over such distances is naturally uneconomical; the greatest part of the initial energy is lost before it gets to its destination. But the Germans do not shrink from such wastes, since their factories, particularly in the Rhineland, are in great need of electric power. Bombardments by the R. A. F., directed at the electric power stations first of the Ruhr and then of Belgium and northern France, have been very effective. It must be noted that the production of the electric power stations in the French mountains is not consistent over the whole year; it suffers a considerable reduction during the winter in the Alps and in the Pyrenees as snow-

beds and ice reduce the water supply and diminish the flow of rivers. In October 1941 the probability of rationing electricity during the forthcoming winter was announced in southern France (this rationing was already in force in Paris), but very few Frenchmen realized the true reasons for this shortage of electric power.

Power supplies from France to Germany will probably increase in the near future. The construction of new power stations in the Pyrenees, which proceeded very slowly before 1940, is now being greatly accelerated; there are few transmission yards in France as active as these. A voltage capacity of 480,000 units will soon be added to the 702,000 produced in the French Pyrenees before 1941. High voltage lines which were used for the transmission of current at 60,000 and 150,000 volts in southwestern France are now being equipped for transmission at 220,000 volts which will permit a reduction of current losses in long-distance transmission. A member of the Vichy government has spoken of the need for establishing "European inter-connections." The importance attached to the new power stations may be judged by the following fact: last summer in the yards of two of these stations south of Tarbes every workman was given three litres of wine per day, which is a considerable ration and greatly in excess of ordinary pre-war consumption, while the rest of the population of that region was suffering from an acute shortage of wine. Thus, workmen in the electric power stations were not only privileged but even bribed, since such methods have never been used by French authorities.

The wine question is one of the gravest problems for the average Frenchman. There is a shortage of wine in the restaurants and cafes all over France. Even in Montpellier, the capital of Languedoc which is the most important "wine belt" in the world, consumers have been given only half a glass of wine per meal since September 1941; and yet September is vintage time in that region. What happens to this wine, of which in peace time there was such an embarrassing surplus? "We are letting too much of it go to the north," said a competent high official of Languedoc. Wholesale dealers openly admit that almost the whole wine production of southern France is sent to Germany where it is distilled and converted into alcohol. Alcohol is used in a great variety of war products. It is also mixed with petrol to fuel the trucks and tanks of the *Wehrmacht*. One may say that the German tanks are drinking French wine.

French wines, in addition to industrial uses, have many customers in Germany—normal consumers and soldiers of the *Wehrmacht*. Ger-



mans prefer the best French wines, and almost all the producing areas of famous vintages (Champagne, Burgundy, Bordeaux, the Loire valley) are in the occupied zone. The German army treats wine stocks and production as war prizes. In the unoccupied zone large quantities of third-rate wines with a small percentage of alcohol (Languedoc and Algeria, the latter imported through Marseilles) are to be found; these are sent to Germany for industrial use rather than for individual consumption. The important regions producing liquors and spirits (Cognac, Touraine, Normandy, northern France, *etc.*) are also in the occupied zone, and only negligible quantities of their production reach the unoccupied zone.

Very stringent restrictions have been imposed upon the production and consumption of *aspértifs*, liquors, and alcohols in the unoccupied zone. Officially it is claimed that these measures are directed against alcoholism; in fact, their purpose is rather to reserve this alcohol for other uses. M. Edouard Barthe, the "wine king" of France, was arrested and put into a concentration camp in unoccupied France in October 1941; he was accused of "hindering the export of wine from the wine growing region." Actually, he had refused to send his last wine reserve to Germany and protested when the Germans failed to return the tank-wagons in which wine was sent to them.

Thus the coal, water power, and wine of unoccupied France are exploited to add to the power supplies of the Axis war machine. The amount of supplies of the unoccupied zone taken from stocks accumulated at Marseilles are better known; rubber, cotton, and wool have been carried off. The Germans have also drawn, although we cannot say how much, on the gasoline stocks of Étang de Berre and of Frongignan. They buy, often at a high price, a large proportion of the fruit and vegetable harvest of southern France; whole trains carry to Germany the fruits of Roussillon and the early vegetables from the region of Avignon as well as cattle from the mountains. It is almost impossible to find onions (which it is said are necessary for certain pharmaceutical products in Germany) in regions such as Vaucluse and Herault, both of which produce large supplies of this vegetable.

Among the mineral resources of southern France, bauxite is probably the most important. Almost the whole production of the fields of Var and Herault is sent to Central Europe. Even the nickel which exists in the form of small coin is collected by the Germans, using French institutions for that purpose. Five centime pieces have been withdrawn from circulation by the Bank of France. In Marseilles, school children

who brought in large quantities of them were given an alluring reward—chocolate, which is a very scarce luxury. Thus the German Armistice Commission succeeded in converting the chocolate stocks of Marseilles into nickel. French agencies have progressively withdrawn nickel coins (10 centimes) from circulation and replaced them with zinc pieces. Since August 1941, I have never seen cashiers of the Bank of France, of Treasuries, and other state agencies give change in nickel.

Germans are not interested merely in raw materials; they also have an eye for manufactured goods. There are very few factories in the unoccupied zone which are not working in one way or another for Germany. Often the workers and even the employers are quite unaware of this, since, far from repressing the "black market," the Germans are encouraging and developing it in unoccupied France. Almost the whole production of the textile industries of Mazamet, Lavelanet, Castres, and Vienne is bought by the Germans either directly or through the agency of commissioners, who do not hesitate to pay twice the normal French market price for these materials. Whole trains of German freight cars can be seen in the railway stations around Tarare, near Lyon, a region specializing in light fabrics. Similar German purchases are made in the great tanning and leather centers such as Saint Rambert d'Albon. Dealers at Marseilles sold leather soles for 45 francs apiece to the Germans, though the official price had been fixed at 9 francs by Vichy.

Motor cars, which have been immobilized by the shortage of petrol, are bought up by the Germans. As a consequence of Armistice conditions, the French army had to deliver its whole motor car equipment to the Germans; these cars were collected in large groups around the most important demobilization centers and have been sent to Germany or Italy. During the whole of 1941, inhabitants of Montpellier have seen processions of these cars marked with the letters KUK; most of these had been privately owned before the war and requisitioned by the French army. There is also a very flourishing trade consisting of the purchase in the unoccupied zone of private cars which have been immobilized by lack of gasoline; these are sent to the occupied zone where they are sold to Germans at a high price. This sort of trade specializes in trucks.

Aviation supplies sent to Germany are particularly alarming. It is well known that before the war the French aviation industry had to start almost from scratch, but new factories were built in the winter of 1939-40, mostly in the south. One of these, at Marignane near

Marseilles, was nearly completed at the time of the Armistice. The Germans have completely removed it in return for an indemnity paid to the *Société des Constructions Aéronautiques du Midi*. All of the equipment has been shipped from France, leaving only the walls of the factory at Marignane.

The large Dewoitine pursuit-plane factory was completed at Toulouse in the summer of 1940, but production did not start. In the spring of 1941 the government attempted to get an authorization to start operations in the Dewoitine works. The Germans would grant permission only if six planes should be supplied to the *Luftwaffe* for each plane supplied to the French air force. Vichy decided that this proportion was exorbitant and broke off negotiations. During the war in Syria Vichy asked for a more favorable proportion, and it appears that they came to an agreement in September. The directors of the factory were particularly active at that time, and it was being said openly at Toulouse in October that the Dewoitine works were going to open again. What proportion of the output will be supplied to Germany we do not know, but the recent statement of the Vichy Air Ministry that the air fleet has been increased is proof that these agreements are working.

Instances such as these show how efficiently the Germans are controlling industrial production in unoccupied France outside armament industries proper. In Marseilles, where all factories are controlled by the *Deutsche Küsten Wache*, a German controlled commission for fats levies 70 per cent of the vegetable and mineral oil production of the region. Only 30 per cent is supplied to the French food control authorities for civilian consumption. Another German-Italian commission deals with all goods entering the Marseilles harbor, and well known dealers and importers have stated that it levied 60 per cent for the Germans and 20 per cent for the Italians on all food products entering the harbor. Thus only 20 per cent of the merchandise coming from French colonies in Africa is going to the French population. The enormous percentage taken by the Germans has been officially accounted for by reference to the needs of the occupied zone, which includes two-thirds of the French population. It is, of course, impossible to know what share of these foodstuffs eventually reach French consumers in the occupied zone; but this explanation cannot account for the 20 per cent given to the Italians whose occupation territory does not extend farther than the little town of Menton!

Lastly, unoccupied France, in addition to her stocks and her imports,

is of some importance to Germany in transportation. German shipments are taken over by French railroads from the Iberian peninsula and even from Italy. This burden to the French railway system is in addition to the large proportion of the railroad equipment delivered to the Axis as a consequence of the Armistice. At the international stations of Cerbère and Canfranc on the Franco-Spanish border one can often observe German or German-bound trucks on the French rails, although at Canfranc the majority of trucks on the French side are Swiss and used for supplies to Switzerland. The rôle played by French harbors of the Mediterranean, Marseilles and Sete, is also important to the German war economy. Large quantities of fruits and minerals from Spain are shipped via these ports to Eastern Europe. Some Spanish ships which arrive regularly at Marseilles are completely manned by German crews, and the Germans operate two French ships which travel between northern Africa and Marseilles and the total cargo of which goes to Germany.

Unoccupied France and, through Marseilles, French North Africa thus play a substantial part in supplying the armies and factories of the Axis. A large proportion of the products which these colonies believe are sent to the metropolis never reach the French consumer, and actually German requisitions seriously affect the African population. Although Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco are the greatest producers of olive oil in the world, they suffer from a shortage of olive oil. In Morocco a rationing system is in force in the towns. Every consumer is allowed but 125 grams of oil per head per month—not olive oil, which no longer can be found, but ground nut oil from Dakar. Olive oil apparently is sent to Italy where, it is alleged, technicians have discovered a method of transforming it into lubricating oil—one of the materials greatly needed by the Axis. North Africa also produces many other materials of value to the Germans: cereals, vegetables and fruits, phosphates and various minerals (iron, zinc, lead, manganese, and molybdenum), cork, leather, *etc.* But these are bulky products and must escape the British blockade. Some ships succeed in doing so, mostly between Tunisia and Sicily, but it seems unlikely that large quantities have thus passed across the Mediterranean Sea.

On the other hand, Tunisia does play a paramount part in the supply of foodstuffs to General Rommel's armies. Tunisia is a large producer of foodstuffs with an abundant surplus, and many Tunisian dealers are Italian colonists who serve as exporters to Libya. Libya has never been in a position to feed its population, whose needs are



greatly increased by the presence of armed forces, the loss of the southern oases (Mourzouk and Koufra, twice raided by the Free French), and the devastation of Cjrenaica. Most of its food must be imported, and Tunisia is clearly in the best position to meet these needs.

The contributions levied by the Germans on unoccupied France are, of course, quite small when compared to the exploitation of occupied France. In this conquered area the German authorities requisition harvests and stocks and operate industries much as if they were German. In order to exploit French industry to the full they have subdivided the occupied zone, setting up a "forbidden zone" (*zone interdite*) which includes the great northern industrial basin developed around the coal mines and the eastern or Lorraine industrial area developed around the iron-ore mines. This zone embraces four-fifths of the French industrial potential, almost all heavy industries and large chemical plants, and a considerable part of the French textile industry. "Forbidden" is not just a word carelessly applied to this zone; a special pass is required to enter it, and even the people who evacuated this area during the campaign in 1940 are rarely authorized to return. The northern industrial district is not administered by the German authorities in Paris but has been placed under the *Gauleiter* of Belgium. These provisions seem to make it clear that it is considered a part of the Nazi province of Belgium, and that the "forbidden zone" will be included in the boundaries of Germany in case of a Nazi victory. Lorraine has also become simply a part of the German economic machine.

The territory of occupied France also plays a considerable rôle in German strategic plans. This is particularly true of the Atlantic coast from Dunkirk to Hendaye. One of the earliest German projects after the surrender of France was the development of a new network of strategic highways through the country, and under German pressure the French budget for 1941 authorized the construction of several important new roads. One ran from Strasbourg to Calais, through Nancy, Vitry le François, Rheims, Laon, and Arras; a second extended from Strasbourg to Paris with branches to the important ports of Rouen-Le Havre, Cherbourg, Saint Brieu, Brest, and Bordeaux. These roads improved the communications between the Rhine valley and the naval bases on the western coast of France. Nor did the Germans neglect the Mediterranean coast; a highway was projected from southern Alsace to Marseilles, through Belfort, Dijon, Chalons sur Saone, and Lyon. Two other highways, one from Bayonne to Cerbère, the

other from Bordeaux to Marseilles through Toulouse, Narbonne, and Montpellier, were planned to facilitate transportation between the Atlantic coast, the Mediterranean, and Italy.

Aside from the immediate military objectives, the German-Vichy program of highway construction unquestionably had another purpose or effect. It decentralized the former French road-net centered on Paris and is causing the French capital to lose its former importance as a communications center. France now has "Europe at its back." It is significant that the Vichy government used French funds to construct highways essential to German strategical aims and designed to reduce her importance in the European communications network. Once again the French people were required to assist the war machine which oppresses it.

# RECORDS ADMINISTRATION AND THE WAR

BY EMMETT J. LEAHY

When the United States first squared away for open war with Germany and Japan, the Federal government hunched its shoulders under the astounding burden of approximately *seven million cubic feet* of its own records *in the District of Columbia alone*. This is the equivalent of two thousand miles of records the size of an ordinary letterhead. Expressed in terms of the commonplace four-drawer filing cabinet, this quantity of records would require approximately a million and a half units costing currently more than thirty-five million dollars; if the unjustified portion of such cabinets represents enough metal to build a pipe line to the East, it is food for thought hard to digest. It is easily possible that as much as ten million square feet of badly needed office and storage space in the Capital's congested area must be marked off for records maintenance; that exceeds the combined total space requirements of both the War and Navy Departments. Equally important is the enormous drain on manpower required in the creation, handling, filing, and maintenance of records in such volume.

Among this mass of records, probably in less than five per cent of the total, is the accumulated recorded experience, the memory, of the government of the United States. If these records were destroyed, or if what remains is or becomes unmanageable, we are subjected to a government wandering helplessly in an impenetrable fog of amnesia. The March issue of *Systems* sustains the theme that records are the administrative machine-tools of management. This metaphor is echoed in the April issue of *American Business*. The May issue of *Office* calls attention to the fact that "all war production starts on paper. It progresses only as fast as a vanguard of plans, letters, schedules, priorities, contracts, and other paper work allows it to move." Federal agencies, particularly the war agencies, are simultaneously heavily overlaid with a record burden of their own creation and vitally dependent upon the essential core of that burden.

From studies and surveys made during the last several years by The National Archives, the Society of American Archivists, and the W. P. A. Survey of Federal Archives, it is evident that the germs causing cancerous records growth in the Federal government are not inescapable, that they can be isolated, and that in their most damaging form they are indigenous to this country. Administrative practices and or-

ganizational patterns peculiar to our form of government constitute the more general causes of over production and dissipation of records. It can be noted with satisfaction, however, that an intelligent constructive attack on wasteful administrative practices and clumsy organizational patterns is being made at the planning level by the revitalized Bureau of the Budget and, even more important, by competent planning staffs in some of the larger agencies.

The lack of effective records management is in itself a more specific and immediate cause of unwarranted records growth. This is one of the few remaining substantial fields of public administration in which there has been little or no progress for many years, the efforts for reform having been sporadic and patchy. Records management hit bottom in 1941 after a long devolution from the physical controls it experienced at the turn of the century before typewriters, carbon paper, and other record-making and duplicating machines were turned loose in uncontrolled production. The costs and losses the government has suffered by failing to control its records are appalling—the word is used advisedly—and too little publicized to be healthy. It should be sufficiently damning to reveal that the War and Treasury Departments and the General Accounting Office have officially reported that each has over a million cubic feet of records in its custody.

The gross output of records, the breakdown of record offices, and the scattering of essential source materials during the last three or four decades finally elicited an effective response from several potent sources by the fall of 1941. The Bureau of the Budget has established a committee on records of the war administration to insure that experience gained in the administrative development of this war effort will not be lost. The Civil Service Commission has established a central committee on records administration to appraise the problem and make recommendations. The National Archives has inaugurated a records administration program to render needed advice and assistance to departments and agencies. These are very substantial reinforcements. With their assistance, the most important job remains to be done in agencies of the line, particularly in those directly responsible for the conduct of the war. The Navy Department led the way by establishing last September an Office of Records Coordination which is accountable for efficient records management throughout the Naval establishment. The experience of this office has been drawn upon considerably in the following discussion of the different, but closely related, parts of the program so greatly needed in most of the larger agencies in Washington.



## I

A records administration program should and can be launched on some flank susceptible of prompt and noticeable results. One of the most profitable places to strike is against the indefinite retention in congested office areas of relatively inactive records which need to be permanently preserved. Since the creation of The National Archives in 1934, the Federal government has invested over twenty million dollars in optimum storage conditions and expert handling of records of this type. Within a comparatively few months upwards of thirty thousand cubic feet of Naval records have been cleared out of congested Naval buildings into the more responsible and better equipped custodianship of the Archivist of the United States. Many of these records date back to the earliest days of the Republic. Officials having such records in their custody should have been knocking on the door of the Archivist eight years ago requesting that he receive them. During the interval the government has been forced into new building construction while most of the massive vaults of The National Archives have remained empty.

Meanwhile, records remaining in the custody of agencies which are properly more concerned with their current activities than they are with the records of preceding administrations have taken a fearful beating. A third of all the Federal records in Washington were recently found to be exposed to danger from fire; nearly half to danger from dust, grit, and filth; and smaller proportions to damage from rain, excessive sunlight, theft, mold, vermin, and other hazards. In such condition is the government's accumulated, recorded experience, its memory. The tragedy of an individual with an obscured, disordered, and fragmentary mind is greatly exceeded, because of the greater importance of the issues at stake, by a government similarly afflicted.

With uncontrolled governments running riotously across the face of the world, we should be constantly aware that there is no more fitting conclusion to the democratic process than that civil servants, from the chief executive downward, render to the nation an account of their stewardship by making available in an institution such as The National Archives the essential records of their administration. It is to the enduring credit of the President that all the papers of his public life will be opened to the nation in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park. In contrast, papers of many former presidents and other top flight executives, removed from official custody with outgoing administrations, have been lost or destroyed.

An important corollary to a program which deposits valuable records in an institution such as The National Archives is the prompt elimination of valueless records. These greatly exceed in quantity the records which must be preserved. This explains the report of the Washington Chamber of Commerce that the largest single item in freight car loadings out of the Nation's Capital is waste paper. On this flank there are two elements in the attack. The source of supply must be cut by eliminating useless paperwork and by withholding from the files or segregating therein the great volume of papers which are useless at the time of their receipt or shortly thereafter.

There must be planned elimination, regularly and promptly, of voluminous records of countless types which have outlived their usefulness. This can best be accomplished by an inventory of the papers received, scheduling therein those categories which should be withheld from the files, those which should be eliminated therefrom at specified intervals of time, and those which should be retired at regular intervals to an archival institution. Inventories of this kind in the myriad organizational units of the Federal government are nearly as scarce as Nipponese gunboats in the Mississippi, but the Department of Agriculture, collaborating with some of the ablest representatives of The National Archives, has produced exceptional results along this line.

Between the two extremes of valuable records which must be retained indefinitely or permanently and of valueless records which can be disposed of promptly, there is a broad twilight zone. The bulky records that fall in this group can be handled effectively but rarely are. These are the records which must be retained for varying lengths of time until the public business to which they relate has been accomplished. It is common practice to relegate material of this kind to warehouses, with or without a guard, where it is almost invariably forgotten and kept long after it is of any further value.

In a brief existence of several critical years the United States Food Administration of the first World War accumulated the suspect total of over 20,000 cubic feet of records. These moldered in costly storage for over twenty years. After their transfer to the newly established National Archives it was found that only a small part of the total should have been preserved. The National Recovery Administration, somewhat more spectacularly short lived, produced a similarly suspect 17,315 cubic feet of records. Since their comparatively prompt deposit in The National Archives, there has been a substantial reduction of their bulk by the elimination of useless or duplicate material.

In these cases it is responsible custodianship which is needed in the agency having cognizance over both the records and the warehouse. At negligible expense it is possible to convert such depositories into giant sieves through which material which has outlived its usefulness can be sifted. By means of summary inventories, checking with responsible offices, and appraisal, valueless material can be eliminated and the worthwhile material properly preserved. The common practice, however, is to fill one warehouse, then procure and fill another, and another, and so on. Several years ago one independent agency had more than twenty such storage areas. A planned records program could have done with only a few.

An attack of the foregoing type can be coordinated and directed most effectively by someone who by training and experience knows, or knows how to find out, the administrative, legal, research, and other values a given body of records may hold. Here a good archivist pays for himself literally a hundred times over.

## II

Many bulky records containing important information must be preserved indefinitely, but not necessarily in their original form. This is one of the justifications of microphotography. For historical, administrative, and legal reasons the Navy has always preserved two logs of each of its ships of the line and their auxiliaries. One is an engineering log; the other a deck log. For excellent reasons those ships are numerous. Their daily logs accumulate to such an extent that one type of log for the years 1917-1939 adds up to twenty-five tons. Reducing those logs to tiny images on 16 mm. microfilm eliminates for all practical purposes the costs of storing them for as many years ahead as we can foresee. What is more, applying microphotography as soon as possible to the current accumulation of logs and eliminating the substantial cost of binding saves the government an additional pretty penny.

Although justifiable applications of microphotography to record problems are too numerous to mention, they are not limitless. The direct and too simple reasoning of many administrators fascinated by so simple a device for reducing their bulky records to tiny images makes for stupid abuses. Here again it has been amply demonstrated that an archivist collaborating with a microfilming analyst pays a hundred times over. In too many cases administrators and available microfilming facilities are so absorbed in mass microfilming that many of the other excellent applications of this device are smothered by the tons

of valueless material which should have been destroyed outright or which could have been destroyed after several years, in both cases without microfilming.

President Roosevelt has called attention in a singular manner to a second purpose of microfilming. Recently in writing to the president of the Society of American Archivists, accepting honorary membership in that society, he expressed the hope:

. . . that the Society of American Archivists will do all that is possible to build up an American public opinion in favor of what might be called the only form of insurance that will stand the test of time.

I am referring to the duplication of records by modern processes like the microfilm so that if in any part of the country original archives are destroyed, a record of them will exist in some other place.

The Navy, for example, will undoubtedly build planes and vessels of revolutionary design. The Germans or the Japanese may blast to smithereens these ships of unique design, and, what is more, they may bomb to obliteration the original plans from which they were built—plans into which we have put hundreds of thousands of dollars. But we are insured. Hidden safely away beyond their reach will be microfilm copies of those plans. From that microfilm those plans can be reconstructed; from those plans ships can be built; and from those ships the Japanese and Germans can be blasted to defeat. There are many similar applications of microphotography wherein the responsible administrator and the microfilming analyst working together can provide a security which we cannot afford to do without.

A responsible records officer will recognize that there are many cases where microfilming will not provide the security that is needed. This is particularly true in those many instances where there is a great deal of inter-filing. Frequently material added to a file, which has been microfilmed for security purposes, is more immediately vital than the other important records in the file which were photographed a week, a month, or more ago. In cases of this kind, the best prescription calls for insulated, reinforced filing cabinets. These are standard products of several trustworthy companies. The cabinets will do all that is claimed for them. They will not, of course, survive a direct hit, but all but an insignificant few will survive the fires and demolition resulting from air raids.

Microfilming to speed administrative action is a third purpose to which the process has been put with excellent results. Mail within the Naval establishment, for example, must be speeded and must not



be lost. In several instances thus far mail has been microfilmed on receipt with a double purpose. It releases letters to action desks immediately and at the same time provides a security copy. The cost is negligible. Whatever recording may be necessary to hold action desks accountable for the mail routed to them is done from the developed film.

A fourth excellent purpose of microfilming is large scale duplication. When the Navy found it essential to keep posted on the progress of machine-tool procurement, instead of setting up a large office force in the War Production Board to transcribe the desired data, one camera and one operator yielded the same results. When the British government requested certain documents in the possession of only the United States government among the United Nations, those documents were microfilmed. Over a thousand pages were reduced to a narrow roll of film which easily fitted in the pocket of an officer flying to London.

There are dangers in forced applications of microphotography. Older records that are more or less disorganized and modern records that are as yet unorganized are frozen in that condition on film. In other cases the essential arrangement or the physical form of whole collections has to be modified when processed for filming. It is possible, if the film replaces the originals, to incur an irrevocable loss of information or serviceability.

The American government is on firm ground when it duplicates the excellent experience of the British government in reducing official and personal air mail to microfilm at some central point of dispatch and enlarging it to a readable size at a distant central point. In this way one plane can easily carry a load which otherwise would have required sixty. There can be no cavilling today about the importance of releasing planes.

### III

After valuable non-current records have been retired to an archival agency, valueless records eliminated or scheduled for disposal, and suitable records microfilmed, a records program worthy of the name is by no means consummated. Decks have been cleared for action and no more. There remains the herculean task of planning a mail and records system to implement rather than burden the administration. Each of the larger agencies in Washington has somewhere between two and five thousand people giving their full time to mail and records work. That number of employees, in proportion to the total number

of employees in those agencies, is strong indication of the large gains to be realized if here also there is a flank vulnerable to attack. Just as the fascist heel on the Nazi boot may trip Hitler, there is a vulnerable point in the fact that almost every agency has *two or more filing systems* duplicating one another and giving only fragmentary service to the same administrators. There are the numerous mail and file units officially designated as such, and there are the much more numerous semi-formal files in individual offices or organizational units. The reforms to be made here are both important and large in scale. The two systems must be merged.

Before the introduction of the typewriter to the Federal government about the beginning of this century, a principal clerk drafted a letter in longhand. Necessary changes were made in that draft by his division chief, bureau head, head of the agency, and anyone else concerned. Before or after the letter was received by the head of the agency, a smooth copy of it was prepared by a writing clerk. It was this copy that was usually mailed. There remained only the rough draft or a press copy of the letter as it was transmitted. The mere physical effort of writing in longhand served as a brake on the productiveness of executives. Substantially the same procedure, with or without typewriters, still prevails in German and British administrative organizations and in the more settled governmental units, the State Department for example, in this country. In most instances, single copies of documents sent, as well as documents received, permit the creation of only one file on each subject.

Current practice in the United States is in sharp contrast to the foregoing procedure. It is more the observance than the breach for an assistant to prepare a smooth letter with whatever numbers of copies is standard. Additional revised smooth letters, with copies, may be and very frequently are prepared by any one or all of the following: the unit head, the section chief, the division chief, the bureau head, an assistant to the head of the agency, and the head himself. Instead of a single draft, anywhere from several to fifty pages, with the attendant labor, equipment, space, and other costs, are spread over the many administrative levels.

There are subtler and perhaps more important values involved in this procedure. In the instance of the one draft with all revisions thereon or attached, differences of opinion and the talent or the lack of it within the agency are there for everyone and particularly staff officers to see. Both incompetence and competence are laid bare daily. More-

over, the accountability provided and the morale engendered is immeasurable. In the instance of the many revisions in smooth copy, all evidence of conflicts and incompetence can be and usually is successfully hidden.

Should we revert to longhand? In some circumstances, yes; but in the large, of course not. Type the first draft smooth as now. Require that it be transmitted all the way up through channels. Make all revisions on it whenever possible, each revisor initialing his changes. If a new draft is unavoidable, require transmission of the first draft with it. File the first draft with revisions. Badly needed accountability is achieved and individualized. The impeccably smooth last draft can be prepared before or after it is approved depending on the preferences of the responsible officer; he will gain if it is after approval.

When President Taft's commission on economy and efficiency quite properly encouraged the use of carbon copies in lieu of press copies shortly before the first World War, it unintentionally started a snowball rolling. In 1941 that snowball measured nearly seven million cubic feet. Easy multiplication of copies made possible for the first time a multiplication of filing systems. This, together with the tremendous expansion of governmental agencies, has broken down the old central filing offices. In most cases, however, so-called central files have continued to exist, but rarely are they effective. Their ineffectiveness is obscured by the great volume of correspondence which passes *through* them. These offices keep that which they can get and sometimes keep it well, but in the vast majority of cases the offices which they are supposed to serve also have copies of their own which satisfy most of their needs. The cost of classifying, filing, and servicing these unofficial individual office files is almost incalculable.

The mode of attack here which promises the greatest success is the establishment of an official branch file within divisions or sections which have a sufficient volume of correspondence to warrant it. Centralized technical supervision and general direction over these branch files, in whatever number circumstances in a particular agency may justify, will achieve everything desired from unwieldy central files. This bridges the present gap between the administrator and the official files. It is possible for these smaller, specialized, filing offices to render service of a kind most executives have ceased to hope for. These branch files should be so planned, however, that the records they accumulate will comprise one or more well integrated groups. Properly planned, each branch serves one or more clearly defined functional units in the admin-

istrative organization. At the same time it must be sufficiently close to the executives served that service is prompt and personalized.

Each branch must receive, route, and file all the official mail of the units it serves. It would be a very rare case in which the establishment of such branch files would not yield a fifty per cent savings in filing personnel and the space and equipment occupied by records. It should be remembered that we are talking about personnel in thousands of clerks and messengers, space in hundreds of thousands of square feet, and equipment in millions of dollars in each of the larger agencies.

A branch file smaller by nature than a large central file is also limited in the range of subjects with which it is concerned. Encyclopedic classification schemes of the larger central-filing organizations can be sharply reduced to those comparatively few general subjects of common interest to all or almost all branch files. The much more limited and specialized classification in the relatively small branch files can be perfected to the advantage of the units served. In time many executives will find that they can readily obtain from their records office information for which in the past they have deemed it necessary to establish units of substantial size to tabulate or record and otherwise make available. This last is another hidden cost which is almost incalculable.

A pattern of this kind provides the framework for an Administrative Reference Service. Specialized records offices can render specialized service in anticipating and satisfying the needs peculiar to the units maintaining them. The classification, organization, and arrangement of the records themselves can be adapted accordingly. Supplementary material can be procured if necessary and held in readiness. The centralized, technical supervision and general direction which these branch records offices should have is the vehicle for making the specialized information in the branch offices available to anyone who may need it wherever he may be in the administrative organization as a whole.

This is the foundation upon which administrators and technicians can obtain from records offices a reference service as vitally useful as that which legislators regularly obtain from a library's legislative reference service. The administrator and analyst of public administration will find administrative history "on file." With excellent reason the Science Committee of the National Resources Committee reports that hidden away in the Government's records are "as much in the way of intellectual resources as there are mineral resources beneath the soil of the North American Continent." These resources must be tapped as well as conserved.



It would be a badly administered program which could not yield to an agency all the advantages cited and, at the same time, reduce the personnel employed in mail and records work from as much as ten per cent of the total personnel to less than five per cent, preferably close to three per cent. This reduction, happily, is a painless process. In most instances central filing personnel should man the branch files established. Clerks in outlying offices who have usually found it burdensome to maintain the unofficial and incomplete office files are released for more useful and satisfying tasks. Heads of central files can head up or assist in the centralized technical direction the branch files require.

To effect this substantial phase of an agency-wide records administration program the sure, guiding hand of a specialist thoroughly experienced in current records management, with the additional talent of an administrative analyst, is needed. Like the archivist and the micro-filming analyst, such a specialist will unquestionably pay his own way many times over.

#### IV

The problem as a whole is far too substantial for the patchwork given it thus far; it has outgrown part-time treatment. The prevailing tendency to cast off misfit and incompetent personnel by assigning them to files has worked both ways. The records problem could not be much worse, but with personnel of this kind it will not improve.

The Federal government has been confronted with equally large-scale problems before. Its effective procedure has always been the designation of an officer responsible for a solution. The truly chaotic state of the estimates, appropriations, and accounting for Federal expenditures prior to 1921 was such as to warrant a requirement in the Budget and Accounting Act that a budget officer be designated in each department and agency. In some cases duds were appointed. In other cases it was made a part-time job. The over-all result, however, has been an appreciable gain in this field. The outstanding job done by William A. Jump, Director of Budget and Finance in the Department of Agriculture, can be borne in mind; his work will continue to permeate through the government with excellent result long after he is gone.

The extreme backwardness of personnel policies in many agencies led to the requirement by executive order in 1940 of the establishment of a director of personnel in each department and agency. Again re-

sults have varied, but as a whole the gain is easily recognizable. The principle behind that executive order caused the Department of Commerce to experience the fine, true hand of Oliver C. Short in its personnel administration. Such a hand was grievously needed, and it is regrettable that the experience was short-lived; Mr. Short was drafted to a more vital program.

The establishment of the Office of Records Coordination in the Navy Department has already been mentioned. For several years a somewhat more limited but extraordinarily effective program has been conducted throughout most of the Department of Agriculture by the Division of Communications and Records in the Office of Plant and Operations. Since 1934 the Treasury Department has greatly profited in those instances where the services of the Treasury Archivist have been utilized; the present responsibilities of that officer and the scope of her influence need to be increased. The Tennessee Valley Authority has recently established a records officer in a staff office, the Division of Standards and Procedures.

It remains for other departments and agencies—perhaps each major branch or bureau—to pin responsibility for effective records administration on a competent, accountable officer. It has been proposed to the Bureau of the Budget, with the blessing of the Society of American Archivists and the very substantial support of the Archivist of the United States, that each agency be required to designate such an officer. The need is greatest in the War Department,<sup>1</sup> the war agencies under the Office of Emergency Management, and the General Accounting Office. The need is only somewhat less great in the other executive departments and agencies such as Treasury, Commerce, Veterans Administration, and the Civil Service Commission.

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<sup>1</sup>As this article goes to press the establishment by the War Department of a Director of Records in The Adjutant General's Office has become certain. The plan as now formulated charges an Adjutant General with the coordination and supervision of all disposition and microfilming of records throughout the War Department and the Army; this program apparently does not include current records administration as in the Navy Department. Colonel Thomas M. Spaulding, a Trustee of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE, is to be the Director of Records.—(Editor.)

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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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Through the cooperation of the Archivist of the United States a temporary home has been found in Washington for the INSTITUTE's library. Space has been provided for it in one of the offices of the War Department Division of The National Archives where it will be available for use daily except Sundays. This is a particularly appropriate place for the library since it will now be possible to use it effectively in connection with research in the records of the War Department which have been transferred to The National Archives.

Robert E. Runser, Librarian of the INSTITUTE for the past two years, has submitted his resignation because the new library hours conflict with his regular duties at the District of Columbia Public Library. His successor is to be Marie Charlotte Stark of the War Department Division of The National Archives. Miss Stark, who is a graduate of the School of Library Service at Columbia University, has been arranging the volumes and hopes to have them ready for general use in the near future. As soon as this has been done, she plans to permit at least limited circulation to enable greater use to be made of the library.

Do you have back issues of the journal that you don't need or want? If so, PLEASE let the Managing Editor know about them! We are receiving more and more orders for back issues, especially from libraries which are trying to build up complete reference sets. This is a worthy cause and to be encouraged—and, incidentally, means cash in hand for the INSTITUTE. Volume I, number 2 (Summer 1937) is the issue most needed; the supply is completely exhausted, and there is a waiting list for it. Other issues of which the supply is running low are: volume I, number 1 (Spring 1937); volume II, number 1 (Spring 1938); and volume V, number 4 (Winter 1941). If you don't want to give them away, we will try to sell them for you. How about it?

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs held its annual conference at Toronto, May 23-24, on the general topic "Wartime Collaboration of the United Nations and the Post-War World."

We've received inquiries since the appearance of the Spring issue about the sudden dearth of illustrations. Let it be known once and for all that we don't intend to allow the journal to remain pictureless, but neither do we feel that valuable space should be used at this time simply to avoid that possibility. The articles we've been publishing recently don't lend themselves to illustration as readily as historical subjects do, and we've lost our chief illustrator in the bargain—Captain Todd, in case you didn't know. Furthermore, we're on a budget. The Treasurer says we can only publish sixty-four pages per issue this year, and we want to give you just as much as possible in those pages. As memberships and subscriptions increase—and they are increasing—we'll be able to add pages and have more illustrations. In the meantime, the luxury of pictures and maps will be indulged in only when they add materially to the text.

#### *Contributors to This Issue*

Dr. Max Werner is the author of *Military Strength of the Powers* (1939) and *Battle for the World* (1941). His present article is from his forthcoming volume, *The Great Offensive: Problems of Coalition Warfare*.

Harry H. Bell, now attached to the Finance Section of the First Army Corps, studied as a graduate in economics at the University of Geneva and was formerly a member of the Foreign Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Jean Montry is the pen-name of a French economic expert now resident in the United States.

Emmett J. Leahy is Director of Records Coordination in the Administrative Office of the Navy Department. His article may appear at first glance to be on a strange—certainly a neglected—subject for MILITARY AFFAIRS. Proper records administration has, however, a two-fold military significance: first, in the actual conduct of the present war; second, in the records of the war which will remain for future historical research.

Dean Robert G. Albion of Princeton University writes in his present article as President of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE.



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## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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*The Destiny of Sea Power, and Its Influence on Land Power and Air Power*, by John Philips Cranwell. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 262. \$2.75.)

The thesis of this cryptically titled work is at once brilliant and provocative. Underneath the three forms of modern warfare, land, sea, and air, there is a common industrial and mechanical pattern. Though air power is only a generation old and land armies only thirty years ago were still primarily composed of men and muscle, sea warfare has been vehicular, and therefore mechanical, for centuries. These centuries of evolution in the basic strategy of naval warfare have given us, in the doctrines of sea power, some principles for the use of all mechanical weapons. Instead of being rendered obsolete by the development of air power, the doctrines of sea power will be the foundation of all mechanized strategy. In their compromises between speed, range, armament, and protection—the battle of guns against armor—land and air vehicles are already unconsciously retracing the naval history of the nineteenth century. And the first nation which consciously follows the example of sea power on land and in the air will decide the course of future warfare. In their “methods of operation, reliance on bases, . . . primary weapons, . . . crew training, communications, and organization . . . the fighting machines used ashore and in the air are following the course already travelled by the machines with which men fight on the water.” From this fact “the military theorist and the designer will be able to predict the future evolution of tanks and planes.”

Though Mr. Cranwell's parallels between sea and tank warfare are sometimes slightly strained, his chapters on air and sea power are brilliant and penetrating. Only when he begins to apply the principles of naval tactics and design to the problems of the tank and airplane does his argument seem to run away with him. The greatest value of such lay studies, the author himself suggests, is simply in pointing out some general factors in future development. The study of certain aspects of naval history would undoubtedly benefit military and air men every-

where. But even Mahan, whose doctrines Mr. Cranwell so ably reinterprets, made his greatest mistakes when he assumed that historical arguments and analogies bear on tactics and ship design. The wealth of historical knowledge with which Mahan opposed the dreadnought should be a lesson to all future naval historians. Such considerations need not detract too much, however, from a very original and excellently written book.

THEODORE ROPP

Duke University

*Allenby: A Study in Greatness*, by General Sir Archibald Wavell.  
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. 312. \$3.00.)

The biography of one of the greatest British generals of the First World War by the most distinguished British general of the Second World War offers unusual attractions for the general reader. The American edition of this work appeared just after Wavell's spectacular victories in Libya and before his conquest of Italian East Africa. As a consequence there was as much interest in the author of the book as in the subject treated.

General Wavell was singularly well-equipped to write a life of Allenby. He had campaigned at one time or another in every important theater in which Allenby served. He was liaison officer to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in 1917 and later served as chief of staff to Chetwode's corps. He saw Allenby in action at the time of his greatest triumphs. After the war Wavell gave considerable time to a study of the whole campaign in Palestine which he published as *The Palestine Campaign* (London, 1928). The outbreak of war in September 1939 prevented him from completing the present volume, which ends with the capture of Aleppo in October 1918. A final chapter, which appears to have been added to permit the immediate publication of the book, presents a brief summary of Allenby as a soldier.

Few new points of view on military operations will appear to readers familiar with the British official history, *Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine* by General Sir George MacMunn and Captain Cyril Falls (London, 1928-1930). Yet Wavell presents some new and interesting facts on Allenby as a practicing soldier. He shows that Allenby's rigid discipline and terrifying rages at minor infractions thereof were inspired by a basic concern for the welfare of his men. He was capable of berating individual troopers who might have their chin straps out of place on the retreat from Mons. He rigorously banned

the wearing of shorts in Palestine. Had he been concerned with personal popularity he might have made some effort to explain that many of the cavalymen who lost their hats in the campaign of August and September 1914 suffered sunstroke, that every bare leg scratched in Palestine became infected. He was widely and not affectionately known as the "Bull." His visits to the front terrified officers who for their own protection worked out a scheme of signalling his coming to advance units. The code used was simply the letters BL (Bull loose). However, competent officers who stood up to their chief had nothing but profound respect for his character and intellect. Wavell shows that behind the rather terrifying front of Allenby there was an extremely sensitive man who loved and captivated children and was deeply interested in birds and flowers.

Allenby's handling of the British cavalry division from Mons to the Marne in 1914 is praised by Wavell as being the most effective of any of the cavalry engaged in those operations. After the stabilization of the front he served as commander of the 5th Corps and the Third Army. He was not popular with his troops or with the G. H. Q. Allenby and Haig were in one sense natural rivals. They passed the staff college at the same time. Both were strong unyielding men who disdained the arts of flattery. Both were sensitive and fundamentally shy. They never understood each other and were always uncomfortable when together. On one occasion during the war they met alone to discuss certain important matters (probably Allenby's transfer from the Third Army to Egypt). When face to face alone neither one spoke a word!

To Wavell's way of thinking Allenby's mind had "breadth and poise rather than great depth." He did not have the sharp intellectual cut-water of a cruiser but "like the *Mauretania* carried crushing weight behind the blunt bow of his mind." Students of the present war will find that Wavell has consciously or unconsciously modelled some of his conduct on Allenby's pattern, his victory at Sidi Barrani apparently having been adapted from Allenby's Gaza-Beersheba maneuver. In summary, he holds that Allenby had better physical and mental makeup to face the harsh tasks of war than most British soldiers. He was stout-hearted in defeat, remorseless in pressing home an advantage. His sense of loyalty, duty, and straightforwardness were marks of a great and generous nature.

H. A. DE WEERD

*The Institute for Advanced Study*

*History of the United States Food Administration, 1917-1919*, by William Clinton Mullendore, with an introduction by Herbert Hoover and a foreword and bibliography by Ralph Haswell Lutz. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 1941. Pp. 399. \$4.50.)

Along in the summer of 1941 it became evident even to the pacific Herbert Hoover that the United States was inexorably being drawn into the war against the Axis. He had in his files an historical report of the work of the Food Administration of World War I which had been written by William C. Mullendore in 1920 but never published, presumably because of the lack of Congressional appropriations after the Armistice. Mr. Hoover felt that his experience in 1918 would be of value to the present administration in any emergency that might come, and consequently the long suppressed report was brought out last October as the eighteenth publication of the Hoover Library of War, Revolution, and Peace. Alas for Mr. Hoover's good intentions! The ink on these pages was scarcely dry when the Japanese raided Pearl Harbor, the United States was in the war, and we had adopted a system of price control the very opposite of the voluntary system of cooperation so earnestly advocated in this report. The experience of the Food Administration in the last war consequently has little pertinency to our price problems in this one. On the other hand, Mr. Mullendore's report carries its own interest as an historical document. In spite of its cumbersome machinery and lack of powers, the United States Food Administration in the main did a successful job; in a few important instances its success was outstanding and even astonishing.

In a foreword to the present volume, Dr. Lutz emphasizes the fact that Mr. Hoover went to Washington in 1917 to be "Food Administrator," not "Food Dictator" or "Food Controller." This, indeed, is the keynote of Mr. Mullendore's whole report. Nevertheless, there is a contradiction of this very point within the report itself. Whatever Mr. Hoover thought of the advantages of voluntary cooperation, there is evidence that his enforcement officers did not entirely agree with him. The original intent of the Lever Bill had been to give the Food Administration complete control of the entire food trade by a system of licenses, but Congress, with its political ear to the ground, exempted dealers doing a gross business of less than \$100,000 a year. This provision exempted 95 per cent of the retail food dealers of the country from direct license control. Although Mr. Mullendore calls this exemption one of the principal "weaknesses" of the law, the implication that the Food Administration had no more than exhortatory con-



trol over the retailers is not quite the truth. Actually, it had a powerful coercive weapon to use against them. It is true that the retailers were outside the licensing laws, but the Food Administration did control the wholesalers and jobbers through licenses. If a retailer defied the regulations, Mr. Hoover had only to say the word to shut off his principal supplies and throttle his business—a penalty far more terrible than any system of fines. The power was not invoked, but the threat of it was always in the background as the retailers well knew.

So far as food prices were concerned, Mr. Hoover faced a far tougher problem than that which now confronts Leon Henderson. Inflation was then already upon us. For two years the Allied purchasing commissions had been ruthlessly raiding the American food reserves without regard for prices paid. Wheat was \$3.25 a bushel; flour had risen to \$16 a barrel; the “five-cent loaf” was a fading memory. The price of sugar at retail was on its way up to 20 cents a pound. The American public was finding out what it meant to pay \$20 and \$25 a pair for shoes. The way in which the Food Administration solved the various price problems is taken up in this history, commodity by commodity; each has its separate story, often a most interesting one. The Administration scored its most spectacular success in the control of wheat. The first step was the creation under the Food Administration of the Grain Corporation with a capital of \$150,000,000 of government funds. This corporation became the sole purchaser of wheat at the primary markets and was able to establish and maintain a Chicago price of \$2.20 a bushel. By agreements with the baking industry the retail price of the pound loaf of bread was stabilized at 10 cents.

The wheat crop of the United States for 1916 was disappointing—two-thirds of normal—and that of 1917 was no better. As a result of this and of over-export, the reserve stock of wheat in this country when Mr. Hoover took control was the smallest in years—less than a month’s supply of our normal consumption. The crop of 1917, after subtracting America’s normal needs, offered no surplus at all. Moreover, the Allied nations were asking for a minimum of 75,000,000 bushels, and the needs of the other countries in Europe we were feeding would take 25,000,000 bushels more. It was evident that this export would have to come out of American sacrifices. In the face of this situation Mr. Hoover appealed to the public. The response was magnificent. Restaurants and other public eating-places inaugurated “wheatless days” and finally struck wheat products from their menus altogether. The patriotism of American women found an outlet in

devising substitutes for wheat-flour dishes. The result was that our wheat exports exceeded the minimum requirements of Europe, and the American public came through it with no loss of health or feeling of deprivation.

When it was over, Mr. Hoover could look back over his work with the satisfaction of contemplating a good job well done. In spite of all his efforts, however, the retail prices of food had steadily increased—though not as much as the prices of those other commodities which were not controlled. Mr. Hoover had saved us from a dictatorship, but he had not saved us from inflation. Whether Mr. Henderson will be any more successful in stemming the tide of inflation remains to be seen. It remains also to be seen whether we shall emerge from his regimentation as a “trodden, broken-spirited people.” Certainly there are no signs of it as yet.

FORREST WILSON<sup>1</sup>

*Secret History of the American Revolution*, by Carl Van Doren. (New York: Viking Press. 1941. Pp. 534. \$3.75.)

The appearance of this book has given rise to an acrimonious public discussion. Mr. Van Doren claims that he was the first to use the secret service files of the British headquarters, and on nearly every page of his book he emphasizes that his description is based on material used or published for the first time. These claims have been widely challenged. To the reviewer this whole debate seems utterly beside the point. Much more important is the question whether Mr. Van Doren has made the best use of this new material; that is, whether he has correctly evaluated it, and whether after his work its value as a historical source can be considered exhausted. In this respect, Mr. Van Doren has failed.

Quite one-sidedly, he has not gone beyond the secret files of the British headquarters to examine the papers of those characters he found mentioned in the British files; their motives and attitudes remain in the dark, and frequently he has to confess that a case is not clear. His volume is full of unsolved enigmas, loose ends, unresolved suspicions; the people whom he discusses remain without life and flesh. In the opinion of the reviewer, the application of correct historical methods would have led to the creation of a much better book—

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<sup>1</sup>This review was submitted by Mr. Wilson shortly before his untimely death at Westport, Connecticut, on May 10. He had just been awarded the 1942 Pulitzer prize in biography for his *Cru-sader in Crinoline*.—(Editor.)

better not only because it would have been more scholarly (who dares to care about that?), but also because it would have been more interesting. As it stands, at least half of it makes extremely dull reading.

The volume falls distinctly into two parts. Nine chapters deal with the conspiracy of Benedict Arnold and, although Mr. Van Doren's report does not contain startling revelations, it brings out the fact that Arnold offered his services to the British as early as May 1779 and proves the involvement of Arnold's young wife in the conspiracy. The whole story has never been told in such minute detail, and this will probably remain the authentic description of this *cause célèbre*. So far so good. But there are eight further chapters dealing with other secret negotiations which were in progress during the War of Independence, and it is this half of the book which makes dull reading.

In a rather confusing and seemingly unending review of individual cases, Mr. Van Doren reports on interviews between English and American officers, on letters between Loyalists and Patriots, on acts of treason which failed and others which succeeded, on the means by which secret information found its way into the camp of the enemy and how it was intercepted. It is truly amazing to see the amount of communication between the two enemy camps during the war, and a merit of Mr. Van Doren's book is that it reveals the existence of this whole network of connections. Yet we want to know more than he shows us. We want to be told what groups of people were particularly susceptible to offers from the enemy; we want to hear to what extent these secret dealings influenced the course of the military campaigns; we want an explanation of the reasons for this vast amount of treacherous negotiation. These questions remain unanswered.

The reason is that, aside from limiting his researches entirely to the material which he found among the British headquarters papers, Mr. Van Doren has made the further mistake of not organizing his material systematically. A systematic arrangement leading to some general conclusions would have been simple; the principles according to which the material might have been organized are quite evident. A study of the material presented shows that, in the War of Independence, treason had several different aspects. First of all, there was the typical eighteenth century problem of the deserter. The English army, and also a part of the American army, was composed of mercenaries; in a war fought by mercenaries, inducement of men and officers of the enemy to desert forms an inherent element of the art of war. Secondly, the War of Independence was a civil war. The lines between the opposing

camps were never rigidly drawn, and the possibility of changing sides was never entirely removed. Finally, the American War of Independence was also a national war, and treason was marked with the stigma which it has in our own time. Thus there were a variety of reasons why treason was committed, but there were no uniform standards according to which treason was judged. The problem of treason in the War of Independence is unique primarily because widely differing motives and standards existed side by side.

The main result of an examination of Mr. Van Doren's book is to show how interesting a secret history of the American Revolution could be if handled in the right way. To the reviewer it remains an enigma how the present volume could have become a best-seller. Is this an indication that buying a book does not mean reading the book? Or does our public really possess the amazing patience to wade through two hundred confused, dull pages? The reviewer can only say that he scarcely would have had this patience had he not been able to look forward to the moment when he could write down his opinion of it.

FELIX GILBERT

*The Institute for Advanced Study*

*Anthony Wayne: Trouble Shooter of the American Revolution*, by Harry Emerson Wildes. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1941. Pp. 514. \$3.75.)

Several biographies of Anthony Wayne have been published in the last fifty years. C. J. Stillé's *Major General Wayne* appeared in 1893; though showing considerable research, it is too cautious to be stimulating and entirely too arid in style for popular appeal. Thirty-six years later T. A. Boyd did very much better; his *Mad Anthony Wayne* is a well-written biography of genuine merit. J. H. Preston appeared with a rather dubious contribution in 1930, *A Gentleman Rebel*, an earthy book written in unwashed language with interpretations more colorful than convincing.

Now Harry Emerson Wildes has completed his *Anthony Wayne*. Living near Philadelphia, the author has become minutely familiar with the area where Wayne spent much of his career; he has also traveled widely and examined innumerable manuscripts, some of which have seldom or never been used before. The resulting biography is told in clean, fine prose. Conclusions concerning Wayne are free from rancor or the defect of preconceived opinion. Sometimes they differ widely from those commonly held; frequently they are not at all com-



plimentary. In fact, Wayne would have fared better if Dr. Wildes had been less painstaking and truthful.

From the time that Wayne played soldier at the school of his uncle Gabriel until his own men dug a burying hole for him in the frozen ground of Presqu' Isle, he was a dauntless, restless figure with a strong will for the ways of war. He was masterful, sometimes even savage, in method. When he thought Joseph Holliday insubordinate, he smashed him in the face; in compliance with his orders the heads of Macaroni Jack and Jack Smith were blown off by an execution squad ten paces distant, although the charge of mutiny was not clearly proved. His judgment was often subject to whim or influenced by the ties of friendship. Colonel James Jackson got a damning down one side and up the other for what he had a perfect right to do. Out of regard for his old friend Richard Butler, he tried to make an ensign out of his son even though the lad was under age and had only one good eye. He showed a more or less fleeting fancy for a couple of Marys, but he gave little evidence of genuine affection for the members of his family. He addressed his son as "Mr. Wayne," ignored his wife, showed slight regard for his daughter, and failed to meet financial promises made to his mother. Though he often prated of honor, he clandestinely traded with the British-held Charleston for the luxuries that he wanted and allowed his henchmen to stuff the ballot-box in an effort to make him a Representative from Georgia.

In spite of these defects and many others, Wayne was a leader of men. Washington trusted him and often used him as a "trouble-shooter" in the Revolution. His stalwart work along the Canadian border, his brilliant success at Stony Point, and his valuable help in the Middle and Southern States and the Northwest Territory will always mark him as an able commander, but they will never place him in the front rank of our great generals. In small-scale action he won objectives where abler officers might have failed. He was eminently brave, highly resourceful, and persistent beyond the range of ordinary men. Sometimes he evinced a faculty given to only a very few—the ability in battle to discern quickly and apply energetically the means needed for turning defeat into victory. His mind was far above the reach of most non-commissioned officers, but in his prejudices, driving power, and crassness he was very much like most of them. As he grew older, he became more irascible, inconsistent, and self-centered. Even so, Wayne was very much of a man, and his work was considerable in winning the Revolution.

Dr. Wildes has well sketched the background of Wayne's life in the Army. Little attention, however, has been paid to strategy or tactics. The maps, too, are without scale, and the index is not sufficiently informing. The citations of sources are not specific enough to be of the most aid to scholars for whom they are primarily designed. Though numerous riddles concerning Wayne remain, Dr. Wildes has clarified several and pointed ways to the solution of others. His book is a distinct contribution.

JAMES R. JACOBS

*Manlius, New York*

*The Roman Imperial Navy, 31 B. C.-A. D. 324*, by Chester G. Starr, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1941. Pp. 228. \$2.50.)

The Roman navy is not an institution upon which historians have dwelt. Little is to be found about it in Gibbon; there is a little more in Mommsen, who before his death was made to play a small rôle in the ideological build-up of the Imperial Germany Navy. Compared with the Roman legion, the Roman *classis* has been a stepchild of historiography, but now Mr. Starr has adopted it—or, if partial adoption is a permissible phrase, the imperial aspect of it. His history begins a little after Pompey's grandiloquent "*Navigare necesse est vivere non necesse*" and ends with Constantine.

It seems to be a job competently and conscientiously done, on the whole steering close to the many small beacons represented by the sources rather than heading out to any high sea of speculation. Still, in common with other recent works on the military history of antiquity, it points to a disturbing state of things. Hans Delbrück was probably the last general historian to enter the field of classic military history, much to the perturbation of the philologists. Since then no one has dared to follow him, for the impression prevails that to know merely the prime materials of the history of the ancient world has become such a complicated business that only philologists can handle it. This leads to the further consequence that only so much is known of this ancient history as is suspected and then discovered by the philologists.

The philologist-historian approaches the problem from the safe but limited basis of the available source materials, whereas the general military historian might be inclined to raise further questions. How, for instance, was this or that specific feature of military life and organization regarded and treated by the Greeks and Romans? The general military historian would not be content with the available

sources; he would suspect that still more could be known if more queries were raised. Having just made a survey of Roman army discipline, I should welcome much more on Rome's naval discipline than the scant half page given. Another item missed by the reviewer is Seneca's thoughts on shipping and discovery as the means of peaceful expansion for Rome.

Other questions naturally arise when a work like this falls into the hands of the general historian, but, not to be lacking in generous appreciation, we must add that numerous features of the Roman navy *are* fully evolved by the author—the organization of the several naval stations; the recruiting and racial composition of the personnel; the officer part, of which Mommsen could treat with exceeding scorn on occasion. He has also discussed the function of the navy in the total system of Roman imperial defense and, finally, this navy's somewhat strange but still understandable *raison d'être*—"not to fight battles but to render them impossible." Could the British navy have thought of that?

ALFRED VAGTS

Washington, D. C.

*Indian Fighting Army*, by Fairfax Downey. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1941. Pp. 329. \$3.50.)

Mr. Downey has aimed at producing a popular book, and in this intention he has well succeeded. Such a volume as his, lavishly illustrated with reproductions from Frederic Remington, Charles Schreyvogel, and R. F. Zogbaum—too few, unfortunately, of Zogbaum—is bound to be attractive to all interested in the subject. Moreover, his accounts of the fights from 1865 to the close of the Indian wars, and his considerable contribution to the social and administrative picture of Army life on the frontier, are spirited and vivid narration. The bibliography, while not comprehensive, contains a large number of the books that should not be ignored (but usually are) in writing about the Indian wars. Mr. Downey has not invariably checked back to ultimate sources for some of his statements (he is quite positive, for example, about the disputed order of Colonel Carrington to Colonel Fetterman concerning the Lodge Trail Ridge), but blunders are remarkably few considering the number of controversial questions through which he has threaded his way.

DON RUSSELL

Chicago, Illinois

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## NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

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### THE INSTITUTE'S OPPORTUNITIES IN WARTIME

BY ROBERT GREENHALGH ALBION

THE AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE was founded to afford a common meeting ground where soldier, sailor, and civilian might further the study of the art of warfare through the examination and analysis of the past. With most of its service members now actively engaged in helping to make history, more of a responsibility and opportunity falls upon the civilian amateurs to search and to interpret history in the hope of finding something which may help the war effort.

The events of this war have shown that success has come not so much from the sudden introduction of some surprise weapon as from the skilful coordination and utilization of materials already at hand. It is ironic that many of the devices exploited with such marked success by the Axis were originally invented by its enemies.

The INSTITUTE is not trying to invent new instruments of war, but it may be able to play some part in suggesting the effective utilization of those already available. Three qualities are needed for such an adaptation—imagination, experience, and a keen sense of practicability. That last function belongs clearly to the experts of the armed services, who must pass final judgment upon all suggestions; all that the civilians can ask in that field is that they retain an open mind. Imagination, however, has been distributed by nature among men in varied walks of life, while experience is not restricted to army or naval service records. Many successful soldiers of the past have profited by experience from wars and campaigns conducted long before their own careers began. While military history cannot always, or even often, point clearly to what should be done, it can very frequently sound the alarm about what definitely should not be done. "History," of course, does not necessitate going back to Hannibal, Frederick, or Moltke; the recent developments on the Russian Front and in the Southwest Pacific already belong to the great body of military history.



One might hope that during the next year or two, the pages of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* could be filled with a number of brief articles reflecting a search of the past and near-past to throw light upon some of the most pressing problems involved in the manifold aspects of total warfare on a global scale. The *INSTITUTE* would be justifying its existence if even one of those articles could aid the war effort. There is no room during the emergency for the simple gratification of antiquarian curiosity; the space can be put to much better use along these other lines. The field for such study is broad, extending into many branches of study; the following suggestions are offered simply to hint at the possible nature of such articles.

A particularly pertinent subject might be the relative efforts of different nations to keep abreast of the possibilities latent in new developments. It has often been said of one country that it was always ready to fight the previous war over again, only to meet serious initial reverses at the hands of enemies who had been carefully planning how to fight the next one. Such a study would involve both methods of experimentation and attitudes toward change. A few contrasts occur at once—Napoleon's relations with Fulton, for instance, and Kitchen-er's alleged remark in 1914 that the British army ought to be able to carry positions without the help of artillery. Or one might compare the remarkable experiments of the United States Navy during the Civil War with its amazing retrogression in the following fifteen years.

Narrowing the scope to a particular aspect of warfare, one might consider the changing problems of logistics, occasioned by the improved methods of transport by land and air. Even in the older field of transport by sea, some of the recent achievements of the Japanese are worth considering; apparently they have landed large amounts of bulky supplies on open beaches without benefit of docks or cranes, thus throwing off defensive concepts based on previous methods. The absence of decent roads in the Ardennes and the Malay Peninsula likewise produced a false sense of security against a resourceful enemy who, like Hannibal and Napoleon in their crossing of the Alps, was not content to be limited in his movements by old conditions.

It might also be appropriate to examine the consequences of the well established British custom of withdrawal by sea. For centuries it was understood that the Navy would rescue an English army which got into a jam and give it a fresh start somewhere else. The evacuation of Boston in 1776, the rescue of Moore's army in the Peninsula, and the final act at Gallipoli are samples of dozens of instances; Yorktown

was almost the only occasion upon which the Royal Navy failed a general near tidewater—Burgoyne at Saratoga and Townshend at Kut were too far inland for such aid. The plane, however, has been spoiling that old security. A correspondent recently complimented a British destroyer commander for his efficient rescue of refugees from Sumatra; the officer replied that they ought to be able to by now since they had been rescuing the army all the way from Norway to Tobruk. Those rescues, however, had been growing increasingly difficult and costly, from Namsos and Andalsnes, through the "miracle of Dunkirk" and Greece, to the smashing at Crete. Then came actual surrenders of British forces at the edge of the sea; Hongkong was understandable, but the fall of Singapore seemed definitely to mark the end of the good old days when the Navy kept open the line of retreat. Our own experience at Bataan and Corregidor show that Britain is not alone in the problem. With A.E.F.'s being scattered around the globe, this is more than an academic consideration.

The practical implications of that much-abused word "morale" deserve still further study in their practical military aspects. Men have doubtless been scared in battle down through the centuries, but panic and rout have been far less common. The happenings in three great armies in 1917 afford plenty of source material along this line.

Those few suggestions barely scratch the surface of the possibilities, but suggestive interpretations of any of them might prove helpful. Armed service in wartime leaves one so occupied with the present that there is scant leisure, if any at all, to examine the past. The civilian, however, can help along that line. Scholarly efforts during the emergency can perhaps best be justified if thinking is diverted into this field. Graduate students, if any still remain outside the services, can find excellent Ph.D. topics of this nature. Even senior theses are being found useful in Washington, where several important branches of the government have asked for the loan of studies of this nature. The services of the civilians in this field could be greater if confidential information could be made available to qualified and trustworthy individuals working on these topics as it is to some of their scientific colleagues.

Finally, there is the delicate question of the manner in which these findings should be presented. Even in wartime, the armed services need not be above constructive criticism which is offered in the proper vein. The INSTITUTE's attitude should properly be an open-minded position, avoiding the two extremes of the complacent "whatever is is right" and the cynical "whatever is is wrong."

# ECONOMIC FACTORS IN MILITARY ACTION<sup>1</sup>

BY EDWARD S. MASON

The importance of economic factors in modern warfare is so obvious as to be easily exaggerated. It has in fact been exaggerated by Anglo-American commentators in ways which have tended to obscure the main problems and to hamper an effective war effort. Some of the more common misconceptions of the rôle of economic considerations are serious enough to require particular attention.

The obvious fact that war has become to a high degree mechanized has been interpreted, particularly by American writers, as indicating that victory is essentially a production matter. If we produce enough planes, tanks, guns, and ammunition, the most necessary steps, the argument runs, will have been taken. This belief is not only wrong; its promulgation is dangerous in the extreme to the effective organization of this country for war. Modern warfare not only demands large numbers of fighting men, but highly trained men who have been toughened to withstand an intensity of combat and a range of fighting conditions rare in the history of warfare. A merely superficial examination of the circumstances of the present war is all that is necessary to indicate the importance of the quantitative and qualitative requirements for manpower. The maintenance in continued operation of one first-line airplane requires at least 150 uniformed men in the Air Corps. This does not include the anti-aircraft services, the industrial workers engaged in plane production, or the workers employed in laying out and preparing airfields and airdromes. The continued operations of 5,000 first-line planes thus require the existence of around 750,000 officers and men. If searchlight and anti-aircraft personnel is included, the personnel requirements may easily total a million and a half men.

The need, moreover, is not merely for men, but for qualified men of strong fiber and high morale. The collapse in Western Europe was due as much or more to the lack of these qualities as to the enemy strength in mechanized equipment. The magnificent stand of the Russians was only possible to a virile, fighting breed of men. Japanese successes in Southeast Asia and the East Indies were accomplished not by highly mechanized troops—though, of course, continued air su-

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<sup>1</sup>This article was presented in substantially the same form before the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University on April 27, 1942.

periority has been a most important contributing factor—but by tough, trained warriors. The insistence in Japanese propaganda that the Empire's great military asset is the virility of its fighting men is not only good propaganda, but it emphasizes a factor which requires emphasis in any country at war. We shall be doing a great disservice to our own cause if our preoccupation with armament production figures blinds us to the fact that wars are still fought by men. Although events of the last three years have somewhat dampened this tendency, here in the United States we are still prone to think that a rate of production superior to that attained by the Axis is a guarantee of victory.

A second fallacy growing out of an overemphasis of the importance of economic factors is the belief that military objectives are essentially economic. The term "economic warfare" emerged in the last war and has been well to the fore in this. England boasts a separate Ministry of Economic Warfare, and in this country a Board of Economic Warfare has been in existence since early last year. Economic warfare in its broad sense means attack on the productive resources of the enemy by military and other means. Before the advent of airpower, economic warfare was essentially the series of naval operations embraced within the term blockade. Airpower has added the bombing of economic objectives to the total conception of economic warfare.

The blockade of Germany in the last war has been credited, and rightly, with an important rôle in the achievement of the Allied victory. But an overstatement of the achievements of economic warfare, together with an overstatement of the merits of the defensive, has been an incubus which has continued to paralyze our efforts in the present conflict. The general belief was persistent in England and France before Dunkirk that the superior economic resources of the Allies, their strong position in the West, and the continued blockade of Germany were sufficient for eventual victory. Victory, however, can only be achieved by the destruction of the enemy's armed strength, and economic warfare has a relatively modest rôle to play in this total accomplishment.

A part of the same fallacy is an overvaluation of the importance to us of the areas from which we draw the industrial materials utilized in our armament production. If we take the view that every area from which we draw such materials represents a vital interest which must be defended at all costs, the resulting dissipation of our armed forces is nearly enough in itself to insure defeat. The North American continent is bountifully blessed with the raw materials of modern warfare.



For almost all these materials the output of this continent is from two to five times the output of comparable materials on the continent of Europe exclusive of Russia. The relative lack of such materials, however, has not prevented Germany from creating the greatest striking force yet known. Our problem is the concentration of forces in the areas in which we have the greatest relative strategic advantage, and that means the areas in which the enemy can be met and defeated. Economic considerations are of decidedly secondary importance in this calculus.

A third fallacy, which (though of a different character) is very much to the fore at the present time, is that the German economic system is something special and apart; that it is not subject to the limitations of other economies but is equal to any burden which the military may impose upon it. To some this appears an obvious deduction from the efficiency of the German military machine. If Germany has put into the field an army of three hundred of the best equipped divisions the world has ever seen, why can she not maintain or even improve this equipment indefinitely regardless of the rate of war wastage? For many economists this false conclusion is largely a reaction from an earlier period during which predictions that the Nazi economy was about to collapse were practically a daily occurrence.

The problems facing the Nazi economy in fact are not essentially different from those of any other war economy operating at full employment, and it is by no means impervious to the terrific strain which is being put upon it. In any economic system the ultimate limit—the final bottleneck—to further increase in production is a shortage of manpower. By the outbreak of war in 1939 Germany had already reached and passed what would normally be called full employment. The continued increase in armament production had involved a decline in living standards by 1938 which, with the increase in the work day and the calling into employment of all the ragtail and bobtail of the labor market, had already brought to an end the ordinary yearly increase in productivity per man-hour.

Since 1939 Germany has increased the number of men under arms by seven million and has doubled employment in war industries principally at the expense of the already severely depleted civilian sector of the economy. Perhaps four million war prisoners, foreigners, and newly employed women have been recruited to the labor force, and it is possible that the exploitation of occupied countries yields to Germany the equivalent of another two or two and a half million laborers

—but the new recruits, man for man, are no adequate replacement for the Germans transferred from industry to the army. Some indication of the economic strain Germany is undergoing may be given by a consideration of what a war effort proportionately as large would involve in the United States. It would mean an armed force of approximately sixteen million and from two to three times as many employees in war industries as are at present employed there. It can be imagined what would happen under these circumstances to the civilian sector of the economy.

It must be remembered, furthermore, that manpower cannot be withdrawn to the army and to war industries from certain areas of the civilian economy. Employment in agriculture, for example, has been increased in Germany since 1939 rather than decreased. This is true also of transportation, government civilian employment, and the coal industry—all areas of large labor requirements. The transfer of labor to the army and war industries from the remainder of the economy could only have been accomplished by practically complete curtailment of construction, capital maintenance, services of various sorts, and the production of civilian goods other than food and a minimum of clothing. This is possible for a limited period of time, but Germany has been subjected to a strain of this or similar magnitude for a number of years. Under these circumstances it is impossible that the efficiency of the German economy as a going concern could have been maintained. Within the very near future men will have to be returned from the army to industry if the German war economy is to continue to function. It can be seen, therefore, how much hinges on the outcome of events in Russia this summer.

We have been considering, up to this point, certain fallacies of an economic character which are present in many current discussions of the war situation. Let us turn now to the main subject of this discussion, the significance of economic factors in military operations. This excludes the whole range of domestic problems—priorities, allocation, price control, plant conversion, and the like—which are involved in armament production. We are concerned primarily with two questions: (1) the relation of economic factors to the military potential of a nation, and (2) the effect of economic considerations on military operations.

The military potential of a country may be measured in terms of the numbers of suitably equipped and trained men it can put into action and maintain. Given access to industrial materials and plant capacity,

military potential is a function of the numbers and productivity of a nation's manpower. The enormous increase in economic productivity over the last century has made it possible to divert an ever increasing percentage of a country's manpower both to the armed forces and to war industries. The army which Napoleon was able to assemble from a population of France numbering twenty-five million never exceeded half a million men. At the height of Germany's 1941 campaign against Russia nine and a half million Germans out of eighty million were in military and semi-military status. No more than 2 per cent of the French population were ever under arms in Napoleonic times; nearly 12 per cent of the German population were under arms in the autumn of 1941.

Substantially the same relationship holds true with respect to war production. The war industries of France in the Napoleonic period represented a very small percentage of the value of the national output. In Germany—and equally in England—substantially more than half of the productive resources of the nation were, in 1941, devoted to war production. In this country a comparable percentage will be attained by the end of this year. The devotion of so staggering a proportion of a country's resources to war is only possible because of the enormous increase in the productivity of the economic machine in the last century and a half. Only a few centuries ago wars were fought with the manpower which could be spared between harvests, the necessities of the situation compelling both sides to break off hostilities when work vital to the continued existence of the population had to be done.

The second economic factor which determines a nation's military potential is the size of plant establishment devoted or convertible to armament production. The German High Command is reported to be of the opinion that only Germany, Russia, and the United States are capable of sustaining large-scale modern warfare. Certainly the capacity of a country's metal-working industries is a good index to its armament production potential, and in this respect those three nations lead all the rest. Bernard Baruch has said that this kind of a war—with its dependence on *matériel* and mechanization—is our meat. It is a statement with which we can all agree if it is also recognized that the existence of weapons does not dispense with the need for large numbers of tough fighting men. Our current production of armament, on any method of measurement, now exceeds England's, will top Germany's by the end of the summer, and will equal the total output of the entire Axis by the end of the year. For this we have to thank the

existence of a highly industrialized and productive economic system. Providing we can find places in the world where armament can be used effectively against our enemies, the production rates now current and planned constitute a long step towards victory.

The third economic determinant of military potential is materials. War and war production are, as every one knows, huge consumers of industrial materials. An infantry division uses in periods of active fighting a thousand tons of ammunition a day and an armored division half as much again. But, although industrial materials are indispensable to armament output and the position of the United Nations in this regard is incomparably better than that of the Axis, it is a great mistake to think that the war is going to be won or lost because of materials. Both Germany and Japan entered the war with considerable stockpiles of scarce materials, and Germany has shown in the pre-war period and during three years of war enormous ingenuity in economizing on materials. Synthetics have taken the place of natural products, scrap has been recovered from improbable sources, slag piles have been reworked, military equipment has been redesigned to eliminate the use of scarce materials, and civilian consumption has been reduced to a minimum.

The principal disadvantage Germany has suffered thus far from a shortage of important materials has been the additional manpower requirements involved in producing and handling substitutes. Certain types of oil drilling equipment and other machinery, for example, are twice as heavy as comparable American types because of a shortage of steel-hardening alloys. Twice the quantity of steel, therefore, has to be produced, worked, and transported. Additional men are required to install and, perhaps, to manipulate the machinery. The working of inferior ore deposits, the reworking of slag piles, and, in general, the production of materials from sources which would ordinarily not be used in peace time require additional laborers per ton of material produced. Substitute materials and redesigned military products, moreover, ordinarily require different machinery for the working of such materials and the production of these products. This increased drain on the supply of manpower, already severely overtaxed by the requirements of the army and of war industry, indicates the real Achilles' heel of the German war machine. From an economic point of view the vulnerability of Germany lies, not in the shortage of oil, steel, alloys, or any other particular material or group of materials, but in a general manpower shortage which the scarcity of certain materials accentuates.

We have seen that, if a country's military potential is to be judged



by the number of suitably equipped men it can maintain in action, this potential may be said to be determined by the number and productivity of its manpower, by the adaptability of its capital equipment to armament production, and by its access to industrial materials. A more interesting range of problems is concerned with the effect of economic considerations on military operations. The first and foremost of these is concerned with the proper distribution of manpower between producers and fighters. It is obvious, of course, that there is no simple and unequivocal answer to this question. The proper allocation of manpower at any given time will depend on the character, magnitude, and duration of the military operations anticipated, on the supplies of munitions available, on the distribution of troops between active and inactive divisions, and on other factors.

At various times in the last war both the Allies and the Central Powers were forced by imminent shortages of munitions to shift men from the armed forces back to war industries, and it was only in 1918 that the Allies had sufficient supplies and an adequate flow of production to allow their armed forces an unrestricted expenditure. At the present time there can be little doubt that Germany can justify the number of men under arms only if decisive results are obtained within a relatively short period of time. The induction into the army of seven million men since 1939 has seriously diminished industrial output; the terrific rate of expenditure has depleted previously built up supplies. If a decision can be reached in Russia before winter, it will be possible to return four or five million men to industry in time to prepare for the ultimate test in the West. If a decision cannot be reached, men will have to be returned to industry in any case since Germany cannot for long maintain an army of nine million men, a considerable proportion of whom are engaged in active fighting.

Since 1918 a number of books have been written around the general subject of the number of men required behind the lines per unit of first-line troops. One of the most serious of them,<sup>2</sup> after a painstaking calculation of weight of equipment and ammunition needed per kilometer of front based on World War experience, ends up with the absurd conclusion that modern war is beyond the capabilities of even the highly industrialized countries to support. Although the conclusion is absurd, the general argument is sound—the more mechanized the warfare, the smaller the ratio of front-line troops to supporting manpower.

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<sup>2</sup>Stefan T. Possony, *Tomorrow's Wars: Its Planning, Management, and Cost* (London, 1938).

Modern warfare requires organization in depth. This is conspicuously true of the Air Corps which requires at least 750,000 men to maintain 5,000 first-line planes. It is only less true of ground troops. Every German infantry division has, for example, a complement of about 250 trucks. During active fighting these trucks are capable of hauling only half a day's supply of the division per turn-around, which means that the division cannot move far without advancing its supply base. Behind the supply bases lie the rail facilities which connect the advanced bases with the supply depots. Behind the depots are the war industries, and between them and the front line stretch an unbroken series of men, in and out of uniform, whose services are necessary to the continued functioning of first-line troops.

The proper numerical relation of fighters to workers is closely bound up with questions of military strategy. For instance, the economic factors involved in the issue of offensive *versus* defensive warfare are fully as important as the military factors. One of the strongest carry-overs from the experience of the last war was the belief that offensive action requires a multiple of the equipment and ammunition expenditure necessitated by defensive warfare. One of the familiar statements ran to the effect that three times the guns and ammunition are necessary for successful attack than for successful defense. This generalization may still be true of attack on certain types of fixed positions, but there is another economic aspect to this question. The offensive permits a choice of time and place, and, if objectives are limited, successful attack permits a rapid withdrawal of men from the armed services into production. This is the economics of *Blitzkrieg*—an economics which the Germans have carefully exploited. The German army personnel, swollen for the attack on the West, was rapidly returned to war industries after the fall of France and was not recalled to duty until the campaign in the Balkans. There can be little doubt now but that Hitler planned to follow the same procedure in Russia—to attack with an army enlarged at the expense of industry in the expectation that after a short and successful campaign men could again be returned to industry to prepare for a last offensive in the West. The continued resistance of Russia set these plans awry and bids fair to turn to the advantage of his enemies the economics of the offensive.

Even more important than the economics of the offensive or the defensive are the economic questions involved in interior *versus* exterior lines of communication. The central importance of transport to military operations is obvious to everyone. With every increase in fire

power and in military mechanization has come an increase in the weight of *matériel* which has to be transported to the fighting front. Roughly fifteen tons of shipping is required per man for an initial overseas troop movement, and approximately a ton of supplies has to be transported per month to maintain operations. In Russia the Germans have had to grapple with a land transport problem of colossal dimensions: a railway network equal to the total railroad mileage of England and Scotland have to be operated in the theater of combat; 16,000 kilometers of track had to be relaid; 150,000 to 200,000 freight cars must be diverted from Germany and the rest of Europe; 75,000 to 100,000 tons of military freight have to be moved daily. Every increase in the tonnage requirements per unit of front-line troops involves an increase in the military importance of the interior position. The advantages of this position, however, are at a maximum when the combat areas are close to the reservoirs of men and munitions and to the areas of production. With a continual extension of the fighting front away from the supply depots and areas of production there comes a point at which the advantages of the interior position are nullified. Is it possible that Germany and Japan are approaching this point? The necessity of maintaining armed forces from Norway to Greece and from Bordeaux to Kharkov imposes economic problems which are nearly as serious as the military difficulties of defending frontiers of such length. The position of Japan is similar; the "Eastern Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" may turn out to have a periphery too widely drawn to maximize the prosperity of those who reside at the center.

It is obvious, of course, that the relations between military strategy and the economic problems of production planning are—or should be—close. The possibilities open to the strategists are limited by the present and prospective production rates of war *matériel*. On the other hand, what is produced and in what quantities should be, in large part, determined by the strategic plans. If strategy calls for all-out bombing operations, the production accent should be not only on planes, nor even on bombers, but on the type of bombers which represent the maximum carrying load per unit of economic resources expended in their production. Over the past year every effort has been made to establish an objective which would represent the maximum possible of accomplishment in over-all armament production. It seems probable that this objective has now been definitely set. By the end of this year military production will account for more than half of the total national production, a percentage which compares very favorably with the best that

Germany or England has been able to achieve. The production plans, however, have been built upon a set of military requirements which may or may not represent a clearly thought-out plan of military action. Armament not only has to be produced; it has to be used—and used in specific theaters of operations.

If there are faults to be found in the present production plans, they are to be found, not in the inadequacy of the over-all program, but in the relation to each other of the quantities of *matériel* scheduled for production. Is it necessary that quite as large a percentage of total war expenditure be devoted to construction as is provided at present? Will the ship program be adequate to transport the munitions produced to the required theaters of action? Does the aircraft production program outrun the possibilities of training adequate personnel? These questions are the kind which is of present importance to production planners. They can only be answered by the people responsible for military planning. Events of the last few years have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a unity of command. If not unity of command, then the closest sort of cooperation between military and production officials is necessary to the effective coordination of strategy with production planning.



# THE FEDERALIZATION OF OUR ARMY

BY H. A. DE WEERD

Comprehensive accounts of the organization of the Army of the United States and the various stages in its development can be found elsewhere. It may be helpful at this stage, however, to consider it as the embodiment of changing concepts of American military thought and policy. Students of American institutions have pointed out that "a second revolution" has taken place in American political and economic life since 1783. This has been the gradual absorption of power by the Federal government and the extension of its control over many new phases of the life of our society. An equally revolutionary change has come about in our basic military policy, but it has attracted far less attention. It, too, has undergone a steady process of federalization. The fact that this revolutionary development has escaped the attention of historians and politicians can be attributed in part to the fact that military problems held no interest for them.

Until recent years American military institutions have been neglected by civilians and scholars. This neglect developed in part from an ingrained American distaste for and suspicion of things military. Admiral Mahan made the observation that Americans were "aggressive, combative, and war-like," but he added that "they are the reverse of military, being out of sympathy with military tone and feeling." To some writers, this lack of interest appears a little unusual in a people with our impressive record for military activity. Colonel Ganoe has pointed out that in 150 years of history the American people have engaged in 110 separate conflicts and something more than 8,600 separate battles. Despite or perhaps on account of these facts, the whole range of activity of the War Department—one of the most costly (if judged in terms of money expended) and the most active (if judged in terms of surviving archival material) of all the branches of the Federal government—has until recently been practically ignored by serious students of national institutions. Although the Army is responsible for the maintenance of national security, certainly one of the primary functions of the state, it has not yet attracted the attention of a competent civilian historian. There are only two histories of the Army of anything like recent vintage or respectable standing; both were written by Army men.

Up to the year 1939 there was only one comprehensive survey published in the field of American military policy, General Emory Up-

ton's *The Military Policy of the United States*. That celebrated report dated back to 1881 and included nothing after the Civil War. As an indication of the lack of public interest in such matters, it should be pointed out (regardless of the controversial aspects of General Upton's findings) that this penetrating and provocative analysis of American military policy was allowed to languish in manuscript form for twenty years in the dusty files of the War Department before it was rescued from oblivion and published by Secretary of War Root in 1904. The same public apathy over military matters may account in part for the fact that Washington's views on the requirements of an American peace-time Army, a manuscript of 1783 entitled "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," remained undiscovered for nearly a century in the Washington papers of the Library of Congress.

There have been only a handful of really distinguished names connected with either the consideration or administration of military affairs in this country. Only two Secretaries of War, Calhoun and Root, have been judged by history to have risen above the traditional time-serving performance expected of incumbents of that office. Neglected by civilian interest, which only developed in periods of national crisis, military matters became the almost exclusive province of the professional soldier and the professional politician. In this case it was neglect—not adversity—which made these strange bedfellows.

The average American can find little meaning or comfort in the publications of Congressional committees on military affairs. Colored by local and national political considerations, influenced by individual zealots or organized interests, the reports on the immediate needs and future policy of the Army were of only temporary interest to the changing personnel of the national government. Even the most tenacious student of military affairs often finds himself baffled by the welter of legal, technical, and professional jargon with which these reports are filled. Thus, in 1917, when Congress appropriated the colossal sum of over one billion dollars for small-arms ammunition to shoot at Germans, the form of the authorization ran:

An Authorization for the manufacture or purchase of ammunition for small arms and hand use, for reserve supply, for burials at the National Soldier's Home, and for firing the morning and evening gun at the military posts as prescribed by General Order No. 70, 1877.

"My God," said Representative Tilson in honest bewilderment, "one would think we were appropriating several hundred million dollars to fire the evening gun at the old soldiers' home!"

The occasional scholarly investigator who did venture into the field found himself hampered by the absence of any consistent civilian study of military problems, but there was another handicap as well. Until after the establishment of The National Archives, most of the records of the War Department were almost impossible of access. Widely scattered and indifferently cared for, one had difficulty learning of the very existence of great bodies of important source materials. The Adjutant General's Office, custodian of the largest and most important single collection and schooled in the narrow Ainsworth concept of the function of government records, jealously guarded all but the most harmless papers and made no secret of its distrust of the civilian historian. Even today it "protects" the fair name of the Army and the reputations of citizens as far back as the Civil War. Nevertheless, conditions have been improved greatly with the concentration of practically all War Department records prior to the World War and large quantities of more recent date in The National Archives. Although by no means perfect even yet, scholars are not taking full advantage of the opportunities now open to them.

The historical development of the Army cannot properly be considered apart from geographical and political factors. Favored by an isolated location, protected by friendly oceans from involvement in European or Asiatic conflicts in the early stages of our national development, freed from the menace of potentially hostile and powerful neighbors, the military requirements of the United States were far different from those of European states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As an offshoot of British imperial efforts, we naturally modeled our early military establishments on English lines. Before the American Revolution we had become accustomed to two types of British soldiers, the long-term professional, or regular, soldier and the short-term colonial militiaman. The American distaste for the standing army as a military unit may have been born from early contact with the British regular soldier quartered in such troublesome places as Massachusetts and from the fact that Lord Shelburne's scheme of colonial administration aimed at forcing this type of military protection on the unwilling colonists. In any event, when the Revolution came and the British regular forces were withdrawn into the hostile camp, the only armed forces available to the colonies were the local militias. It was with this military prototype that we began our military experience as an independent community.

The course of events soon demonstrated that the very nature of the

colonial militia rendered central control of the war impossible. This forced the Continental Congress to improvise the Continental Army, composed, however, of both short- and long-term enlisted men. Thus, the first step toward a national army, like many of the steps which were to follow it, was an act of improvisation forced upon the country by the pressure of circumstances. This theme runs through the entire history of the development of our Army. The Revolutionary War was fought to its conclusion by the Continental Army with the aid of the colonial militia.

The ultimate American victory, attained with French assistance, did not conceal the fact that the make-shift arrangements of the time left much to be desired from the standpoint of an effective military establishment. In the minds of Washington, Steuben, and others, the situation at the end of the war seemed to call for the maintenance of a small but well-trained standing army reenforced with what Washington called "a well-regulated militia." The retention of the militia in the national scheme of things after the Revolution reflects the existing resolution to safeguard the rights of the states against possible growth of Federal power, as well as a desire to protect the liberties of the citizens against the possible rise of a tyrant.

At the end of the Revolution (or, for that matter, even before it ended) the militia simply went home, and the new-born republic reduced the Continental Army to a single battery of artillery retained to protect supplies left over from the war. Thus, Alexander Hamilton's old battery (now Battery D, 5th U. S. Artillery) formed the nucleus of the Regular Army. It may be regarded as typical of the casual character of our military program and planning that the retained force consisted entirely of artillery. One can understand why European military students were often struck by the whimsical character of our military arrangements. Napoleon was able to defend the Convention with artillery, but we found that infantry was needed to put down the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. As a result, the first infantry regiment of the Regular Army, now the 3d U. S. Infantry, was formed.

From this period up to the outbreak of the War of 1812, the main reliance of the government for protection of the frontier and the maintenance of order rested on the militias of the several states and on an extremely small standing army which varied in size from two to nine regiments. The Militia Act of 1792 did not provide a well-trained militia, and the vital question of whether or not state militias could be ordered beyond their state boundaries reduced the potential military



effectiveness of this force far below that apparently indicated by the number of men involved.

One phase of the militia problem, often overlooked by military students, was that the caliber of the muskets with which the state forces were equipped varied greatly. Seventeen sizes of lead bullets, ranging from thirteen to thirty to the pound, were required to supply small-arms ammunition to all the forces. Since military effectiveness is bound up closely with standardization of equipment and uniformity of training, this was, next to the question of authority and discipline, one of the greatest drawbacks to the effective employment of the militia in extended military operations.

The military misfortunes of the War of 1812, in which only 12 per cent of the troops employed were regulars or long-term volunteers and 88 per cent were militiamen, convinced Secretary of War Calhoun in 1820 that an "expansive" army of sufficient size and training should be set up in peace time so that for war it need only be expanded by pouring partly trained or untrained men into the ranks. From the standpoint of sheer military efficiency, the events of the Mexican War seemed to bear out Calhoun's doctrine. In that war, which saw an almost uninterrupted series of American victories, the proportion of regulars and long-term volunteers to militiamen was exactly opposite to that of the War of 1812. Eighty-eight per cent of the troops in the Mexican War were regulars and long-term volunteers. Both wars involved amphibious operations which always require a high degree of military skill. The comparison between the two wars would be misleading, however, if one did not take into account the relative weakness of the Mexican army and the relative amount of preparation made in each case by the United States before hostilities.

The first experience of the Army of the United States in war on a grand scale was the Civil War. Its colossal requirements could not have been foreseen, since civil wars can never be planned in advance. An infantry war on a vast scale, nearly three million troops were required to conquer and hold in subjection the vast areas in rebellion. Such large bodies of troops could not be raised by the volunteer system, even when bonuses were offered, so conscription, which in itself was a great step toward the federalization of the Army, was resorted to.

The system of using Federal and state troops in the Civil War resulted in military inefficiency through the rise of political generals, with resultant deviations in many cases from the purely military objectives of the war. The Federal and state governments competed against each

other in the same markets for the supply of available weapons and materials. The variety of weapons employed by the troops of the several states complicated the ammunition supply problem. As an example of the confusion existing, it has been pointed out by Professor Shannon that Iowa troops went into action equipped with Austrian, Prussian, and Harper's Ferry muskets, Spencer and Sharp carbines, Belgian, Whitworth, and Minié rifles, Colt and Navy revolvers, and other less well-known types of weapons. Summarizing the experience of the Union armies in the Civil War, General Upton could not resist the conclusion that the existence of a well-trained Union force of 50,000 men could have crushed the rebellion in the first months of its life. After the Southern states were able to place their armies in the field, it required nearly three million men four years to do this.

The trend in the development of the Army from 1866 to 1898 was in the direction of a larger national army with relatively less reliance on the state militias. An increasing number of American military missions to Europe brought back recommendations for an "expansible" Federal force on European lines. Chief of these was the report of General Upton. After his trip around the world in 1875-1877, Upton recommended, among other things, the abolition of short-term enlistments, the maintenance of an expansible Regular Army, the adoption of the three battalion system, the establishment of a general staff on the German model, the interchangeability of staff and line officers, compulsory retirements, examinations for promotions, and a general system of military education for all branches of the service. Though shelved at the time and severely criticized in later years by supporters of the National Guard as an attempt to "Prussianize" our military system, most of General Upton's recommendations were ultimately embodied in the practice of the Army.

The experience of the Spanish-American War, although brief in duration and subjecting us to no severe test, also tended to emphasize the desirability of a national army. This time the infantry forces of the Regular Army and the state troops were equipped with only four different types and calibers of shoulder arms, a considerable improvement over the situation in 1861. State troops, originally enlisted for the war against Spain, grew restless during the prolonged Philippine Insurrection which followed. Though victorious over a notably inferior opponent, the conduct of our whole war effort was subjected to great criticism by Congress and the press. These factors enabled Elihu Root to carry out his far reaching reforms in 1903.

The history of the Army up to this time indicated that certain conditions were necessary for the efficient conduct of military operations: (1) the existence of a body of well-trained and equipped troops proportionate in numbers to the task involved; (2) the existence of an agency for the superior direction of the war, with lines of authority clearly laid out; (3) that the equipment and maintenance of the Army be simplified as much as possible by the employment of standard military units, weapons, uniforms, and equipment; and (4) the increasing size of armies and their vast requirements in the matter of supplies pointed to the necessity of providing some means of mobilizing industry for war purposes. It had also been shown that, with the development of new military techniques and weapons, second-line state troops were of limited value.

Up to the year 1903 the superior direction of the Army was hampered by a curious division of authority between the Secretary of War, the Commanding General, and the Adjutant General. This relationship was almost unworkable at any time and broke down completely in war. It caused so much trouble in the Spanish-American War that Secretary Root was able to force through Congress the Organic Act of February 14, 1903, which abolished the office of Commanding General and created the General Staff. The Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General were both made subordinate to the Secretary of War by this legislation, but the struggle between those two was to be continued for many years. In 1912, as the result of an acrimonious test of strength between Chief of Staff Leonard Wood and Adjutant General Ainsworth, the latter was forced out. Congress passed legislation in 1916 designed to restore the dual control, but Secretary Baker balked this attempt to undermine the General Staff. Congress then weakened the Staff by making it illegal for more than half of the limit of forty-five officers to be employed in or near Washington, with the result that only twenty were there when war broke out in 1917. Nine of these had their whole time taken up with routine functions, leaving eleven to do all the military thinking, the strategic planning, and the coordination of all military efforts of the United States. Not until a month after war was declared did Congress provide an increase of personnel for the General Staff. The new limit allowed ninety-two Regular Army officers, although the services of 1,200 officers and 3,000 civilians were ultimately required. Because of the poor-orphan treatment accorded the General Staff in the years before the war, only four officers on the General Staff had enjoyed any previous

Staff experience. In the eyes of European critics the American General Staff was merely a paper organization in 1917. Nevertheless, the establishment of the General Staff was an important step toward the federalization of the Army.

From 1903 to 1917 the nationalization of the Army and the attempt to coordinate all state troops with those of the Regular Army continued. The Dick Bill of January 21, 1903, must be regarded as the foundation stone of the National Guard and a great advance in the direction of uniformity. To the extent then thought possible, it standardized the National Guard with the organization, equipment, and discipline of the Regular Army and provided for definite periods of training, inspection by Regular Army officers, and funds for implementing these changes. But Secretary of War Garrison felt that the National Guard as contemplated in the Dick Bill still did not provide a dependable reserve force for the Regular Army. In the preparedness movement which began in 1915, Garrison went back to the Calhoun-Upton concept of an expansible national army, but, for considerations connected with the presidential election of 1916, President Wilson saw fit to accept Garrison's resignation and shelved his plan for an army on the continental model. Before his retirement, however, the Army War College had undertaken at his request a series of elementary studies on the question of a military policy for the United States.

The preparedness movement of 1916 culminated in the National Defense Act of June 3, up to that time the most comprehensive military legislation enacted in the peace-time history of the United States. Its very scope and character indicated that a major revolution had taken place in the earlier concepts of the rôle, function, and character of a suitable military force. It contemplated expanding the Regular Army from 128,000 to 280,000 officers and men and the National Guard from about 118,000 to 480,000 officers and men over a period of five years. The act gave the Federal government much greater control over the National Guard than had hitherto existed and enabled the President to transfer complete Guard units to the Federal service if required. An effort was made to modernize the military equipment of the Army in line with European combat experience, and a Council of National Defense with advisory powers was organized to facilitate industrial mobilization. At the end of a five year period, had war not intervened, the United States would have had a well-balanced, well-trained, and well-equipped national force of 700,000.



Some comment is called for on this far-reaching bit of legislation. The size and character of the Army contemplated was not necessary for the defense of our frontiers. The implications of this act and other preparedness steps were that the Army should be a unit capable of fighting a war in distant, perhaps European, theaters. The recommendations of the Army boards for the acquisition of new types of weapons point to this conclusion. The Treat Board, which was set up in April 1918 to survey the needs of the Army for artillery, recommended not only great increases in the light artillery establishment of the army; it also recommended super-heavy 11- and 18-inch howitzers. These heavy siege weapons were obviously designed to be employed against permanent fortified works—and there were no such positions in the Western Hemisphere at that time. It may also be pointed out that the road conditions in the United States at that time would have prevented the movement of these super-heavy weapons except by rail; they could, however, be transported over the network of paved roads in Europe.

The war crisis of April 1917 swept aside essential parts of the 1916 program before they were under way. The trend toward federalization, already apparent in the Army, now developed with amazing swiftness. The Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, providing for the conscription of the unorganized military manpower of the nation, also permitted the National Guard to be drafted bodily into the Federal service. Every one of the seventeen National Guard divisions reached France, and eleven saw service as combat troops. But, although the name National Guard was retained, they were no longer state militia in Federal service; they fought, like the Regular Army and the National Army, as part of the Army of the United States—a truly national army in the organizational sense of the term. Nothing shows the process of federalization at work in the development of the Army more clearly than this changed attitude toward conscription. It had been adopted in the middle of the Civil War after the volunteer system had failed. It was adopted at the outset of the World War in spite of large numbers of volunteer enlistments. It was to be adopted in 1940 over a year before the United States was at war.

The attempts made by Congress and the nation to profit, at least from the organizational point of view, from the lessons of the World War were numerous and intelligent, and the Congressional investigations seeking to arrive at a sound national policy for the Army were the most statesmanlike in our history. The actual effects on the organi-

zation of the Army were embodied in the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920. In keeping with our traditional policy a small Regular Army was retained as the initial defense force with two reserve forces, the Organized Reserve and the National Guard. Under this law the latter still remained a state body until called into Federal service, but in 1933 it was made a full-fledged reserve component of the Army even in peace time. The final and inevitable step toward complete federalization of the Army took place in the midst of an almost worldwide tendency toward totalitarianism in government—and with it a totalization of war. In 1940, as a reaction to the collapse of France, the National Guard was brought into active Federal service in peace time, and the United States passed its first peace-time conscription bill.

Thus has the Army of the United States developed by slow evolutionary steps from the time when the main reliance was placed on the militias of the several states, through a process of using long-term volunteers to augment the small Regular Army, to a point where the nature of war no longer allowed the profitable employment of partially-trained state troops. The federalization of the Army has gone on continually and is now firmly established. As this process took place, the fundamental rôle of the Army in our national scheme of things has broadened from the early concept of a defense force on the frontiers to an implement consistent with the expanding character of our foreign policy and commitments. In recent years the Army has been given tasks of hemisphere defense and post-war police duties never seriously contemplated before. Like all our previous important wars, these commitments were certain to involve amphibious operations—the most difficult of all military tasks. They could only be performed by a well-trained national army. Despite the dire predictions of early prophets, our Army has never concerned itself with internal politics or threatened the liberties of a free people. It has never faced a Sedan or a Jena and only recently met its first Bataan. One can be assured, however, that the reorganized Army of the United States, representing the best elements of American national life, will meet its future trials with traditional steadfastness and warlike ardor.

# MOLTKE'S STRATEGICAL CONCEPTS

BY HAJO HOLBORN

For half a century after the peace of Vienna, Prussia abstained from active participation in European wars. When the Prussian army emerged in the 'sixties as the most powerful force on the continent, it had had no practical experience in war for almost two generations. It had taken part in insignificant campaigns during the revolutions of 1848-49 and had been mobilized repeatedly between 1830-59 in anticipation of conflicts which did not materialize. In the same period the Russian, Austrian, French, and British armies had seen active service. The superiority of the Prussian army was made possible only by its organization, by its peace-time training, and by the theoretical study of war which was brought to perfection in the half-century before Sadowa and Sedan.

The Prussian army of the nineteenth century was created by four men: Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau. Frederick bequeathed memories of victory and endurance in adversity, both of which are so essential for the pride and self-reliance of an army. In addition, he impressed upon his military successors the knowledge that even the peace-time life of an army consists of hard labor and that battles are won on the training ground. The over-emphasis on the minutiae of military life was originally counterbalanced by the strategic genius of the king. He did not train younger strategists, however, and it was a foreign conqueror who reminded the Prussians of the rôle which strategy plays in warfare. Two young officers, both non-Prussian by birth, had to remold the Prussian army, which they did largely along the modern French pattern. Thus Napoleon became the second taskmaster of the Prussian army, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau adapted the Prussian army to the new type of warfare.

The Prussian military reformers knew that the new methods of war were an expression of the profound social and political changes which the French Revolution had produced. The army of Frederick the Great had been a force of mercenaries isolated from civilian society. The noble-born officer's sense of honor and loyalty was glorified while the rank and file were kept together by brutal discipline. The Prussian military reformers undertook to transform the army of the age of despotism into a national army; and to this end they introduced universal conscription of a more radical type than had ever been attempted

before. Napoleon's treaty of Tilsit hampered the immediate realization of Scharnhorst's ideas, but in the Prussian military law of 1814, drafted by his pupil, Boyen, his plan became the permanent order of Prussia's military system.

Conscription became the rule in practically all countries on the continent, but outside of Prussia it amounted merely to the conscription of the poor, since the well-to-do were allowed to make money payments or purchase substitutes. In Prussia, all groups of the population actually served. In this respect, the Prussian army was more clearly a citizens' army than that of any other country. Unfortunately, the Prussians were not democratic citizens but remained subjects of a bureaucratic absolutism. There was also a recrudescence of the privileged position of the Prussian gentry in government and army, and the junker class continued to monopolize the officers' positions. National service, the logical outcome of national and liberal thought in America and France, became in Prussia a device for strengthening the power of an absolutist state.

The dream of the Prussian military reformers of creating a true citizens' army was frustrated by the political reaction after 1815. The legacy of their strategic and tactical knowledge fared better, though even here the old school scored certain successes. The Prussian field service regulations of 1847 tried to revive Frederician tactics which Scharnhorst's order of 1812 had wisely shelved. Scharnhorst's and Gneisenau's strategic ideas were to have a more lasting effect on the Prussian army.

These two officers from Hanoverian and Austrian families were the only contemporary equals to Napoleon in the art of war. An early death in the summer of 1813 kept Scharnhorst from ever assuming high command in the field. Gneisenau, as the chief of staff of the Prussian army from the fall of 1813 to the summer of 1815, was destined to prove that the new Prussian school of military thought could produce not merely a new philosophy but also men able to translate it into action.

There has been much controversy about which of the two was the greater general. Clausewitz, friend and pupil of both, gave the crown to Scharnhorst because he combined a profound contemplative mind with a deep passion for action. Schlieffen found Gneisenau superior because he seemed to have possessed higher perspicacity and determination on the battlefield. From an historical point of view, however, it is most important to remember that both officers, the calm and self-



possessed Scharnhorst and the impetuous and generous Gneisenau, represented a new type of general. Both were born leaders of men, the one possibly greater in educating them for war, the other in directing them on the battlefield; but both these products of Germany's philosophic age, of the epoch of Kant and Goethe, believed that thought should lend wings to action.

The new Prussian strategy sprang from an original interpretation of Napoleon's art of war. To most nineteenth century students of war before Sadowa and Sedan, Jomini's writings seemed the last word on Napoleonic strategy. Had not Napoleon himself said that Jomini had betrayed the innermost secrets of his strategy? But Napoleon, though admiring Jomini, had also remarked that he set down chiefly principles but that genius worked according to intuition.<sup>1</sup> Jomini's cold rationalism was not capable of doing justice to the spontaneity of Napoleon's actions. The interpretation of Napoleon's strategy, which Scharnhorst found and which animated Gneisenau's conduct of the campaigns of 1813, was based on an historical and inductive method which gave full credit to the creative imagination of the commander and the moral energy of his troops. In Clausewitz' work *On War*, the new philosophy found its classic literary expression.

The new Prussian school of strategy created its own organ in the Prussian General Staff which became the brains and nerve center of the army. The origins of the General Staff go back to the decade before 1806, but not before Scharnhorst's time did it receive its characteristic position. When Scharnhorst reorganized the Ministry of War in 1806, he created a special division charged with the organization, mobilization, and the peace-time training and education of the army. Under the jurisdiction of this section also came the preparation of intelligence and topographical studies and finally the preparation and direction of tactics and strategy. As Minister of War, Scharnhorst retained the direction of this section and exercised a strong influence on the tactical and strategical thought of the officers in it by training them in war games and staff maneuvers. It became customary to assign these officers as adjutants to the various army units, a step which went far to extend the control of the chief of staff over all generals. The young men with the purple-striped trousers carried Scharnhorst's strategic thought into all sections of the army.

Under Scharnhorst, the General Staff was still a section of the Ministry of War, under which it would have remained if Prussia had

<sup>1</sup>General Baron Gourgaud, *Sainte Hélène, Journal inédit, 1815 à 1818* (Paris, 1899), II, 20.

received a parliament. The absolutist structure of the Prussian government, however, made it possible to divide military responsibility under the supreme command of the king. In 1821, the chief of the General Staff was made the highest adviser of the king in matters of warfare, while the Ministry of War was restricted to the political and administrative control of the army. This decision was of far-reaching consequence, since it enabled the General Staff to take a leading hand in military affairs, not merely after the outbreak of war, but also in the preparation and initial phase of a war.

Moltke was destined to take full advantage of the traditional ideas and institutions which were created during the Wars of Liberation. Like Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, he was not a Prussian by birth, but came from Mecklenburg. His father was an officer of the king of Denmark, who, as the Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, was then still a German prince. Moltke was brought up as a Danish cadet and became a lieutenant in 1819. In 1822 he applied for a commission in the Prussian army in which his father had started his military career before transferring to the Danish army. The Prussians put the young lieutenant through a stiff examination and made him begin at the very bottom of the military ladder, but after a year he was favored by admission to the War College under Clausewitz' direction. Clausewitz gave no lectures, however, and Moltke did not come under his spell until 1831, when Clausewitz' work was posthumously published. From his studies at the War College, Moltke gained his lasting interest in geography, physics, and military history. In 1826 he returned to his regiment for two years, but most of his time was given to the teaching of the officers of his division. In 1828 he was assigned to the General Staff where he remained for more than sixty years.

With the exception of five years as a lieutenant in the Danish and Prussian armies, Moltke never served with troops. He had never commanded a company or larger unit when, at the age of sixty-five, he took virtual command of the Prussian armies in the war against Austria. The years 1835-39, which he spent in Turkey as a military advisor of the Supreme Porte, gave him some war experience, but it was largely in the rôle of an observer.

As a lieutenant, Moltke never had a penny to spend. Dire need prompted his writing short stories for a popular magazine and historical essays. In order to purchase riding horses, without which he could not accept a commission on the General Staff, he translated six volumes of Gibbon's history only to discover that his publisher was insolvent.



FIELD MARSHAL COUNT HELMUTH KARL BERNHARD VON MOLTKE  
*From The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1870*  
(New York, 1870)

Moltke wrestled with materialistic problems and yet acquired an Attic education in a Spartan setting. His chief work in his early years was concerned with topography, but he went beyond into all the other aspects of geography and penetrated deeply into history as well. Moltke became one of the foremost writers of German prose.

He did not, however, become a statesman or original political thinker. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been statesmen, and their military reforms aimed directly at a reformation of the whole life of the nation. Moltke was conscious of the natural interrelation of generalship and statesmanship and took a lively personal interest in politics, but he abstained from active participation in political affairs. He was convinced of the superiority of monarchical government and found its special justification in the fact that it allowed the officers to manage army affairs without interference from non-professional elements. The defeat of German liberalism in the revolution of 1848-49, and again in the 'sixties, pleased him.

William I apparently discovered Moltke's talents and appointed him Chief of the General Staff in 1857. But William was more immediately interested in the political and technical reorganization of the army, and for a time the figure of the Minister of War, Roon, overshadowed Moltke in the councils of state. What Roon and William proposed was a decided improvement in the efficiency of the army, but it meant the ultimate abolition of those militia-like sections of the army in which a liberal spirit had survived. The popular *Landwehr* was curtailed in favor of a greatly expanded standing army. This gave the professional officer corps unchallenged control over all military establishments of the nation. The Prussian parliament fought this measure, but the reorganization became effective under Bismarck without parliamentary consent. The ensuing constitutional conflict was still raging when the Battle of Sadowa was fought. The parliamentary opposition broke down, however, when Bismarck's policy and Moltke's victories fulfilled the longing for German national unity. Moltke's successful strategy, therefore, decided two issues: first, the rise of a unified Germany among and over the nations of Europe; second, the victory of the Prussian crown over the liberal and democratic opposition in Germany through the maintenance of the authoritarian structure of the Prussian army.

The rôle which Roon, as Minister of War, played in the years of political conflict made him the most influential figure in the army before 1866. William was so used to taking military advice from him



that the Chief of the General Staff was almost forgotten. The unpretentious Moltke was little known in the army, and even during the Battle of Sadowa, when an officer brought an order from him to the commander of a division, the latter replied, "This is all very well, but who is General Moltke?" Moltke's later rise to prominence among the advisers of the king was sudden and unexpected, though it was the logical outcome of Prussian military history following the days of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

His aloofness from the political scene in the years 1857-66 allowed him to give his undivided attention to the preparation of future military operations. The revolutions of 1848-49, the rise of the Second Empire in France, and the Crimean War had already shown that a new epoch of European history had opened. Moltke began at once to overhaul the plans which the Prussian General Staff had drawn up. His predecessor, General Reyher, one of the few Prussian generals who had come up from the ranks, had been a man of great vision and a remarkable teacher of strategy. Moltke could count on the ability of the Prussian officer to find original solutions for the tactical problems of war. These officers dropped the official service regulations of 1847 as soon as they crossed the Bohemian frontier in 1866 and followed their own ideas.

The peace-time organization of the Prussian army was more highly developed than in any other country. With the exception of the guard troops, regiments drew their recruits and reservists from their local districts. The Hapsburg Empire with its nationality problems could not use such a system. Moreover, the Prussian army had retained the army corps created by Napoleon during his campaigns but given up by France under the Bourbons. Except in Prussia, army corps were formed on the eve of war, thus retarding rapid mobilization and limiting the training of officers for large-scale operations.

Rapid as the mobilization of the Prussian army already was, Moltke accelerated it still further. The unhappy geographical structure of the Prussian monarchy of this period, with its far-flung east-west extension from Aix-la-Chapelle to Tilsit severed by Hanover, aggravated Prussia's military problems. The railroad offered a remedy which Moltke exploited to the full. He had begun to study railroads before a single line had been built in Germany and apparently believed in their future. When railroad building got under way in the early 'forties he risked his savings by investing in the Berlin-Hamburg railroad. His speculative interest may have been enhanced by his concern

to cut down the distance which separated him from his young bride in Holstein, but his military thinking was always awake. Troops were moved by rail for the first time in 1847-50. In 1859, when Prussian mobilization was pending, Moltke tested the facilities for the rail transportation of the whole army and introduced important improvements.

The railroads offered new strategic opportunities. Troops could be transported six times as fast as the armies of Napoleon had marched, and the fundamentals of all strategy, time and space, appeared in a new light. A country which had a highly developed system of rail communications gained important and possibly decisive advantages in warfare. The speed of the mobilization and of the concentration of armies became an essential factor in strategic calculations. In fact, the timetable of mobilization and assemblage, together with the first marching orders, henceforth formed the very core of the strategic plans drawn up by the military staffs in expectation of war.

In addition to making use of the modern railroads, Moltke proposed to employ the dense road system which had come into being in the course of the industrial revolution. Roads, particularly good roads, were scarce in Napoleon's day, and it had been necessary to move whole armies on single roads. An army column is not ready for battle, however; it takes a full day to deploy a corps of 30,000. The change-over from marching to battle formation was accordingly a time-consuming process, and armies had, therefore, to be massed days before the battle. After 1815 road conditions improved greatly, and new tactics became possible. In 1865 Moltke wrote:

The difficulties in mobility grow with the size of military units; one cannot transport more than one army on one road on the same day. They also grow, however, the closer one gets to the goal since this limits the number of available roads. It follows that the normal state of an army is its separation into corps and that the massing together of these corps without a very definite aim is a mistake. A continuous massing becomes, if merely on account of provisioning, embarrassing and often impossible. It makes a battle imperative and consequently should not take place if the moment for such a decision has not arrived. A massed army can no longer march, it can only be moved over the fields. In order to march, the army has first to be broken up which is dangerous in the face of the enemy. Since, however, the concentration of all troops is absolutely necessary for battle, the essence of strategy consists in the organization of separate marches but so as to provide for concentration at the right moment.

It is probable that Moltke already envisaged operations in which the concentration of the army would take place on the battlefield itself, thus discarding the Napoleonic principle that the army should be concentrated well before the start of a battle. Still, Moltke's direction of

operations in the weeks before Sadowa did not disregard the Napoleonic rule from the very beginning. He could have drawn the armies together before the battle, but he decided at a late date to continue their separation and to achieve their union on the battlefield. After Sadowa, he summed up his ideas thus:

It is even better if the forces can be moved on the day of battle from separate points against the battlefield itself. In other words, if the operations can be directed in such a manner that a last brief march from different directions leads to the front and into the flank of the enemy, then the strategy has achieved the best that it is able to achieve, and great results must follow. No foresight can guarantee such a final result of operations with separate armies. This depends, not merely on calculable factors, space and time, but also often on the outcome of previous minor battles, on the weather, on false news; in brief, on all that is called chance and luck in human life. Great successes in war are not achieved, however, without great risks.

The last remarks reveal Moltke's philosophy of war. As a loyal student of Clausewitz, Moltke was eager to extend the control of reason over warfare. He knew only too well, however, that the problems of war cannot be exhausted by calculation. War is an instrument of policy, and, though Moltke maintained that a commander should be free in the actual direction of military operations, he admitted that fluctuating aims and circumstances were bound to modify strategy at all times.

While the impact of politics on strategy confronted a general with an element of uncertainty, Moltke felt that the mobilization and initial concentration of the army was calculable, since it could be prepared a long time before the outbreak. "An error," he said, "in the original concentration of armies can hardly be corrected during the course of a campaign. The necessary orders, however, can be deliberated long before and, assuming that the troops are ready for war and transportation is properly organized, they will inevitably lead to the desired results." Beyond this stage, war becomes a combination of daring and calculation. After actual operations have begun,

Our will soon meets the independent will of the enemy. To be sure, we can limit the enemy's will if we are ready and determined to take the initiative, but we cannot break it by any other means than tactics, in other words, through battle. The material and moral consequences of any larger encounter are, however, so far-reaching that through them a completely different situation is created, which then becomes the basis for new measures. No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy . . . The commander is compelled during the whole campaign to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted. All consecutive acts of war are, therefore, not executions of a pre-

meditated plan, but spontaneous actions, directed by military tact. The problem is to grasp in innumerable special cases the actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly . . . . It is obvious that theoretical knowledge will not suffice, but that here the qualities of mind and character come to a free, practical and artistic expression, although schooled by military training and led by experiences from military history or from life itself.

Moltke denied that strategy was a science and that general principles could be established from which plans of operations could be logically derived. Even such rules as the advantages of the inner line of operation or of flank protection seemed to him merely of relative validity. Each situation called for a definition in terms of its own circumstances and for a solution in which training and knowledge were combined with vision and courage. In Moltke's opinion this was the chief lesson to be derived from history. Historical study was also of great usefulness in acquainting a future commander with the complexity of circumstances in which military actions can take place. He believed that staff or army maneuvers, indispensable as they were for training staff officers, could not put before their eyes as realistic a picture of the significant aspects of war as history was able to do.

The study of military history was not left to a subordinate section; it was made one of the central responsibilities of the Prussian General Staff. Moltke set the style by his classic monograph on the Italian War of 1859, first published in 1862, which aimed at an objective description of the events in order to draw from them valid practical conclusions. The histories of the wars of 1866 and 1870-71 were later written in a similar manner under his direction.

Moltke took the view that strategy could benefit greatly from history provided it was studied with the right sense of perspective. His own practice exemplifies the benefits which he derived from historical study. He knew, of course, of Napoleon's occasional use of detached corps for attacks against the flank or rear of the enemy. These operations with detailed units had not, however, affected Napoleon's general principle of strong concentration of the gross of the army or his belief in the irresistible power of central attack. The advantages of such a strategy had been great in the age of Napoleon, but they had not shielded him against ultimate defeat. The Battle of Leipzig had shown the possibilities of concentric movements of individual armies as predicted by Scharnhorst, who had advised that one should never keep an army aimlessly massed but always fight with concentrated forces. In Moltke's opinion the progress of technology and transportation made



it possible to plan concentric operations on a much larger scale than had been possible a half-century earlier.

Important as history was, Moltke pointed out that it was not necessarily helpful in arriving at concepts of strategy. "Strategy is a system of *ad hoc* expedients; it is more than knowledge, it is the application of knowledge to practical life, the development of an original idea in accordance with continually changing circumstances. It is the art of action under the pressure of the most difficult conditions."

Accordingly, the organization of command held a prominent place in Moltke's ideas on war. He treated the subject with great clarity in his history of the Italian campaign. No war council could direct an army, and the chief of staff should be the only adviser of the commander regarding operations. Even a faulty plan, provided it was executed firmly, was preferable to a synthetic product. On the other hand, not even the best plan of operations could anticipate the vicissitudes of war and individual tactical decisions which must be made on the spot. In Moltke's view a dogmatic enforcement of the plan of operations was a deadly sin, and great care was taken to encourage initiative on the part of all commanders, high or low. In contrast to the vaunted Prussian discipline, a premium was placed upon independent judgment of all officers.

Moltke refrained from issuing any but the most essential orders. "An order shall contain everything that a commander cannot do by himself, but nothing else." This meant that the commander in chief should not interfere with tactical arrangements, but Moltke went beyond this. He was ready to condone deviations from his plan of operations if the subordinate general could gain important tactical successes, for, as he expressed it, "in the case of a tactical victory, strategy submits." He remained unmoved when certain generals in the first weeks of the Franco-Prussian War menaced his whole plan of operations by foolhardy, though gainful, enterprises.

Moltke did not wish to paralyze the fighting spirit of the army nor to cripple the spontaneity of action and reaction on the part of subordinate commanders. The modern developments had placed a greater responsibility upon them than was the case in former ages. One of the chief reasons why Napoleon kept his army close together was his wish to keep all troops within the reach of his direct orders. Moltke's system of disposition in breadth made the central direction of the battle itself extremely difficult, although the marches prior to the battle could easily be arranged by telegraph. Moltke directed most movements in the

war of 1866 from his office in Berlin, arriving at the theater of war just four days before the Battle of Sadowa. He confined himself very wisely to general strategic orders. To insure an adequate—and this meant free—execution of strategic ideas, army commands were created, but the authority in tactical questions rested with the commanders of corps and divisions.

Moltke's strategic thought and practice met its first and greatest test in the Austrian campaign of 1866. His rôle in the war which Austria and Prussia conducted against Denmark in 1864 had been modest. In 1866 the forces were more evenly matched than later in the Franco-Prussian War, and Moltke had to overcome more difficult geographical and political problems.

William I wished to avoid the war with Austria into which Bismarck ultimately pushed him. The Prussians thus began their mobilization much later than the Austrians, and even then it remained doubtful whether the king could be persuaded to declare war and enable the army to take the offensive. The strategic problems were accordingly very delicate. From Bohemia and Moravia the Austrians could have operated against either Upper or Central Silesia or marched into Saxony to threaten Berlin, possibly after effecting a union with the Bavarian army in northern Bohemia or Saxony. Whether one or the other of these possibilities could be realized depended entirely upon the date of the actual opening of war. Naturally enough, Moltke supported Bismarck in urging the king to act soon, but he avoided prejudicing the political issue by military measures in contrast to his nephew, who as chief of staff had to inform William II in August 1914 that the strategic plans of the General Staff had deprived the government of its freedom of action.

The elder Moltke's moves were aimed in the first place at making up for the delay caused by the belated start of the Prussian mobilization. In addition, he wished to cope with a possible Austrian advance against Saxony and Berlin or against Breslau in Central Silesia. Whereas the Austrians could employ only one railroad line for their mobilization in Moravia, Moltke used five to transport the Prussian troops from all over Prussia to the theater of war. As a consequence on June 5, 1866, the Prussian armies were spread over a 275-mile semicircle from Halle and Torgau to Görlitz and Landeshut. The original placement of the Prussian troops was safe as long as the Austrian forces were far to the south. In point of fact, they were not even in Bohemia, as Moltke assumed, but still in Moravia.

Moltke, of course, never planned to leave his troops at their points of disembarkation, but began at once to draw them closer together towards the center around Görlitz. At all times he refused, however, to order a full concentration in a small area as was advocated by most Prussian generals and even by members of his own staff. On the other hand, he, too, felt somewhat worried when he ultimately learned that the main Austrian forces were assembling in Moravia, a fact which seemed to point to a contemplated Austrian offensive towards Upper Silesia. Reluctantly he allowed the left wing to extend towards the Neisse River, thus again spreading the Prussian armies over a distance of more than 270 miles from Torgau to Neisse. His hesitation was chiefly caused, however, by uncertainty about the policy of William I rather than by military considerations. In Moltke's opinion everything would be well if he did not miss the opportunity of achieving the ultimate concentration of the Prussian armies along the shortest route. This meant moving forward into Bohemia.

Moltke had chosen Jicin as the point for such a concentration. He did not select Jicin because of itself it offered important strategic advantages; it was a matter of distances. Jicin was about equally close to the two main Prussian armies, the Second Army under Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm which formed the left wing in Silesia, and the First Army under Prince Friedrich Karl which had its base around Görlitz. Jicin was also equally distant from Torgau and Olmütz, that is, from the Prussian Elbe Army and from the Austrian main army. Provided the Prussian armies could begin marching on the same day on which the Austrian army left Moravia, their concentration should have been completed before the Austrians arrived at Jicin.

It was not before June 22 that officers of the Prussian vanguard handed Austrian officers notification of the Prussian declaration of war, but Prussia had opened hostilities against other German states on June 16. Thus the Elbe Army began to occupy Saxony on the same day that the Austrian army started its march from Olmütz to Josephstadt on the upper Elbe.

The Austrian army was worthy of the best traditions of Austrian military history. Its morale and enthusiasm were high; its officers, among them some of the best generals of the period, had great ability and practical experience. Certain branches of the services, namely cavalry and artillery, were definitely superior to those of the Prussian army. The strength of the latter was in its infantry which excelled both in tactics and arms. The Prussian needle-gun could not by itself,

however, have achieved victory; this was proved in the war against France in which the Prussians fought against infantry armed with superior rifles. It was the outmoded shock tactics of the Austrian infantry, together with its old-fashioned guns, which put the Austrians at a decided disadvantage.

The scales were turned by the lesser strategic ability of the Austrian high command. Benedek was a fine soldier with a distinguished record of service to the Hapsburg empire. He was at his best in battle; fearlessly and correctly he directed the retreat of his beaten army on the battlefield of Sadowa. But he had grown up in the classic school of strategic thought, and his chief strategic adviser, General Krismanic, whom he had not selected, lived largely in the operational thought of the eighteenth century. These elements determined the strategic conduct of the war by the Austrian high command. They meant formation in depth and emphasis upon the maintenance of naturally strong positions. Moltke, on his part, showed that space could be conquered by time.

The Austrian army moved from Moravia in three parallel columns. Though the strain of such marching arrangements was considerable, the Austrians reached their goal quickly and in good order. But after the arrival of the vanguards in Josephstadt on June 24, three days were needed to mass the army again. This loss of time probably saved the Prussian armies.

In spite of Moltke's continuous warnings, the First Army had made slow progress since Prince Friedrich Karl wanted to wait for the Elbe Army, which, after occupying Saxony, was to be joined to his command. This gave Benedek an opportunity to use the inner lines of operations. Probably Benedek's judgment was right when he considered an attack on the First Army. He failed, however, to recognize in time that he had only one or possibly two days in which to take the offensive against one of the Prussian armies without having to fear the other in his rear. Since the Austrian high command believed in the tactical advantage of strong positions rather than in the priceless value of time, and since the early concentration of the army hindered its mobility, the opportunity slipped by. When Benedek discovered his mistake, it was too late to retreat behind the Elbe at Josephstadt and Königgrätz, and he had to accept battle with the river at his rear.

The danger of an Austrian attack against one of the two Prussian armies having passed, Moltke began to delay the concentration of the armies, keeping them at one day's distance from each other in order to



achieve their union on the battlefield. The last orders were given during the night of July 2. Actually, they were bolder than their execution made them appear. According to Moltke, the left wing of the Second and the right wing of the First Army were supposed to operate, not merely against the flanks, but also against the rear of the enemy. Moltke conceived Sadowa as a battle of encirclement, but the Prussian generals did not follow him and the Austrian army escaped. An immediate pursuit was impossible since the troops of the Second Army had crossed the front of the First, thus causing a mix-up of all army units which could not easily be disentangled.

Moltke had shown that the much-vaunted inner line of operations was merely of relative significance. He summed up his experiences in these words:

The unquestionable advantages of the inner line of operations are valid only as long as you retain enough space to advance against one enemy by a number of marches, thus gaining time to beat and to pursue him, and then to turn against the other who is in the meantime merely watched. If this space, however, is narrowed down to the extent that you cannot attack one enemy without running the risk of meeting the other who attacks you from the flank or rear, then the strategic advantage of the inner line of operations turns into the tactical disadvantage of encirclement during the battle.

These sentences have often been interpreted as a definite condemnation of operations along the inner line and a recommendation of concentric maneuvers. This was not Moltke's opinion. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 he used both concepts freely and successfully, depending chiefly upon the actions of the enemy. Moltke's strategy was characterized by his openness of mind and by the elastic changes from one device to the other.

It has been suggested that Moltke's strategy reflected the superior military strength which Prussia enjoyed at that time, but such a statement is true only within certain limitations. In 1866 Moltke had to create the slight superior strength of the Prussian armies in Bohemia, which, incidentally, was not to be found in manpower. He took the risk of denuding all Prussian provinces of troops and of leaving only an extremely small army to deal with Austria's German allies. If the Bohemian campaign had dragged on or turned into a deadlock, Napoleon III could have used the opportunity to take the Rhineland and to settle the fate of the continent.

After the treaty of Frankfurt, Prussia-Germany could breathe more freely provided the government succeeded in preventing the military cooperation of her foremost neighbors, France and Russia. Moltke

had considered this eventuality for the first time in 1859, but it had been a passing cloud on the political horizon. After 1879 the possibility of a Franco-Russian coalition loomed larger and larger in the thoughts of the General Staff. With the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in the early 'nineties, it became the major strategic consideration.

Moltke's plans in this situation were in line with his strategy in the past, namely to fight one enemy with as little as possible in order to make available superior forces with which to crush the other. His advice was to stay on the defensive in the West and to take the offensive against Russia. Germany, in possession of Alsace-Lorraine, could defend her western frontier with small forces whereas she could not hope to achieve rapid decisions against the rising line of French fortifications. Greater results could be hoped for in Russia. Moltke's second successor as chief of the General Staff, Count Schlieffen, reversed the sequence in 1894; from that time on, German plans for a two-front war have envisaged making the first offensive in the West.

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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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A valuable addition to the INSTITUTE library has just been received from Mrs. William W. Buckley, of Washington, D. C., as a memorial to her husband, the late Lieutenant Colonel Buckley of the Marine Corps. The largest part of the collection, consisting in all of about five hundred volumes, is on military history from Napoleon through World War I with special emphasis on the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars.

Do you have a copy of volume I, number 2 (Summer 1937), you don't need? Our plea in the last issue brought only one response—and the waiting list grows longer.

As announced briefly in a footnote to Mr. Leahy's article on "Records Administration and the War" in the Summer issue, Colonel Thomas M. Spaulding, a Trustee of the INSTITUTE, was appointed Director of Records by The Adjutant General on June 26 "to operate and coordinate all activities of microfilming and disposition of records, Services of Supply, under direct supervision of The Adjutant General, and to carry out current policies in relation thereto." Colonel Spaulding returned to active duty in The Adjutant General's Office in May of last year to serve as liaison officer between the War Department and The National Archives. The Office of the Director of Records has been divided into two sections, the Microfilming Service under Captain Daniel F. Noll, formerly Associate Microfilm Technologist in the Division of Photographic Archives and Research in The National Archives, and the Records Service headed by Captain Jesse S. Douglas, Managing Editor of this journal and formerly Archivist in the War Department Division of The National Archives.

Among the more important groups of records transferred from the War Department to The National Archives during the past few months have been those of the geographical commands on the Pacific Coast prior to 1918; substantial portions of the General Staff including the

Office of the Chief of Staff, 1903-1921; the Selective Service System including the Office of the Provost Marshal General, 1917-1919; the Office of the Surgeon General, 1917-1927; and the Planning Branch of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1922-1934. In the next issue of the journal we hope to publish a note describing briefly all of the War Department records now in The National Archives. The Navy Department has recently transferred the records of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, 1896-1940, and of the Bureau of Engineering, 1910-1940.

Stephen V. Grancsay, Curator of Arms and Armor at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, writes that he is preparing for publication in the near future a monograph on American powder-horns of the Colonial, Revolutionary War, and War of 1812 periods in which will be included a descriptive list of over a thousand horns giving the names of persons and places, dates, rhymes, maps, and other inscriptions on them. Mr. Grancsay would appreciate being informed of any engraved cow or ox horn which has not already been called to his attention as he wishes to make his list as complete as possible. He is not interested at present in metal powder-flasks.

#### *Contributors to This Issue*

Dr. Edward S. Mason, formerly Professor of Economics at Harvard University, is now in the Office of Strategic Services.

Dr. H. A. De Weerd, Editor of MILITARY AFFAIRS and Professor of History at Denison University, has been at the Institute for Advanced Study during the past year.

Dr. Hajo Holborn is Professor of History at Yale University.

Harry Venneman is a member of the staff of the Committee on Records of War Administration, Bureau of the Budget.



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## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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*The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War*, compiled and edited by Ladislas Farago for the Committee for National Morale. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1942. Pp. 614. \$3.75.)

Mr. Farago and his assistant editors have collected in this volume what they consider the most essential sources of the present Axis strategy. Aside from the editors' running commentaries, their book consists almost entirely of papers and articles written by German officers or officials. The biographical notes on these men read like a Who's Who of modern German militarists. It was they who built up, in the years before the outbreak of the present war, the body of military and political thought which triumphed in Poland, France, and the Balkans. Through their writings may be grasped the essential dynamic unity of that thought in Nazi Germany.

The reader often feels tempted to sigh, "If we had only known sooner of these things!" And, indeed, with the wisdom of hind-sight we can find in this collection the reasons for the almost inevitable success of the "Axis Grand Strategy" up to the fall of 1941. But what the German strategy will be against nations strongly united, heavily armed, and geographically more distant—*i.e.*, during the phase of the war beginning with Hitler's attack upon Russia—only future events can tell. Despite the difficulties of selection and editing, Mr. Farago and his colleagues have given us a book which makes valuable reading for a nation at war, a nation which needs to know its enemy and the nature of the war in which it is engaged.

THEODORE H. VON LAUE

*Princeton, New Jersey*

*Automatic Arms: Their History, Development, and Use*, by Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., and Charles T. Haven. (New York: William Morrow & Company. 1941. Pp. 344. \$4.50.)

It is curious that the current manifestation of the perennial craze to attribute "decisive" value to a particular type of weapon—depending on which one the particular expounder is most interested in—should be

so lacking in references to automatic arms. One of the most prominent characteristics of the present war is that it represents what appears to be the penultimate stage in the development and use of such weapons. In this respect the present war betokens not a break with the past but merely the continuation of a trend which began when fire power first asserted its ascendancy over shock power in tactical evolutions. The present authors have given us about as handy and at the same time comprehensive a treatise on automatic arms as could well be imagined. The volume is divided into five parts: "History and Development," "How They Work," "How to Keep Them Firing," "How They May Be Employed in Combat," and "Miscellaneous Considerations."

Throwing a fleeting glance at the time when "it was necessary to build a fire under a gun to make it go off," during which period, nevertheless, several repeating guns made their appearance, the authors begin their narrative of the development of automatic arms with the revolver patented in 1836 by Samuel Colt. The remainder of Part I is devoted not only to historical development from that point to the present, but also to the use of such weapons in combat. Concise and yet reasonably complete, this brief historical account will be a valuable aid to students of military technology and tactics and to military historians generally.

The parts of the book dealing with the mechanisms of automatic weapons, and these comprise most of the volume, will probably interest a much more restricted group of persons. Although about as lucidly written and readable as any treatise on purely technological matters can be, these chapters may not prove especially stimulating to anyone other than the specialist in problems of ordnance design. This reviewer regretted that the book, which is plentifully illustrated with drawings and photographs of both old and modern automatic arms, contains no diagrams to illustrate the more abstract portions of the discussion. The section drawings in the fourth appendix do not fill this need.

The portion of the volume dealing with the use of automatic weapons in present-day combat is intensely interesting but altogether too brief. The dismissal of problems of ammunition supply induced by the use of rapid-fire guns in only nine pages is rather cavalier treatment of a crucial aspect of the use of modern arms. The logistical problems connected with their use are scarcely touched upon even in those nine pages, which are concerned rather with methods of economizing on fire. On the other hand, the authors clearly did not consider themselves accountable for the incidence of automatic arms on

strategy, and their tactical analyses are wholly satisfactory. The reader will be grateful for the freedom from "field manual" style.

Unquestionably the outstanding omission in the book is the neglect of modern automatic cannon of larger caliber which have become so important in anti-aircraft and anti-tank fire. Except for two pages at the end of the historical section, there is practically no reference to automatic weapons larger than the machine-gun. The book is in fact mostly a treatise on the light machine-gun and the automatic rifle. Authors must, of course, impose limits upon their work somewhere, and the material these authors have chosen to cover has been covered extremely well. Although it is not for the merely casual reader on military subjects, this volume is indispensable reading for any serious student of the tactics and technology of modern war.

BERNARD BRODIE

*Dartmouth College*

*The Nature of Modern Warfare*, by Captain Cyril Falls, with an introduction by Major George Fielding Eliot. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. 101. \$1.25.)

This excellent little book by the present military correspondent of the *London Times* consists of the four Lees Knowles Lectures, which the author delivered as successor to General Sir Archibald Wavell, and of a fifth paper on mountain war.

The weakest chapter is the one on the doctrine of total war, which the author defines as "a reversion to the most primitive conception of warfare, the tribal war of extermination which ended in the killing of all the males, the looting of all the beasts, and the burning of all the immovable property of the defeated." This definition is most certainly not correct; and, even if these were really the aims of a totalitarian aggressor, Captain Falls' definition does not enlighten us as to the *methods* of total war, which in some essential respects are largely different from traditional war methods. The author is also inclined to regard terror as an important part of total war and states that the Nazis—whom he considers, quite correctly, as the parents of this kind of war—"have not improved upon ancient methods of spreading terror." Perhaps not; but the decisive improvement the Nazis *did* achieve was the increase of fear and intimidation and the spread of defeatism. This, surely, is a most effective feature of total war. Fortunately, in the course of the discussion several of the preconceived ideas are forgotten, and Captain Falls actually examines some of the

decisive factors of the Nazi methods of war, such as propaganda, fifth column, parachutists, attack against civilian refugees, and the doctrine of the bloodless war, though he is frequently blinded by his endeavor to prove that all this is not so new as is sometimes believed. Though it is true that all the elements of total war can be found in former wars, their combination and their application is nevertheless a fundamentally new one.

One chapter is devoted to mechanized attack, and it is an excellent analysis of the tactics of Panzer units, containing very interesting proposals for their improvement. The German tactics should not be repeated against an equal foe, and, if we translate this into plain English, not against the Germans themselves. On the contrary, the idea of the armored division followed by a motorized division should be abandoned, and a very small formation "comprising all arms, including the air arm," should be created instead. In the chapter on the tactics of defense, Captain Falls exposes the reasons why an army which is too weak to attack can nevertheless counterattack, and he advocates the principle of a defense which muffles and absorbs the shock rather than breaking it. Defense must have depth. It is unfortunate, however, that he does not discuss the problem in relation to theaters of limited extent—the typical European case, and probably also the case in concentrated industrial regions—where defense cannot always be deeply organized. As for a possible new invasion of Europe by a B. E. F., the author suggests that its best chance would lie in a combination of strategic offensive and tactical defensive, which is "perhaps the only possible method to adopt in view of the tremendous strength of the German Army."

The most interesting chapter is the "Notes on Mountain War," in which the author maintains that defense of mountains must always be unsuccessful and that, in this special kind of war, attack is the stronger form of fighting. This view is exactly opposite to the opinion held by many military writers and, of course, by almost all newspaper men. Your reviewer, though coming from a mountainous country, also believed in the natural strength of mountain barriers. Nevertheless, according to Captain Falls and to his quotations, this was never the opinion of past authorities like Pierre de Bourcet and Montecuculi, nor of modern masters of mountain warfare like Franchet d'Espèry. Their main argument is that the defender is unable to maneuver, whereas the attacker can easily do so. The defense positions are known and detectable, but the point of attack can be chosen arbitrarily by the attacker.



On the whole, this is the same argument which applies to the quasi-impossibility of defending rivers—in this case, also, rivers are popularly believed to be strong defense lines, though in reality and according to all authorities (except the French General Staff in 1940) they are not. Captain Falls draws attention to a French study, *Etude sur la Guerre de Montagne, d'après les enseignements de la campagne d'Orient*, which deals with French experience in the Balkans, particularly in 1918, and which contains the most valuable material on the problem. It must be added that Captain Falls wrote before the Balkan campaign in 1941, and that his opinions and those of the French study have been vindicated by this latest instance of mountain warfare.

In the concluding chapter, "Immutable Realities," he argues—correctly, in the opinion of the present writer—that tactics are "if anything more important than strategy. . . . The success of a strategic operation nearly always depends upon tactical success. That the most modern forms of warfare have not altered this fact is proved by the instance of the German thrust to the Channel ports last year. The *débacle* which would have fallen upon the Germans had the French been able to strike decisive counter-blows against the shoulders of the breach effected on the Meuse would have been terrific. The strategy was remarkable, but victory, indeed, avoidance of disaster, depended upon the German forces outfighting the French, as outfight them they did." The author lays emphasis upon the gambling factor in warfare, and states that military history affords more examples of failure through over-caution than of failure through excessive boldness. On the other hand, the highest strategy almost never consists in sheer inspiration, but in the correct choice from among two or three alternatives. "It is probably seldom that the bad strategist does not consider the best course; much more often he considers it and rejects it owing to an error in judgment." This cannot be avoided by rigid and completely preconceived operations, by thorough planning such as is characteristic of German strategy. Marshal Foch opposed this method vehemently, because it pays "no attention to the possible movements of the enemy or else [assigns] to him in advance a definite rôle and [banks] upon his fulfilling it." The solution of Foch was "a strong fighting advanced guard of all arms, with the main body so disposed that it could quickly reach any point. . . . The finishing touches should never be put to the plan of attack, or for that matter to the plan of defence, until the enemy was fixed. Fixed he could not normally be without fighting." And finally a last interesting quotation: "Strategic

surprise . . . means . . . that the enemy is caught by the impending attack in such circumstances that he cannot alter his dispositions to meet it as he would have done if he had not been surprised."

These brief remarks and quotations will suffice to show that Captain Falls' book is a very valuable contribution to military science, perhaps one of the most valuable in recent years. It is very rarely indeed that problems of strategy are treated with such insight and understanding and with such a high, almost philosophical view.

STEFAN T. POSSONY

*The Institute for Advanced Study*

*The Potsdam Führer: Frederick William I, Father of Prussian Militarism*, by Robert Ergang. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. 290. \$3.90.)

To have the massive figure of the second Prussian king emerge from the work of an American scholar essentially the same as from the patriotic schoolbook of one's Prussian youth is indeed a disquieting and challenging experience. No doubt the early War Lord of Prussia will be found a new and weird personage by the majority of readers since this is his first biography in English, but to the reviewer he is a familiar apparition from childhood. Here he is again: the *pater patriae* eager for the love of his subjects but ready to cane any whose affections seem lukewarm; the practical joker who used professors as court jesters; the stern army-builder able to discipline the remaining feudal elements of the land as well as to break the will of his son, the greater Frederick.

Although on the whole Mr. Ergang presents an accurate picture of Frederick William I, he was much more enigmatic than indicated and in quite different ways. His fondness for his giant guard, for instance, was hardly unique or a sign of madness; other princes, his contemporaries, had the same fad. A recent German work on the king's own paintings, which the author has apparently not seen or used, would have provided stirring material for a fresh interpretation, a psychogram of this curious mind. The portraits of peasants and soldiers, whom he chose as subjects in preference to his noblemen, and the disturbing allegories all reveal an undeniable rude power and a brooding melancholy best described by one of the inscriptions, "*In tormentis pinxit.*"

Turning from the king's personality, we must admit that the military sections are not the best part of the book. Less than two of the thirteen chapters are dedicated to the military activities of the "Soldier King"

and his aides. We are told again that they introduced strict uniformity in exercise manuals, clothing, and marching in step; but, we may ask, which step? Was Frederick William or the Old Dessauer the inventor of the parade-step—*vulgo*, goose-step? That question is not raised or answered by the author. The person of the Old Dessauer, Duke Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, has been little analyzed although such an analysis might clarify the socio-economic origins of the Prussian army.

Duke Leopold was the modern man of his time, able to shed his feudal heritage and religion. Buying out feudal landowners in his own duchy and acquiring large holdings in eastern Prussia, he organized "grain factories" and persuaded the king to grant protective tariffs which excluded the cheaper Polish grain and ruined the flourishing grain trade of cities like Königsberg. This combination of grain production, protective tariff, army posts for the junker landlords, and army service for the serfs who worked on their farms is fundamental to any description of Prussia or Prussian militarism. It remains fundamental today.

ALFRED VAGTS

*Board of Economic Welfare*

*The Administration of the American Commissariat During the Revolutionary War*, by Victor Leroy Johnson. (Allentown, Pennsylvania: published by the author. 1941. Pp. 238. \$3.00.)

This book is a study, based on the best contemporary sources, of the problem of supplying food for the Continental forces during the Revolutionary War. All factors that brought about our uneven success in meeting the supply problem are discussed in detail and illustrated by concrete examples. For the military student the book contains material for a comprehensive study of the American strategy of supply, a subject rarely mentioned and even more rarely explained in detail.

When the Revolution began there was less organization in the Commissariat than in the fighting forces. When a campaign was undertaken and it became necessary to collect provisions, the local colony appointed commissary officials, usually civilians whose duties terminated at the close of the operation. During the siege of Boston the supply problem was comparatively simple, but later, when the army marched or lived in cantonments distant from the coast and rivers, difficult problems arose. It was realized from the first, of course, that a well organized Commissary Department was needed, but its organization was delayed for many reasons. Rivalry and prejudice existed

among the colonies; Congress lacked authority and experience. We have often seen these defects mentioned in a general way, but Dr. Johnson gives us innumerable examples.

One is struck with the constant and persistent efforts of the colonies and of Congress to meet difficult executive problems by means of committees. Americans seemed to fear the creation of executives for any purpose whatever, and they hesitated to appoint individuals clothed with ample power to operate. When, at times, individuals were appointed as officials and given limited authority, above them were appointed the inevitable committee to hamper their action. Such committees and officials were usually remunerated, not by a fixed salary, but by a percentage upon the business they transacted. They were not officials of the state but business men employed in state business and entitled to continue to make money. However, it should be remembered that at this period the armies of Europe acting in the field were accustomed to depend upon contractors to collect supplies which were then issued to troops by commissary agents. As the war progressed the commissary official drawing a fixed salary appeared.

Every conceivable means of supply was given a trial. Contractors purchased and issued food to the troops; contractors delivered food to agents of the separate colonies and to those of Congress; purchasing commissaries were appointed by the separate colonies or by Congress. Finally, when it became evident that an executive head must be entrusted with the task, unshackled by committees, Joseph Trumbull was made Commissary General of the Army of the United Colonies, and under him were appointed purchasing and issuing commissaries. When the army marched, purchasing officials were sent ahead to secure and deposit on the route the necessary supplies. To supplement this system, the marching army also foraged, giving in return Certificates of Indebtedness. At times, when supplies were not forthcoming, generals in the field had to take matters into their own hands and exact forced contributions. The appearance of French fleets upon our coast and the final arrival of Rochambeau's army caused great rejoicing among our people, but not so among the commissary officials as the colonies of necessity had to provision the fleets and feed the army. French commanders, lacking faith in our supply methods, employed their own American agents to secure supplies, and these competed in the market with Continental and colonial purchasing agents.

No one can understand properly Washington's military operations without a careful reading of this book. Too many of his campaigns and



many of his maneuvers were closely related to the supply of his army. The reviewer suggests that a student, after reading the military account of a campaign, might profitably take up the corresponding chapter in Dr. Johnson's book, having always at hand a contemporary map of the theater of operations. On such maps in *The George Washington Atlas* (1932) will be found the various depots and supply localities which formed the very skeleton of Washington's system of maneuvers. Modern maps as a rule show neither these localities, often mere cross-roads, nor the roads of the period that fed the depots when they were not on streams. With this combination, the military reader will find much information of interest and value.

JOHN W. WRIGHT  
*Army War College*

*William Henry Harrison: His Life and Times*, by James A. Green.  
(Richmond, Virginia: Garrett & Massie. 1941. Pp. 536. \$5.00.)

For its author this newest life of General Harrison has been a labor of love. In one sense it cannot be called the latest biography, since it was completed a decade ago and for some time lay fallow in manuscript. That is why the bibliography fails to mention the definitive lives of such contemporaries as General Wilkinson, Henry Clay, Martin Van Buren, Andrew Jackson, John Tyler, and even of Harrison himself, which have appeared since 1931. But the neglected authors need not feel disturbed. It is simply that Mr. Green did not see fit to revise his work in the light of later findings.

On the other hand, it is unfortunate that this interesting volume did not appear sooner so that other writers might have had the benefit of Mr. Green's vast knowledge of the place and period. Particularly does Mr. Green emphasize Harrison's accomplishments as dirt farmer and horticulturist, although he glosses over details of the General's unfortunate experiences as business man and entrepreneur and disregards the aftermath of crop failures. General Harrison, upright and honest to the core, and perhaps over-generous, had little talent for either practical politics or business. He was a wise and capable General and the devoted head of a family which numbered not only his own considerable brood but very nearly every war orphan within hailing distance. Mr. Green shows too that Harrison—like Washington—was undoubtedly done to death by bungling physicians rather than, as has been commonly supposed, by the incessant clamor of office-seekers during that windy month of March 1841.

Mr. Green's work must be regarded more as a history of the man and his times than as a definitive biography. The writer is chatty and discursive and tends to emphasize Harrison's environment and family life rather than the military and political side, which is completely idealized. It is a strongly partisan work, flavored with some delightful anecdotes, and is generously illustrated. The viewpoint of the writer is that of a family friend, which no doubt is as it should be. None other than Mr. Green could have produced a work so full of precise detail concerning cows, sheep and hogs, domestic help and family bathtubs. The student of mid-West Americana should not miss it.

FREEMAN CLEAVES

*New York, New York*

*Conflict: The American Civil War*, by George Fort Milton. (New York: Coward-McCann. 1941. Pp. 443. \$3.50.)

It is seldom that skill in narrative writing and skill in the analysis of social and economic forces are combined, but to an unusual degree the present volume is such an achievement. George Fort Milton has succeeded in presenting the military history of the Civil War against the background of social and economic changes of the period in a style that is vivid and effective and that absorbs the reader's interest from beginning to end.

The author's expressed desire was "to give a picture of the Civil War as a whole—a war on land, at sea, in diplomacy, the spirit of the people, the employment of their material and psychic strength." The result, as he predicts, is an integration of material which omits much detail and tends toward over-simplification. Yet he has effectively organized the available material to shape a pattern of the war which interprets for the general reader the causes and effects of the crisis which more than any other explains America's "coming of age."

The conflict is pictured as an economic struggle "between the north's virile and balanced economy, with mutually sustaining and supporting agriculture and industry, against the south's misshapen agricultural economy, which neglected the socially appropriate farm products and focused on raising soil-exhausting cash crops by slave labor." A fairly well coordinated economy was at war with the "grip of cotton" which had produced a distorted and incompetent economy. In the last analysis this was the determining factor in the victory of the North. Individual morale and effort were probably greater in the Confederacy, but, as in the case of all modern wars, the armies that were supported

by an integrated industry and an adequate transport system capable of supplying their needs won out in the end.

This narrative account of the war as a whole was not designed to be an authoritative military history, and the accepted standards of research for the evaluation of doctoral dissertations should not be applied in judging it. At the same time, the military developments selected for emphasis suggest new or partially explored areas of interest to the historian. The heavy cost of human life resulting from the amateur direction of military strategy by political leaders, the grievous errors of incompetent generals, the several changes in leadership, and the lack of military organization, especially during the early months of the war, are clearly revealed. A major determinant was the geography of the country. The Appalachian Mountains divided the area of conflict and resulted in two wars rather than one. The strategic use of naval forces by the North in blockading the seacoast and controlling the rivers that split the South followed as the significance of river defense and river campaigns was recognized. The author concludes that the record of the Union Navy remains the outstanding Federal achievement of the war.

THEO. R. PARKER

*Army Air Forces*

*Bohdan, Hetman of the Ukraine*, by George Vernadsky. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1941. Pp. 150. \$2.50.)

In his latest volume Professor Vernadsky traces the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the great Ukrainian national leader of the seventeenth century. Bohdan's life is synonymous with the Ukrainian movement for religious freedom and political unification, of which he was the chief hero. The author gives considerable space to a description of the social and religious background of the Ukrainian revolt from Polish domination in 1648. The main body of the volume is devoted to an account of the Hetman's successful efforts to defend his country's independence against Polish aggression, and in this task he exhibited his great talents both as military leader and as statesman. But the position of the Ukraine could not be maintained without the aid of her Muscovite neighbor, and Bohdan's last great achievement was the union between the two states in 1654.

In describing the origins of Ukrainian nationalism, Professor Vernadsky contributes a great deal to our understanding of the background of the present struggle for power in Eastern Europe. But for many readers, the most interesting sections of this volume will be those which

deal with the Kozak Host. The military life of the Kozaks is treated in some detail, and in their numerous wars with Poland we are shown a type of strategy which cannot have changed greatly with the introduction of mechanized warfare. Even their political structure, with its characteristic combination of democracy and militarism, bears a strong resemblance to that of the present defenders of the Ukraine.

C. E. BLACK

*Princeton University*

*"We Made a Mistake"—Hitler: Russia's Surprising Defense against Germany*, by Lucien Zacharoff. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1941. Pp. 213. \$2.00.)

A quotation from Adolf Hitler, "We made a mistake," serves as a rather confusing title for this brief and altogether inadequate description of the Russian army, navy, war industries, and military leadership. The German failure to win a quick and decisive victory in Russia indicates better than anything else that the Red army is vast, plentifully-equipped, and well-trained. These facts may justify the author's admiration for the Soviet armed forces, but they do not permit him to deal wholly in superlatives. Yet the account never departs from its full round song of praise for Russian tanks, cavalry, airplanes, parachutists, and anti-microbe specialists. Even the armored trains, without which no Russian war could be complete, are singled out for special commendation. No distinction whatsoever is drawn by the author between outright propaganda and technical or professional reports. Indeed, the style and the naive enthusiasm for everything Russian resemble nothing more than the panegyric descriptions of the U. S. S. R. in the communist press.

There are numerous gaps in the narrative. The Russian artillery, fortifications, transport facilities, and mine warfare, both on land and sea, are neglected. The author does not speculate whether the use of land mines in the 1941 campaigns was inspired by traditional Russian naval tactics. Nor is there any indication of the use and importance of fortifications for the Russian operations. There are, however, frequent and laudatory accounts of the Russian guerrillas. An explanation of their success is offered in the book's best chapter, dealing with the *Osoaviakhim*, or the society for civilian defense training. Here a general account is given of the widespread and seemingly competent instruction of civilians in rifle shooting, signalling, first-aid, incendiary bomb snuffing, and the like.



A number of very glaring historical errors, some colored by Stalinist propaganda, are to be found throughout the book. We are informed, for example, that, "In his hour of desperation toward the end of World War I, the Kaiser ordered his Supreme Command to resort to chemical warfare." Gas was first used on the western front on April 22, 1915. In the chapter entitled "Stalin as a Military Leader," the author establishes Stalin as commander-in-chief and organizer of the Red armies during the Civil War. Trotsky is mentioned only in disparaging terms and as having continuously opposed Stalin's successful strategy! Credit for the defense of Petrograd in October 1919 against General Yudenich is given entirely to Stalin, who is also warmly praised for planning and leading the offensive that forced General Denikin into the Black Sea in March 1920. The inaccurate and misleading treatment of the Russian Civil War reaches its climax when events that occurred in 1919 are boldly transposed by the author to 1920 in order to justify his thesis that Stalin was the Red generalissimo! The author may be a better prophet than historian, however, for his concluding remarks pointing to the eventual exhaustion of German man-power and resources by the might of Russia seem already to be in fulfillment.

WILLIAM O. SHANAHAN

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## OTHER RECENT BOOKS

### HISTORIOGRAPHY

*Sea Power in the Pacific, 1936-1941*, by Werner B. Ellinger and Herbert Rosinski. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1942. Pp. 94. \$1.00.) A bibliography from the London Naval Conference to the beginning of the war in the Pacific.

*Alphabetical List of Federal World War Agencies, 1914-21*. (Washington: The National Archives. 1942. Pp. 124.)

*Historical Units of Agencies of the First World War*, by Elizabeth B. Drewry. (Washington: The National Archives. 1942. Pp. 31. \$.10.)

### INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

*The Law of War and Peace in Islam*, by Majid Khadduri. (London: Luzac & Company. 1940. Pp. 132. 6s.)

*World Organization: A Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment*. (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs. 1942. Pp. 426. \$3.75.) A symposium of the Institute on World Organization.

*The Disarmament Illusion*, by Merze Tate. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 398. \$3.50.) The movement for a limitation of armaments to 1907.

*How Many World Wars? The Warning of Foch*, by Maurice Leon. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1942. Pp. 180. \$2.00.) A discussion aimed at preventing a "third Pan-Germanic war."

*Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, by Francis Deak. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. 616.) The diplomatic history of the Treaty of Trianon.

*The House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, by Albert C. F. Westphal. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. 268. \$3.00.)

*The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, by Eleanor Elizabeth Dennison. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 1942. Pp. 201. \$2.50.)

#### NATIONAL WARFARE

*Wartime Price Control*, by George P. Adams, Jr. (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs. 1942. Pp. 142. \$3.00.)

*Industrial Relations in Germany, 1914-1939*, by Waldo Chamberlin. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 1942. Pp. 403. \$5.00.) An annotated bibliography of materials in the Hoover War Library and in the Stanford University Library.

*Campaign of Treachery*, by Henry Torres. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1942. Pp. 256. \$3.00.) An account of the author's experience with fifth column activities in France.

*Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire*, by Johannes Mattern. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1942. Pp. 139. \$2.00.) A study of the development of the doctrine of *Geopolitik*.

*Europe in Revolt*, by René Kraus. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 563. \$3.50.) The occupation authorities and underground movements.

*The Nazi Conquest of Danzig*, by Hans Leonhardt. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1942. Pp. 363. \$3.50.)

*International Air Transport and National Policy*, by Oliver James Lissitzyn. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1942. Pp. 478. \$5.00.) The air services between countries considered from the political and military points of view.

*Canadian Wartime Control of Industry*, by J. Backman and Henry Brodie. (New York: New York University Law Quarterly Review. 1942. Pp. 62. \$1.00.)

*Civilian Morale*, edited by Goodwin B. Watson for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1942. Pp. 475. \$4.75.) A collection of studies with a bibliography.

*Fire in the Pacific*, by Simon Harcourt-Smith. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1942. Pp. 251. \$2.00.) A brief survey of Japanese history, concentrating on events since 1914.

*With Japan's Leaders: An Intimate Record of Fourteen Years as Councillor to the Japanese Government, Ending December 7, 1941*, by Frederick Moore. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1942. Pp. 365. \$2.75.)

*War Medicine: A Symposium*, edited by Winfield Scott Pugh. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1942. Pp. 565. \$7.50.) A collection on military surgery, aviation and naval medicine, and general medicine in the Army.

#### LAND WARFARE

*Attack: A Study of Blitzkrieg Tactics, 1939-1942*, by F. O. Miksche. (New York: Random House. 1942. Pp. 267. \$2.50.) By a former officer in the Czechoslovakian army.

*War Gases: Their Identification and Decontamination*, by Morris B. Jacobs. (New York: Interscience Publishers. 1942. Pp. 194. \$3.00.)

## SEA WARFARE

*Jane's Fighting Ships, 1941*, by Francis E. McMurtrie. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 585. \$19.00.) The well-known guide to the navies of the world.

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*The Coming Battle of Germany*, by William B. Ziff. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1942. Pp. 303. \$2.50.) Argues for an air offensive against Germany.

*Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1941*, edited by Leonard Bridgman. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. \$19.00.)

*The Aircraft Year-Book for 1942*, edited by Howard L. Mingos. (New York: Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce. 1942. Pp. 693. \$5.00.)

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## NATIONAL FORCES

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*India Today*, by W. E. Duffet, A. R. Hicks, and G. R. Parkin. (New York: John Day Company. 1942. Pp. 173. \$1.75.) Three Canadians contribute to an analysis of the background of Indian nationalism.

*British Rule in Eastern Asia*, by Lennox A. Mills. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1942. Pp. 581. \$5.00.) A study of the government and economy of British Malaya and Hongkong.

*United States*

*Strategic Materials and National Strength*, by Harry N. Holmes. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 106. \$1.75.) Essential materials, shortages, and substitutes.

*MacArthur on War*, edited by Frank C. Waldrop. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1942. Pp. 419. \$2.75.) A collection of his writings and speeches.

*West Point: Moulder of Men*, by William Henry Baumer, Jr. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1942. Pp. 264. \$3.00.)

*The ABC's of the I. D. R.*, by P. Brown. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 179. \$.60.)

## MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

*Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Otermin's Attempted Reconquest, 1680-1682*, by Charles Wilson Hackett. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1942.)

*A History of Naval Tactics from 1530 to 1930*, by Samuel Shelburne Robison and Mary L. Robison. (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute. 1942. Pp. 980. \$6.00.) The evolution of tactical maxims.

*Decisive Battles of the U. S. A.*, by Major General J. F. C. Fuller. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1942. \$3.75.)

- Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution*, by Louis Gottschalk. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1942. Pp. 458. \$4.50.) The third of a series on the life of Lafayette.
- Paul Revere and the World He Lived In*, by Esther Forbes. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1942. Pp. 510. \$3.75.)
- Napoleon at the Channel*, by Carola Oman. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1942. \$2.50.)
- War and Peace*, by Leo Tolstoy. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1942. Pp. 1370. \$3.00.) Of renewed interest for the present time.
- Champ Ferguson: Confederate Guerrilla*, by T. Sensing. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University. 1942. Pp. 267. \$2.50.)

#### *World War I*

- South Dakota in the World War, 1917-1919*, by Joseph Mills Hanson. (Pierre: South Dakota State Historical Society. 1940. Pp. 447.) Official history of the draft organization and military operations of South Dakota units; useful as a representative and complete study.

#### *World War II*

- Far Eastern War, 1937-41*, by Harold S. Quigley. (Boston: World Peace Foundation. 1942. Pp. 369. \$2.00.) A scholarly study with an appendix of important documents.
- Tank-Fighter Team*, by Robert M. Gerard. (New York: Penguin Books. 1942. Pp. 83. \$1.25.) An account of a French Armored Group in the campaign of 1940.
- Norway and the War, September 1939-December 1940*, edited by Monica Curtis for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1942. Pp. 164. \$3.00.) A collection of documents on international affairs.
- The Background of Our War*. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1942. Pp. 279. \$2.50.) From lectures prepared for the Orientation course by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations.
- Shooting the Russian War*, by Margaret Bourke-White. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1942. Pp. 298. \$2.75.) Text and photographs.
- Global War: An Atlas of World Strategy*, by Edgar Ansel Mowrer and Marthe Rajchman. (New York: William Morrow & Company. 1942. Pp. 128. \$1.00.) Seventy maps and charts with a running text on the political and geographical context of "world strategy."
- La Guerre Pourrie: La Plus Petite France*, by Ernst Erich Noth. (New York: Brentano's. 1942. Pp. 330. \$1.50.) The background and course of the war in France.
- Engineers in Battle*, by Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Thompson. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1942. Pp. 108. \$1.50.) German engineer troops in action.
- Russia's Fighting Forces*, by Sergei N. Kournakoff. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1942. Pp. 258. \$2.50.) The background of Russian military development and a description of the first phase of the present war.
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- "The War of 1914 as Interpreted by German Intellectuals," by Leon W. Fuller, in *The Journal of Modern History*, June 1942 (XIV, 145-60).
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- "Economic Meaning of War and Protection," by F. C. Lane, in *Journal of Social Philosophy*, April 1942 (VII, 254-70).
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## NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

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### RECORDS OF WAR ADMINISTRATION

BY HARRY VENNEMAN

The administrative organization for war activities has grown so rapidly and become so complex that the maintenance of suitable records of their administrative development has become a problem of considerable magnitude and importance. The records that are normally kept by government agencies report upon the work that is accomplished but give relatively little attention to questions of how the work was administered. More adequate records of administrative activities are desirable not only for historical purposes but to provide a clearer insight into problems of public management and to contribute to the more effective utilization of present experience in post-war administration.

The inadequacy of the data available on administration of the war activities of the Federal government in World War I is now generally recognized. As one consequence of the lack of adequate records of this experience, the recollections of some of the chief figures some twenty-five years after the event have been a conspicuous source of information in the present emergency. The extent to which this source and the records that are available concerning experience in World War I have been and are being consulted amply demonstrates the pertinence of factual data of the last war for administrative problems today.

To provide for more systematic and objective recording of the present experience in war administration, and to encourage the maintenance of more adequate records by government agencies administering war activities, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, at the suggestion of the President, has appointed an Advisory Committee on Records of War Administration. The chairman of the committee is Dr. Waldo Leland, Director of the American Council of Learned Societies. The membership of the committee includes Professor Arthur Schlesinger, President of the American Historical Association; Louis Brownlow, President of the American Society for Public Administration; Profes-

sor William Anderson, President of the American Political Science Association; Dr. Solon J. Buck, Archivist of the United States; and Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress.

At its first meeting, April 16, 1942, this Committee on Records of War Administration reviewed and approved plans which had been formulated in the Bureau of the Budget for a project to develop a historical record of the organizational development and policy administration of the major war agencies of the Federal government. The committee concluded that the staff engaged on this project should focus attention primarily on the collection of data and the creation of records that would serve as the basis for an administrative history of the war activities of the agencies of the Federal government in Washington. It was deemed advisable to concentrate on this more specific, if limited, objective, rather than to attempt to construct a broad history of the war as a whole and the extensive changes in mores and social institutions which it will bring about.

This project has been carried on within the Bureau of the Budget under the direction of Dr. Pendleton Herring, Secretary of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard University, who has been working in the Bureau on the general problem of war records since September 1941. A small staff of analysts has been engaged to work on the project. Each analyst on the staff is responsible for one of the following major areas of war administration: war production and procurement; international economic relations; price control and rationing; mobilization of manpower and labor relations; information, morale, and censorship; civil protection and social welfare; war shipping and transportation; power, fuel, and energy resources; and war finance. Within these major subject fields, the staff is engaged in reviewing and analyzing available records of war administration of the agencies involved, interviewing officials of these agencies, preparing reports and memoranda on important administrative developments, and advising and assisting war agencies on problems involved in maintaining adequate continuing records of administrative development and organization.

In addition to advising with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget on the objectives, scope, and methods to be employed in the conduct of this project, the Committee on Records of War Administration has undertaken to promote the keeping of more systematic war records by other agencies, to the end that full and useful data will be permanently available.

In connection with the latter phase of the work, a concerted effort is being made to secure the collaboration of both the emergency war agencies and non-emergency agencies which carry on important war activities in maintaining adequate records of their own development. This work is important not only for historical purposes but as a contribution to more effective administration in the immediate present. It has been demonstrated repeatedly that a well planned system of administrative records facilitates effective administration in many different ways, and, on the other hand, that the absence of adequate provision for such records is often associated with poor program planning, lack of internal coordination, and other symptoms of administrative ineptitude.

Several of the largest and most important departments and emergency war agencies have undertaken extensive programs for the development of current records of their war activities, in line with the objectives and in some instances at the direct instigation of the Committee on Records of War Administration. The following paragraphs describe briefly some of the more important projects of this character which have been initiated. Many other agencies have undertaken or are planning similar programs or less extensive projects for the development of records of war administration.<sup>1</sup>

*War Department.* Perhaps the most extensive of the history and records programs which have been undertaken is that initiated by the War Department. On July 15, 1942, the commanding generals of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply were directed by the Secretary of War to "appoint an historical officer, together with such assistants and clerical force as may be necessary, to record the administrative activities of their respective headquarters during the current war" and to issue appropriate instructions and directives to subordinate organizations "to insure complete coverage of administrative events of historical significance." The Historical Section of the Army War College was designated as the "advisory and coordinating office" for all historical activities, and historical officers were instructed to "proceed with work outlined, consulting freely, fully, and directly" with the Chief of the Historical Section.

<sup>1</sup>The information presented here has been drawn from correspondence, notes on interviews, intra-office memoranda or other documents of the agencies concerned, and similar materials contained in the files of the Committee on Records of War Administration. An attempt is being made, in collaboration with members of the staff of The National Archives and other interested individuals and agencies, to maintain a current file of information concerning the plans and activities of war records projects and historical units of all agencies of the Federal government, as well as related activities of other institutions and organizations which may be of interest to the committee.

"In form, the history will be a narrative, supported by copies, extracts or synopses of official documents, or by other authority approved by the Historical Section . . . . The initial date will be approximately that of the opening of hostilities in Europe in 1939." Historical officers are to be given access to War Department files, "but documents will not be removed from the control of their proper custodian." The material to be used for the history "will be only such as may be approved by the interested commanding general of the three War Department commands." Standards for the selection of material and methods of citation of authorities will be fixed by the Historical Section.

Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, Chief of the Historical Section, in a memorandum on procedures for War Department historical officers, points out that the papers to be prepared in accordance with the directive of the Secretary of War are defined as "administrative history" and should provide "a full record of the administrative structure and operation of the major bureaus and offices of the War Department; the administrative subdivisions, with their relations to the whole and to each other . . . . This record should deal not only with *what* these offices did but *how* they performed their duties. An understanding is needed of the way in which significant administrative problems were met." It is contemplated that "military operations will be covered when the documents become available. Systematic plans have already been made for handling these documents in accordance with the same methods now being employed for the records of World War I."

*Navy Department.* The Office of Records Coordination of the Navy Department, under the direction of Emmett J. Leahy, has developed plans for a project, under the immediate supervision of Dr. Robert H. Bahmer, "to insure the creation and preservation of an adequate record of wartime administration"; "to develop standards and procedures for the creation and supervise the maintenance of informational files which will contain all essential data pertinent to the background, establishment, and development of wartime organization and administrative policies"; "to compile as may be desirable from time to time reports analyzing the background and development of particular administrative policies, orders, regulations, *etc.*"; and "to prepare a guide to the wartime records of the Navy Department." Plans now under consideration may result in extension of the project to provide for considerable emphasis on preparation of analytical reports on current administrative developments.

The Office of Naval Records and Library also is participating in the



records program. It is now engaged in making a detailed survey of documentary sources concerning fleet operations and supervision, as a preliminary step in the systematic collection, classification, and preservation of documentation pertinent to such operations during the present war. Professor Samuel Eliot Morison has been commissioned Lieutenant Commander and has been assigned to write the history of naval operations during the present war.

*Department of Agriculture.* A war records project has been undertaken in the Department of Agriculture to develop "a continuous record of the work of the Department during the war period, with particular attention to the background of administrative policies, for use during the war and post-war years," and to insure the "selection, preservation, and creation of those records that are essential for the history of the Department during the war period."

The project staff is to be guided, in its decisions as to problems to be studied and records to be preserved, by consultations with "specialists engaged in war services and related activities" both within and without the Department. It is also instructed to consult with the Agriculture Department representatives of The National Archives, "the various bureau committees on records, and the personnel in charge of bureau and Department files," and to "recommend whatever procedures may be found necessary to continue and improve the proper handling of the Department's archives."

The project is to be coordinated with related activities being carried on in other agencies. The staff is instructed to keep in close touch with the activities of the Committee on Records of War Administration, the Committee on the Conservation of Cultural Resources, "and the various historical societies which are undertaking to collect and preserve records on the present war."

The staff is to have access to "memoranda relating to inter-departmental and intra-departmental war functions," as well as to the regular correspondence files. It is instructed to make a careful selection of documents containing data essential to the history of the Department during the war period, and to obtain typewritten or microfilm copies for the central files of the project.

Officials of the Department will be encouraged to make proper records of important conferences, telephone conversations, *etc.*, "which develop agreements, policies, or direct significant actions." Provision also is made for preparation of "analytical reports on the various war functions of the Department."

*State Department.* E. Wilder Spaulding, Chief of the Division of Research and Publication, has been designated "to assume responsibility for the compilation of . . . data relating to the administrative history of the activities of the Department of State and their adjustment to war demands." The work is being carried on in the Research Section of the Division of Research and Publication.

*Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.* A Division of Historical Studies of Wartime Problems has been established in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, under the supervision of Stella Stewart. In addition to a large number of studies of specific problems of the first World War,<sup>2</sup> the Division has issued several chronologies and indexes of "important economic and military events" of the present war.

*Board of Economic Warfare.* The Office of Administrative Management of the Board of Economic Warfare has undertaken to maintain a "historical file" on the activities of the Board, "to be used as a possible basis of a report to be written later." The activity is under the direction of D. B. Vaughn, Administrative Officer. All division chiefs have been requested to transmit to his office material which they feel should be in the historical file.

*National Research Council.* The Sub-Committee on Historical Records of the Committee on Information, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council, has formulated plans for a medical history of the present war which will include an account of the expanded medical activities of the Army, Navy, Public Health Service, Veterans' Administration, and civilian agencies. Dr. John F. Fulton, Professor of Physiology at the Yale University Medical School, is chairman of the committee.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>For example: "Paper and Paper Products—Development of Restrictive Regulation, 1917-1918"; "Wool and Felt Products, 1918"; "Sugar Rationing in 1918."

<sup>3</sup>For a list of members of this committee and the titles of volumes approved, see the *Army Medical Bulletin* (January 1942), pp. 29-32. A detailed outline of the proposed medical history is presented in a *Bulletin* issued by the Sub-Committee on Historical Records, July 12, 1941.

# THE BACKGROUND OF GEOPOLITICS

BY JEAN GOTTMANN

Geography is today much in vogue owing to the circumstances which have made the period in which we live one of war on a global scale. The fate of each individual is seen to depend on the outcome of battles fought in distant and unknown lands or on the arrival of transports traveling routes and distances of which we previously had no conception. Our present interest in geography has been further strengthened by a widespread belief in the almost magic power of certain geographical formulae to determine, or at least to condition, political and military action.

This belief arises from the fact that there exists in Germany a school of *Geopolitik* which is supposed to have prepared the plans for the Hitler expansion and to have been largely responsible for its success. Nor are German geopolitics alone involved; Italy and Japan seem to follow a plan of action which takes full account of geographical factors. It was just such a geographical plan which the pacifist nations lacked. Having no aggressive designs, they felt no need for one. As the Axis conquests unfolded, they began to look with envy at the "geopolitical" plan which seemed to be spelling success for the conquerors. Studies, conferences, and publications on geopolitics and political geography increased. The two terms were generally confused, and the former was widely assumed to designate a "new science" endowed with astonishing practical power.

Yet in reality the only thing new was the confusion. "Geopolitics," the study of the influence of geographical factors on political action, has existed ever since man first engaged in politics. Napoleon said that "the politics of a state is in its geography," thinking that he was merely stating an age-old truth. The Monroe Doctrine has been described as "geopolitics," because it was based on the fact that America is a continent separated from the others by vast oceans. The papal decree dividing the world between Portuguese and Spaniards was again "geopolitics," as were indeed all agreements which sought to determine zones of influence.

But geopolitics in this sense is quite a different matter from political geography, which is a science studying the relations between political organizations—*i. e.*, states—and their geographical environment. This

science could be developed only after the formulation of the intermediary study, geography. Even so, political geography in its modern form came into being at least two centuries ago. What is new is the appearance in Germany a quarter of a century ago of geopolitics in the guise of a branch of scientific political geography. We cannot review here the whole course of its development; we should have to consider the whole of historical geography. We can, however, go back to the origins of political geography in order to trace briefly the evolution which led to the rise of German geopolitics.

Political geography made its first appearance in the eighteenth century. There were no doubt earlier forms—Jean Bodin, for instance, had written on the relations between land and state as early as the sixteenth century—but the first great thinker and writer to return to and develop such a theme was Montesquieu. A large portion of *L'Esprit des Loïs* is a forceful discussion of aspects of the influence of geographical setting on the laws and government of man. Even earlier, in his *Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de Leur Décadence* published in 1734, Montesquieu analyzed the process of a city transforming itself into a great empire as a problem in political geography. To the minds of modern geographers, he attached undue importance to geographical factors in the growth of Roman power. "Rome, forever making new attempts and forever meeting obstacles, made her power felt without being able to extend it and, within a very narrow circumference, practiced virtues which were to prove so fatal for the world."

In studying the decline of the Empire, Montesquieu made a number of penetrating observations about the weakening effect of territorial expansion.

Conquests are easy because they are made with the whole of one's forces; they are difficult to maintain, because they are defended with only partial force . . . . Rome grew because it fought only successive wars, each nation by inconceivably good fortune attacking her only after the other had been defeated. Rome was finally destroyed because all the nations attacked her at once and penetrated everywhere.

It is noteworthy that these basic principles of political geography appeared for the first time in a work which aimed only at historical commentary.

In *L'Esprit des Loïs* (1748), however, Montesquieu passed from the case of Rome in particular to more general phenomena. A glance at the table of contents of this work reveals the prominent rôle he ac-



corded to geographical factors in the political and social organization of man. In Books XIV to XVII he discussed the influence of climate on law in such detail that it appears somewhat amusing today.

Asia has, properly speaking, no temperate zone, and regions with a very cold climate adjoin those with very warm climates. In Europe, however, the temperate zone extends over a wide area, even though within it climates differ greatly one from another. . . . It follows, then, that in Asia nations are opposed as the weak to the strong; warlike people, brave and active, are side by side with effeminate, lazy and timid ones; thus one must be conqueror and the other conquered. In Europe, on the other hand, nations are opposed as the strong to the strong; adjoining nations have approximately the same courage. This is the chief reason for the weakness of Asia and the strength of Europe, for the freedom of Europe and the slavery of Asia.

Montesquieu admitted, however, that climate is not the sole determining factor, and that people in the same climate change.

Other books of *L'Esprit des Lois* discuss the influence on laws of the soil, of the culture, of the way of life of the inhabitants, of commerce, and of the number and density of inhabitants. Books XIV to XXIII of *L'Esprit des Lois* constitute what is probably the first treatise in political geography ever written. After two centuries we are still able to glean from it many wise and valid observations. The work had considerable influence on contemporaries and was followed a few years later by the *Géographie Politique* of Turgot, written around 1750-1752 upon completion of his studies at the Sorbonne.

The youthful work of a brilliant student, fresh from the university and full of ideas which he had not yet had time to clarify and refine, the *Géographie Politique* is little more than a plan of work, a program of research aspiring to the creation of a new science. The whole amounts to about ten pages and in the *Oeuvres Diverses* of Turgot follows his *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* delivered at the Sorbonne. The idea of political geography had evidently occurred to him while he was preparing this lecture and trying to establish the laws which govern the course of history. The influence of Montesquieu on Turgot was unquestionably strong, but the latter felt that for a better understanding of the past and present the relationships between human and natural phenomena needed to be clarified and systematized. He studied the connection between physical geography and the distribution of people over the face of the globe and their division into states. Realizing that everything cannot be explained by physical factors, he included in his researches economic geography—the diversity of production and the facility of communication.

Turgot returned constantly to the idea of a geographical explanation of the historical past and the political present.

History and geography determine the relative position of men; one expresses their position in space, the other their position in time. The barren description of regions on the one hand, the dry enumeration of years on the other, are the canvases on which the objects must be placed. Simple geography and chronology determine the situation; history and political geography paint them in their true colors. Political geography is, if I may venture to say so, the profile of history.

Turgot proposed his plan of political geography to his teachers; they were much alarmed by it and advised him to abandon such ideas and devote himself rather to political economy. To the economists' gain and the geographers' loss, Turgot followed this timid counsel. Thus the trend toward political geography to be observed in France in the middle of the eighteenth century did not go far, at least on a scientific plane. For more than a century the term and the association of ideas it signifies seem to have been forgotten. There is, to be sure, a confused mass of geopolitical considerations in the *Encyclopedia*; and Malthus, with his preoccupation with the relationship between population and available space, might be considered a geographer—or rather an innovator in the field of human geography. In any event, at the end of the eighteenth century political geography seemed to be lost to the realm of science. It passed, however, into the realm of practice in certain countries and into the realm of philosophy in others.

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century the American and French revolutions advanced the doctrines of self-government and natural boundaries. The fundamental principles of political geography were thus posed through Franco-American collaboration. They were developed during the course of the nineteenth century, assuming in Europe the aspect of the principle of nationalities. Many peoples who hitherto had apparently hardly dreamed of it now sought the right to organize their lives as they chose within a well-defined territorial frame. Outside of Europe itself the principle of "natural boundaries" found expression in geographical terms in the Monroe Doctrine. Political problems ceased to be merely questions of dynasty and genealogy but took on a more and more geographical character. Italy's declaration in the nineteenth century that she was not willing to remain simply a "geographical expression" is typical of this development.

The nineteenth century was one of easy life; the industrial revolution had contributed to raising the standard of living, to enriching the cities. The great powers built up vast empires outside Europe; the

United States expanded westward and settled wide empty regions. The solution of territorial problems was still possible in certain areas of the world, but in Central Europe the solution was already troublesome. Here, in the nineteenth century, Prussian power had been born and had begun to develop. With no maritime or colonial expansion, it built up an imperialistic substitute—Pan-Germanism. Germany had not remained impervious to the French principles of national unity and natural boundaries, and from the end of the eighteenth century her philosophers had been pondering problems of political geography. This literature is too well-known to need analysis here, but we may point out two characteristics which are prophetic: first, the tendency to consider Europe rather than distant continents, avoiding, however, the tracing of too definite limits within Europe itself (Novalis' pamphlet *Christenheit oder Europa*, which appeared in 1799, seems to have exerted considerable influence); secondly, attributing to natural factors a decisive influence in politics. Fichte did not hesitate to speak of "natural law" (*Naturrecht*) in his political philosophy, and the expression itself is significant in contrast to the attitude of French and English philosophers who sought to establish only "rational laws."

Throughout most of the nineteenth century political geography existed among European intellectuals primarily as a philosophy of history, but at the end of the nineteenth century, toward 1890, geography began to assume new status just as political problems were becoming singularly complicated. Nationalism and imperialism had grown so rapidly that there was soon no territory which could be touched without incurring the opposition of powerful interests. To conquer was no longer enough; there had to be discussion, and the scientists were called in to aid in solving the complex problems offered by a map from which all the unoccupied areas had disappeared. Geography came to be recognized as a formal science and was prepared to bring to the study of political problems all the material it had accumulated through observation of nature and man. In 1897 appeared the first great treatise in political geography—the *Politische Geographie* of Friedrich Ratzel, a German geographer.

This work was rich in new and interesting insights, but Ratzel was unable to free himself from the influence of the philosophers who had preceded him. He carried his reasoning into a field where the scholar follows with difficulty. In an interesting discussion of the relation of the state to its natural surroundings Ratzel pointed out two main features, geographical location (*Lage*) and space (*Raum*). *Raum* signi-

fied something more than mere precisely defined territory; it foreshadowed the vague notion of *Raumsinn*, the sense of space which certain nations possess while others do not. In principle he assumed that all expansion is either by commerce or by war, and that small states, without *Raumsinn*, lack the "sense" of expansion. He apparently ignored the fact that a people may be "small" before becoming great.

Ratzel also published at about the same time two pamphlets on political geography intended for a wider public, *Der Staat und Sein Boden* (1897) and *Das Meer als Quellen der Völkergrosse* (1900). The latter dealt with the importance of naval power in political history, a subject of much discussion as a result of the work of Admiral Mahan in the United States and the imperialistic propaganda of Joseph Chamberlain in Great Britain during the 1890's.

In 1902 the great British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder published his now classic *Britain and the British Seas*. In France during the early years of the twentieth century there appeared the works of the geographer Camille Vallaux on maritime problems. But the real answer to Ratzel was made by the founder of the French school of geography, Paul Vidal de la Blache. His *Principles of Human Geography* recognized that the political geography of primitive peoples was determined by forces depending on physical environment, but "that what endures and is developed in the progress of civilization are the forms of social groupments, arising from the collaboration of nature and man, but more and more becoming emancipated from the direct influence of environment." Man found it possible to condition his own environment. There is a "national personality," said Vidal de la Blache, confirming the statement of the historian Michelet that "France is a person." The state is thus a product of history, a human rather than a natural creation. Vidal's conclusions tended toward modern biology, while Ratzel's led him into metaphysics.

Thus was born the conflict of approach which grew up after World War I between French and English geographers on the one hand and the German geographers on the other. With a war of such scope, the major problems of political geography took on a new aspect. The world was to be rebuilt, and man hoped that it could be improved while being reconstructed. Scholars and geographers were called in under various titles to do the work of military and political experts. Such was the case of Professors Emanuel de Martonne and A. Demangeon in France from 1914 to 1919, Isaiah Bowman and Douglas Johnson in the United States from 1917 to 1919, and many others. After victory



and the armistice there was a great awakening of moral fervor; a new world had to be built in which there could be no more wars.

Geographers, who by profession must follow closely the changing and enduring aspects of reality, were the first in the Allied camp to give the cry of alarm over the dangers of the peace settlement. Sir Halford Mackinder published his *Democratic Ideals and Reality* in March 1919, a work which has retained sufficient validity to warrant republication in 1942 with forewords by Professor Edward Mead Earle and Major George Fielding Eliot. Mackinder argued that the great democratic ideal which was triumphing in 1919 might well be crushed later by a conqueror who would cleverly pervert it. To avoid a new catastrophe the democracies and the future League of Nations should take into account the geographical realities which have a lasting influence on world politics. He demonstrated how our material civilization developed through maritime and colonial expansion based on naval power and how the ensemble of the continents of Europe, Africa, and Asia is simply one great island, the World Island, controlled in the past by the sea. But colonization and civilization penetrated far into the interior; land powers are locked in the interior of the huge continents; they can no longer be approached and controlled by naval power, while they can, by obtaining access to the sea, attack the maritime powers and strike at their heart. Since the main Heartland corresponds roughly to Russia, Sir Halford drew his famous conclusion that, if Germany were permitted to dominate oriental Europe and the Russian Heartland as well, it would become a power which could easily dominate the whole world.

These ideas were not entirely new. Mackinder himself had already summarized them in 1904 in a lecture on "The Geographical Pivot of History," and in 1905 he had emphasized the importance of population problems in an article entitled "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength." He warned constantly against the danger of a possible decline of the British Empire, and his pessimism was shared by outstanding thinkers of the period, including Paul Valéry and Albert Demangeon, the great French geographer. They posed the challenge that the face of the world has changed, is changing, and will continue to change. In 1920 Demangeon published a book which he frankly entitled *Le Déclin de l'Europe*, a translation of which appeared in English as *America and the Race for World Dominion*. The two titles are complementary. Demangeon saw the reins of material power slipping away from Europe and passing into the hands of the United States,

perhaps even to Japan. He outlined for France a clear program of recovery which was never really seriously considered, though certain statesmen, such as Joseph Caillaux and Edouard Herriot, claimed to have been influenced by it. Thus a geographer assessed the revolution taking place in the world and its consequences. In the same way in the United States Dr. Isaiah Bowman elaborated in his now classic book, *The New World*, the problems arising from the political geography of the Versailles settlement, in which he had collaborated.

The works of Mackinder, Demangeon, and Bowman present the geographical aspect of the political problems arising from the war as seen in the Allied countries. Numerous less important books, of more restricted interest, appeared at about the same time, but in none of the victorious nations did political geography develop into a school. In Germany, on the other hand, there developed, especially after 1925, a school of *Geopolitik*. Dr. George Kiss has recently shown, in an excellent and brilliant article, the continuity of the German trend of thought which led from political geography into geopolitics.<sup>1</sup> "It is an unwavering line," he wrote, "pointing towards the German goal of supremacy on the continent of Europe, of German expansion towards the great open spaces of Eurasia, with the empire of the world in sight." This approach to the concept of space, the thirst of expansion of the German power locked in the middle of Europe, presents a striking contrast to the trend of the studies of political geography in other countries which, from Montesquieu's *Romans* to Bowman's *New World*, all pointed to the dangers of over-expansion.

The term *Geopolitik* was coined during the war of 1914-1918 by a Swede, Rudolf Kjellen, who, an ardent Germanophile, analyzed in several volumes the "geopolitical" reasons by which it was just and natural for Germany to win. Fate was to decree differently, but the writings of Kjellen enjoyed a huge success in Germany. After 1919 the Germans found some consolation in *Geopolitik*, which proved that their defeat was in fact an undeserved mistake. Major General Karl Haushofer and his collaborators found it an excellent theme to teach to the Germans—to give them, in defeat, the mentality of conquerors and better to prepare them for revenge. The geopoliticians set about building up with scientific arguments a religious aura around the state. In a world where *étatisme* was progressing by leaps and bounds, the idea was popular. The rôle in history of the politics of people, of nations, of

<sup>1</sup>"Political Geography into Geopolitics: Recent Trends in Germany," *Geographical Review*, XXXII (October 1942), 632-45.

individuals, the play of physical forces, all was embraced by and directed toward the state. "States are conscious and reasoning beings just like men," wrote Kjellen. "States speak and act, hold congresses or fight on the field of battle." The geopoliticians, who were not afraid of confusing the state with the many elements of which it is composed, did much to prepare the German intellectuals for totalitarianism. The state of the geopolitical world is subject only to the natural laws which govern history. The geopolitician Hennig, for example, asserted that all the major movements in history have been determined by natural laws. There was only one exception to the rule, the defeat of Germany in 1918—and this would not have occurred if the German leaders during that war had known more about the laws of geopolitics!

The geopoliticians were unquestionably successful propagandists and educators of the masses. With the advent of Hitler to power in 1933, the volume of geopolitical publications became enormous and covered everything—geography, economics, pure politics, strategy and tactics, and much else. Besides Haushofer, geographers such as Maull, Obst, Siewert, Hummel, and Hennig were passionately teaching Pan-Germanism, making use of all possible arguments. It is curious, however, that, while personifying and idolizing the state, they denied any influence of spiritual factors on politics; only material factors and the desire for expansion counted. The end of all scientific activity was to satisfy the German desire for expansion.

As Mr. Strausz-Hupé has rightly indicated, the French geographers were the first to point out the danger of *Geopolitik*.<sup>2</sup> As early as 1932 Demangeon wrote, "German geopolitics has renounced its scientific spirit and has taken its place in the forefront of German nationalist propaganda. It is nothing but an educational enterprise for preparing the German people for an assault upon the European order. It is a tool for war." To see that this is true we have only to compare the works of such German geopoliticians as Haushofer and Maull with those of geographers in the Allied countries who were discussing peace problems or with the whole work of André Siegfried, who was perhaps the greatest specialist in true scientific political geography in the years 1920-1940. No one has shown better than Siegfried the delicate, lace-like character of the interrelations between geographical environment, the psychology of peoples, and international politics. In contrast to such scientific methods, geopolitics merely makes use of a certain amount

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<sup>2</sup>*Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (New York, 1942).

of scientific trappings in order to plead and facilitate certain national expansions. Science cannot plead a political cause.

Does this mean that the term "geopolitics" is to be condemned completely? A term can have value only as derived from the value of what it signifies. We must avoid the common confusion of terms and distinguish between geopolitics and political geography. The latter is a respectable discipline with a brilliant past, and it can be most helpful when applied to actual political problems. To call such scholars as Mackinder, Demangeon, Bowman, or Siegfried "geopoliticians" would be an insult; to fail to profit by their teachings in studying present problems in the light of the science of geography would be absurd. Today, when technical progress has reduced the distances of the globe, and when the politics of each state can no longer be shaped in a vacuum, the moment has no doubt arrived for a great development and wide popularization of political geography, but it must be true political geography. That it must be regarded as a factor of great importance in shaping national and military policies has been stressed again recently by Dr. Bowman, but its use, as he points out, calls for skill and caution:

The tremulous balance of international forces will vex us at the end of the war. We shall be confused and fatigued by the complexities and responsibilities in which war has involved us. We shall want things certain and simple again: we once called it "normalcy." There is no sure "science" to bring us out of these new deeps of international difficulty. Geopolitics is simple and sure, but, as disclosed in German writings and policy, it is also illusion, mummery, an apology for theft. Scientific geography deepens the understanding. But, like history or chemistry, it has no ready-made formulas for national salvation through scientifically "demonstrated" laws.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>"Geography vs. Geopolitics," *Geographical Review*, XXXII (October 1942), 646-58.



# PRE-WAR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

BY WILSON K. DOYLE

Now that we are involved in a revolutionary war waged on a global scale, it may be profitable to consider to what extent and in what ways our traditional democratic controls over military policy and affairs have been altered or invalidated by the changing character of the times and the increased tempo of modern war. Just as the development of an industrialized urban society has tended to increase the social, economic, and political power of the Federal government, so, too, with the appearance of fascist states which regard war as a permanent state of society, it was inevitable that the American system of democratic control over military policy, adequate for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, should show signs of inadequacy. When faced with adversaries whose expansionist aims extend over the globe, whose skill in the "white war" of nerves and whose techniques of "undeclared war" had already conquered other democracies, the democratic system of military control as practiced in the United States, though by no means involving completely effective popular control, was bound to operate at a great, if not decisive, disadvantage. The tempo of modern war and the advances of technology no longer permit a leisurely approach to war or the opportunity once provided for public discussion and debate. These facts pose a problem of great complexity and supreme importance to the people of the United States. A review of our various instruments of democratic control, with particular emphasis upon their operation during this pre-war period, will illustrate some important aspects of the problem.

Because of the scope of this topic and the subordinate position of the states in the field of military affairs, the discussion has been confined to democratic control of national action. It has also been limited, as the title indicates, to the period which immediately preceded our involvement in the present war in the sense of full military participation. It is in such a period, when the issue of war or peace is to be decided, that democratic control of military affairs would seem to become a matter of particularly vital public concern both because of the importance of the decision to be made and for the reason that considerable popular participation in the making of that decision seems practicable. Once a decision for war has been made, the methods of winning the

war must of necessity be left largely, if not entirely, to official discretion.

Characteristic of our system of representative government, no control of military matters or related diplomatic action has been entrusted to the people directly. Direct control in this, as in other matters of government, rests with Congress and the President; the extent to which the people may control the action of Congress and the President is the actual measure of democratic control, as the term is used here.

To Congress the constitution entrusts the main power and responsibility for the organization and maintenance of the military forces of the nation, and to the President it entrusts the sole power and responsibility for their movements. Even in time of peace, or before a state of war has been formally recognized, these powers, moreover, are subject to few and flexible legal limitations. No limitations have yet been imposed by the courts upon the use of the military forces against other nations even before a state of war has been formally recognized. Limits have been set only when the military forces have been used against the people of this nation,<sup>1</sup> and even these limitations are not absolute.<sup>2</sup> Emphasizing the broad scope of the President's powers in time of peace, as well as in time of war, Attorney General Biddle recently declared that "the magnitude of the threatened disaster is the measure of the President's power and duty to take steps necessary to avert it."<sup>3</sup>

Almost equally broad are the powers of Congress in respect to the organization and maintenance of the military forces.<sup>4</sup> Such powers have been restricted only to the extent that they infringe upon basic rights of individuals, and even these rights may be substantially invaded and in some cases perhaps denied altogether when events seem to require.<sup>5</sup>

Still less restrained by legal limitations are the closely related powers of diplomatic action where the foundations for future military involvement are so often laid. In the exercise of this power the main control and responsibility rest with the President.<sup>6</sup> As a Senate Committee on

<sup>1</sup>See, for example, *Ex parte Milligan* (1886, 4 Wall. 2).

<sup>2</sup>The constitution seeks to limit use of state militia when called into Federal service, but this limitation has been circumvented by drafting individually the members of the state militia. See *U. S. v. Stephens* (1917, 245 Fed. 956, and 247 U. S. 504).

<sup>3</sup>Address before the California State Bar Association, September 18, 1941. For cases which seem to support this view see *Martin v. Mott* (1827, 12 Wh. 19) and *Durand v. Hollins* (1860, 8 Fed. 111). In the latter case the court was particularly outspoken.

<sup>4</sup>*Arver v. U. S.* (1917, 245 U. S. 366, 377 ff.), *Sugar v. U. S.* (1918, 248 U. S. 578), *U. S. v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation* (1936, 299 U. S. 304), and *U. S. v. Stephens* (1917, 245 Fed. 956, 960).

<sup>5</sup>*Schenk v. U. S.* (1919, 249 U. S. 47, 52), and *U. S. v. Cohen Grocery Co.* (1921, 255 U. S. 81, 87).

<sup>6</sup>*U. S. v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation* (1936, 299 U. S. 304, 319).

Foreign Relations once stated, the President is "the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations."<sup>7</sup>

At all times, of course, certain political restraints have existed in addition to those arising from democratic control. In the exercise of its powers in respect to military organization and maintenance Congress is subject to Presidential veto and other less direct forms of influence. In his control of military and diplomatic action the President, in turn, is subject to the Congressional restraints resulting from the share which Congress possesses in the power to declare war, in the determination of the size, equipment, and appropriations of the military forces, its power of investigation, its power of impeachment, and the rôle which the Senate plays in treaty making and in military and diplomatic appointments. In time of war all of these restraints virtually cease to function, but even in time of peace, or before a state of war has been formally recognized, most of them exert little more than nominal restraints upon military or diplomatic action.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the restraint which Congress possesses in the power to declare war comes too late to be effective. Through his control of military movements and diplomatic action the President may easily create a situation in which Congress would have no alternative except to declare war or support limited or full-scale military involvement. This fact was illustrated particularly in the events preceding the Mexican and the Spanish-American wars and to a lesser extent by the events preceding the present war.

Equally ineffective is the Senate's share in the making of treaties, since such formal agreements are not necessarily prerequisites to military action; they have frequently come after rather than before such action. Equally ineffective, also, is the power and threat of impeachment. This power is not only difficult to invoke, but it would be a dangerous exhibition of national disunity in a situation critical enough to justify such action. Nor can the Congressional power of investigation be expected to provide an effective restraint in itself. Such restraint as it does provide arises mainly from the more effective democratic control which it makes possible. Potentially more effective is the Senate's share in military and diplomatic appointments. The Senate has customarily allowed the President broad discretion in making these appointments, however, and this control is for practical purposes available only in isolated cases, namely, when vacancies occur.

<sup>7</sup>U. S. Senate, *Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, VIII, 24, cited in *ibid.*, p. 319.

Of all these political restraints, the only very reliable one in the past has been derived from the Congressional control of the size, equipment, and appropriations of the military forces. Prior to actual declaration of war Congress had heretofore limited the President to a military force insufficient for a major military adventure, but even this restraint was largely removed in the present instance by the great increase which Congress had authorized in our armed forces.<sup>8</sup> From the standpoint of democratic control, therefore, this action may be said to have thrust the main, if not the sole, task of curbing potentially aggressive military and diplomatic action directly upon the people. This fact must be recognized in any appraisal of our system of democratic control during the pre-war period.

Except for the civilian draft machinery, which obviously provided no control of military movements, and the relatively recent polls of public opinion, these controls were, at least in form, the same as those which had existed for many years. They included polls or surveys by the President and members of Congress through their various contacts in all parts of the country, the periodic election of members of Congress and the President, and individual or group influence expressed in letters and conversation, over the radio and in the press, and before hearings of committees of Congress. Finally, there were the long-established customs or practices which provided important civilian controls over our military departments, notably, the practice of selecting civilians for the Presidency and for key positions in the military departments. For example, in the Navy Department civilians occupied at this time the offices of Secretary of the Navy, Under Secretary of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of the Navy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Coordinator of Research and Development, and Chief of the Division for Training, Liaison, and Coordination. Further, every bureau and most major sections of the Navy maintained liaison with other civilian divisions and departments of the Federal government.<sup>9</sup> These various civilian contacts helped to keep the military departments responsive to public opinion, and they no doubt also helped to insure the maintenance of democratic control itself. But the accuracy with which they

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<sup>8</sup>In authorizing this increase Congress sought to limit the use of those inducted into the land forces to action in this hemisphere and its possessions (54 *Stat. L.* 885, sec. 3 (e), and *ibid.*, 858, sec. 1). However, this was a very questionable interference from a legal standpoint with the President's powers as Commander in Chief.

<sup>9</sup>Courtesy of Ensign Ross R. Hirshfeld, Office of Public Relations, Navy Department. See also *National Defense Bulletin*, October 23, 1941, issued by the United States Chamber of Commerce.



revealed public opinion was at best uncertain and their influence unpredictable.

In the elections during the pre-war period statements concerning future military and diplomatic policy and corresponding official commitments were made, but the impossibility of foreseeing the course of events made specific commitments inexpedient and impracticable.<sup>10</sup> Though permitting a more direct and timely expression of opinion, hearings of committees of Congress and other evidence of individual or group influence were, as always, very questionable indices to the true state of the public mind because of their obvious physical limitations and their apparent attraction for minority forces.

Better indications of public opinion during this period were to be found, no doubt, in the polls or surveys of public opinion, especially the Gallup and *Fortune* polls.<sup>11</sup> Their importance as instruments of democratic control may easily be overemphasized, however. In the first place, the accuracy with which they measured opinion is at least debatable or sufficiently so that ready justification could always be found for disregarding their results. Furthermore, they were entirely unofficial, and they failed to indicate how strongly opinions were held in respect to a particular measure or policy. Obviously there may be many instances in which an individual has an opinion in respect to a particular measure or policy but is quite willing to accept the decision of the government; in other instances he may not be willing to do so.<sup>12</sup> Still further justification for disregarding these polls could be found, especially by members of Congress, in their failure to measure opinion in each Congressional district or in each state.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Typical of the statements during the campaign was this pledge in the Democratic platform of 1940: "We will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands *except in case of attack.*"

<sup>11</sup>In citing the results of these polls in the following pages, care has been taken to indicate whether the percentages are merely of those with opinions and to cite the percentages of those undecided when this is given. In a few instances the results seem hard to justify. See, for example, two Gallup and *Fortune* polls on more aid to Britain, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, IV (December 1940), 713. However, in this and a few similar instances the questions were not absolutely identical, and it cannot be shown that they were asked at the same time.

<sup>12</sup>Substantially this point is made by Professor Lindsay Rogers in a very critical analysis of these polls, "Do the Gallup Polls Measure Opinion?" *Harpers Magazine*, CLXXXIII (November 1941), 623-32. In 1939 a Gallup poll came fairly close to measuring this state of mind when it distinguished between those strongly or mildly favoring or opposing repeal of the Arms Embargo. Of 62 per cent for repeal, only 41 per cent were strongly for it. But there was a corresponding drop in the percentage of those strongly opposed. In short, the lukewarm elements in each group practically canceled one another. It is unlikely, however, that this would always happen. In any event, this type of question would not completely meet the objection raised. For the above poll see *New York Times*, October 4, 1939. The vote included only those with opinions.

<sup>13</sup>An instance bearing on this point occurred when the proposal to arm merchant ships was before the House of Representatives. The House passed the measure by almost a 2 to 1 majority, although a Gallup poll shortly before had indicated only 46 per cent of all the people in favor of the pro-

In the great majority of cases governmental action during this pre-war period was in accord with the opinion reported in these polls, but there were quite a few instances in which the results were ignored by one or both organs of the Federal government. For example, the Ludlow War Referendum proposal was introduced in Congress as early as February 1935, and it was reintroduced in slightly altered form in January 1937. Despite two Gallup polls reporting majorities of 70 and 73 per cent for the proposal,<sup>14</sup> it never reached the floor of Congress. It was finally killed for all practical purposes when a motion to discharge it from committee was defeated in the House of Representatives by a vote of 209 to 188.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, a poll reported in 1940 that 75 per cent of those with opinions favored an embargo on gasoline and other war materials to Japan and that 6 per cent of the people were undecided.<sup>16</sup> Yet no oil embargo was invoked until July 1941 when Japanese aggression against French Indo-China had materially changed both the conditions which existed at the time the poll was made and the premises, in part at least, upon which our policy had been based.<sup>17</sup>

In the second place, these polls are instituted upon private rather than upon public or governmental initiative. In most cases during this period one or more polls preceded final governmental action and were usually prompted by Presidential speeches or conferences, by the speeches of men close to the President, or by Congressional deliberation on the question. For example, the President suggested the need for revising the neutrality act more than eight months before he asked Congress to repeal the Arms Embargo,<sup>18</sup> and three polls, the first and last showing support by a majority of those with opinions, preceded the President's recommendation to Congress.<sup>19</sup> Seven more polls, also

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posals and 14 per cent undecided. (*Birmingham News*, October 1, 1941.) The much stronger sentiment for the proposal was attributed by some members to the fact that many of their colleagues had revisited their districts and found the "folks back home" strongly for the measure (*ibid.*, October 16, 1941). Also bearing on this point, perhaps, are the instances cited below in which the results of these polls have been disregarded.

<sup>14</sup>*The Public Opinion Quarterly*, II (July 1938), 387. Presumably the percentages were for those with opinions. The percentages of those opposed and those undecided were not reported.

<sup>15</sup>The motion was defeated on January 10, 1938. It should be pointed out that the Gallup poll was cited in the debate on the measure while the discharge motion was before the House.

<sup>16</sup>Gallup poll in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, IV (June 1940), 363. Strong majorities for an embargo on war materials to Japan had been reported in 1939 and an even larger majority later in 1940, but oil was not mentioned in either of these (*ibid.*, III [October 1939], 599, and V [March 1941], 148).

<sup>17</sup>On July 25, 1941, all oil exports were stopped by an order freezing Japanese assets, but this order was later changed to exclude only aviation gasoline.

<sup>18</sup>*New York Times*, January 5, 1939.

<sup>19</sup>However, when the President apparently decided to make the request, support of the measure had dropped to 50 per cent. The last poll appeared on the day the President made his request, and

showing support by a majority of those with opinions, were completed before Congress passed the measure.<sup>20</sup> General Pershing and Secretary Knox had discussed the question a month before the President informed Congress of the transfer of destroyers to Britain, and a poll showing support by a majority of those with opinions had preceded the President's action. Secretary Knox had stated, however, that Congressional action would be necessary.<sup>21</sup> Several polls preceded the introduction in Congress of the Selective Service bill, and, while all of them showed strong public opposition, many favorable polls were reported before final passage of the bill.<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, there were during this period a few instances in which no poll preceded a significant change or development in our military or related diplomatic policy. No poll preceded the decision to establish a safety zone around the Western Hemisphere in cooperation with South America and to broadcast the position of Axis warcraft in that area.<sup>23</sup> No poll preceded the closing of German consulates, the "protection" of Greenland, or the occupation of Iceland. The "shoot on sight" policy was not preceded by any poll directly on the question, although the President had stated several times that all necessary measures would be taken to insure the delivery of supplies to Britain<sup>24</sup> and quite a few polls had reported that a majority of those with opinions favored protection by our Navy of ships carrying war materials to Britain.<sup>25</sup>

To properly evaluate our system of democratic controls during this period, attention should also be directed to certain developments which had considerably reduced the normal effectiveness of these controls.

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it seems likely that he had already decided. See *New York Times*, September 3 and 21, 1939. The majority was as high as 57 per cent with as many as 15 per cent undecided.

<sup>20</sup>*New York Times*, September 24, October 4, 11, 15, 22, 29, and November 4, 1939. The majority ranged from 57 to 62 to 56 per cent. The undecided vote ranged from 9 to 14 to 11 per cent. Many favorable polls also preceded enactment of the Lend-Lease measure, for which see *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, III (October 1939), 600; IV (September 1940), 552; and V (March 1941), 158; and *New York Times*, January 29, 1941. Congress passed the measure on March 11, 1941.

<sup>21</sup>*New York Times*, August 8 and 19, 1940.

<sup>22</sup>*Fortune*, December 1939; and *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, IV (September 1940), 551, and (December 1940), 710, 716-17.

<sup>23</sup>The first detailed report of this decision appeared in the *New York Times*, October 5, 1939, but actual patrol by this country apparently did not begin until later (*ibid.*, November 4, 1939). On October 8 a Gallup poll reported that a majority of those with opinions favored defending South America in case of attack (*ibid.*, October 8, 1939). Whether this poll preceded the President's order to patrol the area is unknown, but the issues were not entirely the same.

<sup>24</sup>For pertinent statements of the President see *New York Times*, May 28, July 8, and September 5, 1941.

<sup>25</sup>For the Gallup polls see *New York Times*, May 21, June 4, 15, and July 9, 1941. For a discussion of related *Fortune* polls see *ibid.*, July 31, 1941. The majority rose from 52 to 56 per cent while the undecided vote ranged from 7 to 9 per cent.

In the first place, there was a considerable and, to this layman at any rate, a rather arbitrary suppression of information vital to public opposition or intelligent public decision. This information was suppressed by the newspapers upon governmental request as well as by the government itself.

Early in 1939 the crash of an Army bomber revealed to the American people for the first time that arrangements were actually being made to sell some of our latest bombers to the French. The "protection" of Greenland and the occupation of Iceland were accomplished facts before the public was informed, but it must be conceded that complete secrecy was necessary to insure the success of these ventures. Just when our "shoot on sight" policy actually went into force has not been announced, but on July 9, in commenting upon a speech by the President, two months before the latter announced the policy, Secretary Knox hinted that the Navy had shooting orders. Two days later, according to some Senators, he admitted in an executive session of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs that an American destroyer had dropped depth charges over a submarine when its presence was detected near the scene of the torpedoing of a British merchant ship.<sup>26</sup>

On September 4, 1941, the Navy Department reported in a terse statement that the American destroyer *Greer* had been attacked by a submarine while the *Greer* was carrying mail to Iceland and that the destroyer had counter-attacked with depth charges. The next day a report from Iceland stated that a British aircraft had assisted in *repelling* the attack. In his statements on the incident President Roosevelt branded it as an act of unprovoked aggression<sup>27</sup> and proclaimed the "shoot on sight" policy. Not until October 14 was it revealed upon the insistent demand of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs that, before the attack upon the *Greer*, a British plane had dropped depth charges over the submarine while the *Greer* was trailing the submarine and broadcasting its position. Whether the submarine was actually submerged when attacked by the British plane and its commander thought that he was being attacked by the *Greer* has not been definitely established, although the officers of the *Greer* reported that they had

<sup>26</sup>*New York Times*, July 10 and 12, 1941. The testimony before the committee has not been made public. Some Senators said that they could not conclude from the testimony that this or other "shooting" had occurred, while others said that they understood Secretary Knox to have confirmed at least this one instance.

<sup>27</sup>*New York Times*, September 5 and 6, 1941. For example, on September 11, President Roosevelt, in announcing the "shoot on sight" policy, declared, "I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning and with deliberate design to sink her" (*ibid.*, September 12, 1941).



at no time seen the submarine.<sup>28</sup>

When the President announced the "shoot on sight" policy, he also revealed for the first time that in July 1941 a submarine had followed an American battleship and had attempted to maneuver itself into a position of attack. At a press conference on September 16 the President declined to say whether the Red Sea was included in our "defensive" waters or whether the Navy was actually convoying ships between this country and Iceland, but Secretary Knox admitted on the following day that the Navy was convoying British-bound cargoes in the North Atlantic. At the same press conference the President went on to say that "it depended on the naval situation whether further sinkings or attacks on American-owned commercial ships would continue to be announced and whether there would be announcements of encounters between American war vessels and submarines or raiders in the Western Atlantic."<sup>29</sup> On September 19 no confirmation or denial could be obtained from the Navy Department, Secretary Hull, or Admiral Frank Sadler in the Panama Canal Zone on a London report that American warships had sunk a *Nazi* raider near the Panama Canal.<sup>30</sup>

During the negotiations which immediately preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor very little information was given to the public. Not until after the attack did the State Department reveal that on November 26, eleven days before the attack, it had proposed as a condition to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific that Japan withdraw "all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China."<sup>31</sup>

Among the newspaper editors and correspondents questioned during this pre-war period, all stated that they had experienced considerable difficulty in getting facts from the government.<sup>32</sup> There can be no question that the instances in which facts were suppressed seriously limited effective democratic control during the period in question. It has also been claimed that, as apparent efforts to manipulate opinion, such instances contributed to the public confusion and indifference which prevailed.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup>*New York Times*, October 15, 1941. For a good discussion of the report see Arthur Krock, *ibid.*, October 16, 1941.

<sup>29</sup>*Birmingham Age Herald*, September 12, 17, and 18, 1941.

<sup>30</sup>*Watertown Times*, September 20, 1941.

<sup>31</sup>77th Cong., 1st Sess., *House Document* 458, p. 109; see also pp. 102 and 106.

<sup>32</sup>See also in this connection James Free, "Vagaries of Censorship Shake Morale," *The [Washington] Star*, September 28, 1941.

<sup>33</sup>George Creel, "The Truth Shall Make You Free," *Collier's*, November 1, 1941. Mr. Creel was head of the Committee on Public Information during the last war.

Another development which reduced the normal effectiveness of our system of democratic controls was the broad transfer of military power from Congress to the President. For, to the extent that power is transferred to the President, the people lose the opportunity which the publicity and delay of Congressional proceedings usually provide to become informed before action is taken and to advocate or oppose it. The final development to be noted is the reduction which took place in our effective electorate with the increase in our armed forces. Members of the armed forces are denied full political privileges,<sup>34</sup> but only a small fraction of the electorate had been drafted by December 7, 1941.

In summarizing democratic control during this pre-war period, it can hardly be said that the people were able to exert very effective control, or that they were able to make the most effective use of their available controls, in respect to the vital military and diplomatic decisions by which we became engaged in limited military action against Germany and Italy, or in respect to the vital decisions which preceded the Japanese attack and our consequent full-scale military participation. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that there was sufficient opportunity for informed public opinion to develop and to assert itself with the means available in respect to the decisions involving the repeal of the arms embargo in favor of the "cash and carry" policy, the Lend Lease act, and the Selective Service act. Possibly there was sufficient opportunity also in respect to the decisions involving the transfer of destroyers to Britain and the arming of our merchant ships. But little opportunity existed in respect to the decisions involving the "protection" of Greenland, the occupation of Iceland, and the "shoot on sight" policy.<sup>35</sup> Nor was any such opportunity provided in respect to much of our policy toward Japan, especially our conditions of peace in the Pacific during this time, and it is certainly questionable whether sufficient opportunity existed in respect to the decisions involving the safety zone around the Western Hemisphere and the policy of broadcasting the position of Axis warcraft.

Whether opportunity for more democratic control should have been provided or whether opportunity for too much control existed during

<sup>34</sup>Members of the armed forces are prohibited from seeking to influence legislation affecting the armed forces and, of course, from taking an active part in political campaigns. It should also be pointed out that only thirty-five states had provided adequate absentee voting privileges.

<sup>35</sup>These decisions were subsequently approved in polls of public opinion, but it can hardly be said that fair alternatives were then presented. For these polls see *Fortune*, August 1941, and *New York Times*, July 18 and 24, and October 3, 1941.

this pre-war period can be answered better after all the facts have been revealed concerning the real nature of the emergency. Probably even then no complete agreement can be expected, for the decision also depends upon an evaluation of the capacity of our leaders, in which justifiable differences of opinion may be expected. It depends also upon an evaluation of the objectives and limitations of democracy itself, in which spiritual aspirations and factual doubt combine to defy proof or demonstration. For example, it cannot be shown now, and probably never can be shown, that an embargo on war materials to Japan in 1939, as an overwhelming majority of the American people were reported to favor, would have hastened, retarded, or prevented the Japanese attack.<sup>36</sup> It cannot even be shown that this report of American opinion was correct. However, it will probably be conceded now that it was essential to increase our armed forces greatly and to entrust to the President and his subordinates much broader discretion in respect to the release of information and in respect to the military and diplomatic policies to be pursued than in any former pre-war period, because of the unexampled nature and tactics of our potential adversaries with their demonstrated capacity to exploit swiftly and effectively the delays and publicity of democratic procedures, because of their demonstrated contempt for inhibitions in respect to method or objective, and because of our own unpreparedness at the time.

On the other hand, it will probably also be conceded that even in such times no act of censorship should be treated as a casual or routine matter because of its vital relationship to democratic control. Opportunity for the people to form and assert their opinion in respect to military and diplomatic policies should be provided whenever the following conditions exist: (1) immediate governmental action is not necessary; (2) sufficient facts can be safely released to the public; (3) the question does not involve factors too technical for the public generally; and (4) the expression of opinion will not betray the limits of governmental action or in any way endanger future policies. Even our polls of public opinion may, perhaps, be criticized on this point. It seems not altogether unreasonable, for example, to attribute in part Germany's emboldened attack upon our merchant and naval ships during this period to the many polls which consistently reported a strong majority of the American people opposed to war in the sense of full military participation, particularly to two polls concerning the people's

<sup>36</sup>See n. 16 above. The actual majority was 72 per cent; no undecided vote was reported.

reaction to the sinking of our merchant and naval ships. The first poll reported, on February 16, 1941, that 61 per cent of all the people were opposed to war if, while carrying war materials to Britain, any of our merchant ships were sunk by a German submarine. The second poll reported, on May 2, 1941, that 58 per cent of the people were still of the same mind, and it reported further that a majority were opposed to war if some of our naval ships were sunk while on convoy duty.<sup>37</sup> Nineteen days after this reaffirmation of public opinion on the basis of the polls, the first of our merchant ships to be sunk while flying the American flag was torpedoed by a German submarine.<sup>38</sup> Even our unauthoritative expressions of public opinion may become a two-edged sword in such times.

It is in the specific application of the foregoing conditions, particularly in regard to the information which could have been safely released and the decisions which involved factors too technical for the public generally, that most differences of opinion may be expected, though, again, most people would probably agree that final determination of these conditions had to be left with the President and his subordinates. To those who take this view and yet believe with the author that opportunity for more democratic control should have been provided, the solution, if any, would seem to be limited to an increase in democratic pressures. For example, it seems probable that we would have had a more generous, and at the same time a safe, release of information if the President and his subordinates had been subjected to a more exacting and unremitting pressure by Congress, the people, and the press.

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<sup>37</sup>*New York Times*, February 16 and May 2, 1941.

<sup>38</sup>The *Robin Moor*, torpedoed May 21, 1941 (*New York Times*, June 10 and 13, 1941).



# COMMUNICATIONS AND STRATEGY

BY STEFAN T. POSSONY

In a period when every man is his own strategist, and when schemes for winning the war appear as numerous and in many cases as spurious as stock company offerings at the time of the South Sea Bubble, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the perils of a premature and inadequately prepared offensive. The supreme objective of the United Nations is to win the war. This is infinitely more important than winning victories in local areas however desirable they may be. Strategy is by no means as simple a subject to the communications officer charged with the responsibility of solving the problem of supply for an army in a given area as it is to the casual students of maps and military best-sellers. At the present stage, when public confusion over the strategy of the United Nations is closely bound up with ignorance of geographical and logistic factors involved, attention should be called to the brief and lucid treatment of this subject by Squadron Leader Murray Harris. His recent book, *Lifelines of Victory* (New York, 1942), deserves a somewhat more detailed analysis than that offered in the ordinary reviewing medium. It fills a real and urgent political need because the public is badly informed and often misled on matters of strategy.

The author begins his book with a quotation from the German General von Willisen, "Strategy is the study of communications." Nazi military doctrine seems to cling to this venerable principle with the utmost tenacity. In fact, Dr. Rauschning reports in his last book the following astonishing conversation between himself and General Wassmuth:

"The thing that really matters is that the military profession has become a transport industry."

"You're joking!"

"I'm not. I mean it literally."

What does this principle mean? It simply means that the commander who has the best communications and amplest transport facilities can "get there fustest with the mostest." It means, in other words, that the belligerent which has the better communications will be victorious. It would seem to follow that one should choose a battlefield where his communication lines are superior to those of the enemy; only there can real military superiority be achieved. The practical implications to be

drawn from this principle with respect to the present military situation of the United Nations are almost limitless.

Are communications the yardstick by which the value of military conceptions must be measured? They are to a very large extent, but are they always the main determining factors as to the practicability of military operations? Has this principle definite limitations? Is victory indeed exclusively dependent upon communication advantages? Or, if it is a matter of degree, to what degree? "The important secret of war is to make oneself master of the communications." This sentence of Napoleon seems to contain more elements of military wisdom than General von Willisen's dictum, though it, too, does not contain the whole essence of strategical experience. This Napoleonic maxim means, in fact, not that communications should be considered a constant factor beyond the reach of the commander's influence and to which his decisions must be adapted, but that communications must be considered a variable factor which, within certain limits, can be adapted to the commander's will. If mass were the outstanding and decisive factor in war, communications would be all-preponderant and victory could only be achieved by overwhelming numbers and *matériel*. Yet speed and skill are sometimes more important than mass and brute force.

Many wars are fought on battlefields with no clear communication advantage for either party. In these cases much depends upon the skill of the opposing leaders in utilizing their own communications to the full and interrupting those of the enemy. Napoleon's first campaign in Piedmont began with the capture of Ceva by which his opponents lost their main communication junction while Bonaparte gained control over the whole region. One of the most important contributory factors to the victory at Austerlitz was Murat's timely seizure of the biggest bridge across the Danube. The German *coup de main* against Liège in 1914 was equally conceived as solution to a thorny communication problem; the early capture of this fortress opened the railways and highways which the Germans needed for their quick advance through Belgium. In 1940 the German parachute attack against the Moerdijk bridge served the double purpose of securing the communication key-point of Holland for the German army and of disrupting the main line of retreat for the Dutch; had the Dutch remained in possession of the bridge, they could have salvaged part of their army.

One must fight for one's own communications, and in no other kind of battle is speed as necessary. If a communication key-point is to be wrested from the enemy or captured before he gets there, speed is

often more important than preponderance of force. Had Napoleon waited until he had a chance to get at Ceva with full strength, he would have lost the campaign, and the Piedmontese and Austrians would have advanced into the Rhone Valley. Instead of mass, he chose speed—and won, though, of course, he could also have lost if the odds had been too heavy, no “principle” ever being universally valid in war.

The overemphasis on communications is, historically speaking, one of the great intellectual dangers for generals. Their wills are often paralyzed by the idea that some specific operation cannot be carried out because communications are insufficient. Actually, however, many of the most successful military operations in history have been executed despite the fact that experts considered them as impracticable. Alexander's crossing to Asia and his Indian expedition would certainly never have been attempted by the “communication experts” of his time. Hannibal's crossing of the Alps and his fifteen year stay in Italy were likewise against the rules of orthodox logistics. This is also at least partly true of Caesar's operations in Flanders and in Britain and of his surprise crossings of the Rhine. One wonders what communication experts would have told Genghis Khan if he had taken the trouble of consulting them, or how they would have advised his successor, Ogdai, who simultaneously attacked Korea, southern China, and eastern Europe. Charles XII began his military career when at the age of 17 he forced his protesting admiral to attempt the passage of the eastern channel of the Sound, the dangerous *flinterend*, hitherto reputed to be unnavigable, and landed his troops near Copenhagen.

Coming down to our time, one has little doubt that most experts would have advised Hitler against his Norwegian campaign. That the Germans actually would begin their attack at Narvik was assumed to be so absurd that all official German reports about their attacks in northern Norway were *à priori* discounted. The author remembers sitting in the broadcast studio in Paris in April 1940 poring in dismay over a map of Norway while these reports were coming in. Certainly the Nazis were referring to a place in southern Norway called Larvik. When attention was called to the location of Larvik in Oslo Bay, the official French *Agence Havas* immediately released the information that the Germans probably had taken Larvik rather than Narvik and that they were apparently trying to spread confusion by exploiting the similarity of the two names. The “experts” in London had also located Larvik; Prime Minister Chamberlain, about to take the floor in the

House of Commons, was informed and immediately passed on the information to the House to his listeners' great relief.

These examples should teach us that under certain circumstances so-called "impossible" operations can become quite feasible. If the opponent thinks that a particular attack is out of question, a resourceful adversary will find a way to exploit it. Strategically necessary operations which cannot be executed by normal means compel the military leader to employ ruses, stratagems, and surprises. Furthermore, these examples should teach us that the degree of impossibility in military operations can rarely be ascertained. In particular, one should never trust in the invincibility of natural obstacles. In former times natural obstacles certainly were of greater importance than today, though then they had to be negotiated by only small armies. But under present conditions one had better assume that there are no natural obstacles left except large spaces. Even Arctic wastes, the sands of the desert, and extremely mountainous areas are no longer impossible barriers to well-equipped and determined men.

Commander Harris stresses the "communication-blindness" which is prevalent among many soldiers. Some months ago General Wavell asserted that amateur strategists are usually distinguished from professional strategists in that they do not see the communication problem at all and are unable to understand its implications. This may be correct, but it must also be realized that professional soldiers, who cling to old traditions and are moulded by the education they received in a by-gone age, very often have difficulty in discerning new possibilities of communication. Despite the American Civil War and despite 1866, the French generals of 1870 did not know how to use their railways and did not foresee the use Moltke would make of the German railway system. The Germans were surprised by Gallieni's taxi army of 1914. Gamelin could not imagine that large tank forces would be able to pass through the rugged Ardennes. The potentialities of aircraft as a means of transport has been widely underestimated by professional soldiers.

The communication problem is often confused by the assumption that only those communications are valuable which allow the transport of great quantities of supply. Yet the amount of necessary equipment is an extremely variable factor in all campaigns. If we look at historical examples, we can find many instances where armies were defeated because they needed much equipment and relied too much on a plentitude of supplies. There is a saturation point of supply, and all above that is a bar to successful operations. Well supplied armies tend to lose



mobility and initiative when operating beyond the immediate neighborhood of their nearest supply bases. Xenophon's *Anabasis* shows what an army can do even if all its communications are cut. Napoleon regained mobility for the French army by renouncing his own magazines; he solved the communications and supply problem during the first Italian campaign by gaining control of northern Italy. In this he did nothing more than imitate the example of earlier military leaders who led small and unsupplied armies to victory such as the Huns, Mongols, Turks and, to some extent, Gustavus Adolphus, Condé, and Charles XII. In some cases armies can supply themselves by advancing; the Germans have proven that this strategic axiom of barbaric invaders holds true to a limited extent even in the twentieth century.

If the importance of communications is overstressed, it must lead to the extinction of the art of war. Every operation would be dictated by the availability or the absence of communications. Take the example of a commander who has the choice between two different attacks. On principle he selects that line of attack which can be based upon better communications. Suppose he has in direction A two highways and two railroads and in direction B one highway and one railroad. Without hesitation he chooses direction A. Certainly there may be many circumstances in which attack A is preferable, but a commander who always selects an attack in the style A and never renounces communication advantages will soon be beaten because his moves can be foreseen. As already said, the overemphasis on communication is a direct consequence of the overemphasis of masses in war. Yet innumerable victories have been won by smaller over bigger armies. Better leadership and better equipment are more than a mere substitute for mass and, by the same token, for communications. If in the present situation our communications are deficient, as indeed they are, why should we not try to offset this disadvantage by better weapons and better leadership? The good general is one able to solve the communication problems which confront him either by fighting, improvisation, or surprise. Communications are a limitative factor, the importance of which continually changes. But they should never be the master of strategy.

To be sure, the creativeness of generals has its limitations, and there are doubtless many periods in war when supplies and communications are so deficient that to act is to invite disaster. Squadron Leader Harris, in a very timely reminder, mentions Fabius Cunctator and his temporizing and delaying strategy. It is indeed helpful at present to recall the lessons of the Second Punic War even if it is not as feasible to

"refuse" battle under modern conditions as it was in former times when maneuvers and topographical positions were of greater importance. After the crushing defeats which Hannibal inflicted on the Romans in northern Italy, the Roman army had to be reorganized and new armies raised. The Romans were much too weak to eject Hannibal from Italy. They could only apply a strategy of attrition in the hope of wearing down his forces and of preventing a final and catastrophic clash.

But the sequel to Fabius' cunctative strategy is not less important. With time Rome became strong again; Hannibal's troops and his government became war-weary. The opportunity to bring the war to a victorious end finally came. Scipio, who had distinguished himself in Spain, proposed the audacious plan of attacking Carthage itself. His plan was militarily practicable and, despite its hazards, a most ingenious solution of Rome's military problem. Yet Fabius, overconscious of previous failures and unable to think in other terms than the strategy he had so successfully applied in earlier years, obstinately opposed Scipio. Why not attack Hannibal directly rather than pursue the round-about way? What if Hannibal should advance against Rome? Fabius also used the communications argument—not a harbor open to Scipio's troops, not even a foothold secured, and Carthage was much stronger in Africa than in Italy.

History has shown that Scipio was as right against Fabius as previously Fabius had been right against Varro. Employing a comparison to the bull ring, Harris holds that the enemy must be worn down in preparation for the kill. Strategy of annihilation and strategy of attrition are by no means alternatives; they are supplementary methods of war. The purpose of war is certainly not to fight battles if they can be avoided, but the kill can never be attempted without risk and without bloodshed—although, of course, this does not mean that it should ever be attempted when the risk is too great and the price in blood too high. "Let us not bother," said Clausewitz, "with imaginary generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then it is a reason for respecting war, not for blunting our swords for humanitarian reasons until someone steps in with a sharp sword and lops off an arm." One may see something like this danger inherent in Harris's implied assumption that really bloody fighting in the European theater may well be put off until our own lines of communication are firmly established and those of the enemy paralyzed by bombing and other operations.

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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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This issue completes volume VI of the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE—and please note that it is out on time and even includes the title-page and index! Having accomplished so much, the present editors take leave of the readers of MILITARY AFFAIRS and turn over their blue pencils and scissors to their successors. In October Dr. De Weerd, Editor since 1938, entered the Army as a Captain to become Associate Editor of the *Infantry Journal*. Both he and Captain Douglas, whose connection with the Office of the Director of Records was described in the Fall issue, felt compelled to resign in order to devote full time to their new assignments, and the Associate Editors are retiring also to give the new Editor a free hand in organizing his staff.

The Board of Trustees has elected Dr. Edward G. Campbell to succeed Captain De Weerd as Editor and has discontinued the office of Managing Editor. Dr. Campbell is a graduate of Princeton and Columbia Universities and is now employed as Archivist in the War Department Division of The National Archives. He is the author of *Reorganization of the American Railway System, 1893-1900* (1938) and of several articles, including two in this journal—"The United States Military Railroads, 1862-1865" (Summer 1938) and "Use of Records of the Last War Today" (Spring 1942). Without pretending to be a military expert or even primarily a military historian, he has long had a more than casual interest in the field and has developed an unusual competency in the backgrounds of American military history and policy through his work with the primary source materials.

With the cooperation of Dr. Solon J. Buck, Archivist of the United States and a Patron of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE, and of Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, Chief of the War Department Division of The National Archives and Provost of the INSTITUTE, Dr. Campbell has been able to recruit his entire editorial staff from the War Department Division of The National Archives. Besides the obvious advantages of having all editorial work concentrated in one place, it is particularly desirable at the present time to thus guarantee the uninterrupted continuity of MILITARY AFFAIRS regardless of what may happen to any

one or two individuals. In effect, the War Department Division has agreed to see the journal through. Dr. Campbell has appointed the following Assistant Editors:

Robert G. Ballentine, who has prepared the Recent Periodical Literature notes and the annual index for the past three years, is the only member of the present staff who is able to continue his work under the new arrangement. He did his graduate work in history at Clark and Harvard Universities and wrote "The Territorial Papers': A Source for Military History," which appeared in the Winter 1941 issue of the journal.

Captain Victor Gondos, Jr. (Coast Artillery Reserve) attended the Universities of Michigan and Pennsylvania and is a graduate of the battery officers' course at the Coast Artillery School. He has contributed to the *Coast Artillery Journal*, among his articles being "Coast Artillery Shy Porto Rico" (December 1929) and "Ponderings on Reserve Officers' Problems" (July 1931), and has also written for *The Reserve Officer* and for *The Bulletin* of the Third Coast Artillery District.

Dr. Stuart Portner studied history at the College of the City of New York, New York University, and the Universities of Oregon and Michigan. He had more than ordinary editorial experience as State Supervisor of the Michigan Historical Records Survey from 1939 to July of this year.

Jerome Thomases is a graduate of the College of the City of New York, did additional work in history at American University, and was a member of Dr. Irvine's Seminar-Conference on the Total Science of War. Last year we published his article on "Fort Bridger: A Western Community" (Fall 1941).

Since the above was written Dr. Irvine has been detailed as an Assistant to the Archivist of the United States, and Dr. Campbell, our new Editor, succeeds him as Chief of the War Department Division.

Because of the large number of members in active military service and the difficulties of transportation, the INSTITUTE has cancelled its customary annual joint session with the American Historical Association for this year. The Association's meeting will be held on December 29-31 at the Neil House in Columbus, Ohio, on the general theme Civilization in Crisis, and some of the papers will undoubtedly be of special interest to members of the INSTITUTE who are able to attend.



Dr. Robert G. Albion, President of the INSTITUTE, was in Washington on October 30 and met with the available officers to make plans for the coming year. At an informal dinner held beforehand, there were present, besides the officers: Dr. Buck; Lieutenant Colonel Joseph I. Greene, Editor of the *Infantry Journal*; Captain Frederick P. Todd and Dr. Alfred Vagts, Trustees; and Dr. Campbell. The officers present were: Dr. Albion; Dr. Irvine; Colonel Ralph C. Bishop, Treasurer; Captain De Weerd; and Captain Douglas. This conference was preliminary to the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees, which will probably be held in Washington in January. A committee, consisting of Dr. Irvine, Captain Todd, and Captain Douglas, was appointed to revise the by-laws of the INSTITUTE, and plans are being made to revive discussion meetings in Washington similar to those formerly held at the INSTITUTE headquarters.

We are still looking for copies of volume I, number 2 (Summer 1937), of the journal to supply libraries which are trying to build up complete reference sets.

Marie Charlotte Stark, Librarian of the INSTITUTE, reports that the arrangement of the library in its new location in The National Archives nears completion. As a result of the recent gifts of Mrs. W. W. Buckley and Theodore Marcone, the shelves which were built around three walls of one of the offices of the War Department Division are nearly filled. Among the valuable works received with these accessions are Fortescue's *A History of the British Army*, Dodge's *Great Captains*, Oman's *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, the *German Official Account of the Russo-Japanese War*, and an English translation of von Clausewitz' *On War*. Incidentally, the second volume of Dodge's *Napoleon* is missing, and the INSTITUTE would be very grateful if anyone could complete the set.

Miss Stark has sorted the periodical files and cataloged those to be retained. Periodicals which are not directly pertinent to military affairs have been discarded and are ready for disposal to second-hand dealers. It is hoped that enough may be realized from this to do some binding and to cover the cost of book-plates. The latter, which have been ordered, are to be very simple, carrying only the seal of the INSTITUTE with space below for the names of donors.

Tentative rules for the use of the library have been established. They provide for the withdrawal of books by members of the INSTI-

TUTE for two weeks, with two-week renewal privilege, and for the withdrawal of periodicals for one week. Rare books may not be removed from the room. Non-members may use the library but may not take items out of the building. The library hours are the same as those of The National Archives, 8:45 A.M. to 5:15 P.M. from Mondays through Fridays and from 8:45 A.M. to 12:45 P.M. on Saturdays.

### *Contributors to This Issue*

Jean Gottman is the author of many studies on geographical and economic subjects. A member of the faculty of the Institute of Geography at the Sorbonne from 1936 to 1940, he is now at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.

Dr. Wilson K. Doyle of the Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama is the author of *Independent Commissions in the Federal Government* (1939).

Dr. Stefan T. Possony will be remembered by readers of MILITARY AFFAIRS for his article on "Rational Planning for War" (Winter 1941). He is now on the staff of Columbia Broadcasting System's short-wave transmission to Europe.

Elbert L. Huber, Bursar of the INSTITUTE from 1939 through 1941, is Associate Archivist in the War Department Division of The National Archives.

Lieutenant Hugh M. Flick, formerly Archivist of the State of New York, went into service two years ago with the 134th New York National Guard, was subsequently graduated from the Adjutant General's School, and is now on duty in the Office of the Director of Records. He became interested in the principles behind campaign medals trying to determine whether or not and why he was entitled to wear the American Defense Service ribbon.

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## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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*World in Trance: From Versailles to Pearl Harbor*, by Leopold Schwarzschild. (New York: L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation. 1942. Pp. 445. \$3.50.)

The "two accursed decades" between world wars are the topic of this book by a veteran German writer and journalist—famous as editor-in-chief of the Berlin weekly *Tagebuch*—who saw what other liberals, progressives, and socialists would not see. From the foreign generals to the German trade unionists, the forces which might have stopped Hitler did not listen. The *Gestapo* today considers the possession of a single copy of his magazine an unailing ticket to the concentration camp. Schwarzschild has not only an unbroken record of extraordinary intellectual integrity and of incessant fighting in that ghostly German republic against reactionaries and fascists, against arrogance and the secret rearming of the military, against the cowardice and inadequacy of the republicans, and against the corruption of German justice; he also has a record of unusual personal bravery.

Back in 1924, when Hitler said he would need "long decades" to achieve political success, Schwarzschild warned against him. When Hindenburg issued a presidential proclamation in honor of the German war dead in 1926, Schwarzschild had the unheard-of daring to thunder that this proclamation neither contained the word peace nor expressed the hope that further wars could be avoided. At the tenth anniversary of the Armistice he exposed the megalomania and irresponsibility of the German army leaders. He cried out in January 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor, that Hindenburg had given in "at the very last minute" when the world-crisis had begun to turn and the *Nazi* party to disintegrate. *Das Tagebuch* of February 25, 1933, openly warned the world of the impending *coup d'état* which took the form of the *Reichstag* fire. Under the difficult conditions of the increasingly *Nazi*-infected Europe of 1933-1940, Schwarzschild managed to publish every week a Paris edition of his German-language message to a world which refused to listen or to act. In the first issue of his Paris edition, on July 1, 1933, he warned, "Only in matters relating to war has

National Socialist theory and practice shown a determined course from its very first day."

Schwarzschild's book, as would be expected, is grim and bitter. His theme, in effect, is how *not* to deal with a defeated Germany. He holds that "All the Wilsonian principles taken together everywhere prevented the establishment of firm and definite socio-economic conditions" and were largely responsible for the "trance" during which Hitler and his Axis partners were able to prepare for war. Not much, the author thinks, remains to be said about the enemy. Instead, his criticisms are directed against the "good" side, against the supporters of an impotent League of Nations, and against the progressives, the pacifists, the humanitarians, and the socialists of Germany, France, and England—those who wanted to be "fair" to "poor" Germany. The post-1918 era wanted "to find the world beautiful at any price and to avoid all unpleasantness." The Locarno Treaty was "a mouse represented as a mammoth"—with the fatal effect of creating a "pacifist hypnosis."

He is bitter against Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald, against Leon Blum and the Archbishop of Canterbury, against all those who unerringly found excuses for German aggressions, whether camouflaged or not. He "debunks" the sentimental fairy tales about German inflation. He is extremely critical of the German presidents, Ebert the Social Democrat and Hindenburg the Monarchist, and of the German foreign ministers, Rathenau who was slain by the *Nazis* and Stresemann the secret friend of the Crown Prince. He criticizes Briand for his failure to face realities and Bruening for his "front officer policy." Among the English he criticizes General Malcolm, member of the Disarmament Control Commission, and Bonar Law as well as the Labor opposition which "swallowed the whole Berlin legend." In this whole era he admires only three European statesmen, Clemenceau, Poincaré, and Churchill. In his opinion, the American and British attitude towards France in 1918-19 was most directly responsible for the "inevitable" French collapse of 1940, which was predicted by Clemenceau and Tardieu as early as 1919.

This book illustrates once more that the traditional distinctions between "right" and "left," progressive and conservative, and militarist and pacifist no longer apply. Schwarzschild is not one of those who in their later years repudiate the ideals of their youth. With grim completeness he disavows the still current "humanitarian" ideas concerning the *methods* which must be used to promote the ideal of peace. Twenty



years of continuous defeat of all progressive tendencies in all of Europe because of the determination of the German die-hards have convinced him that force and power must play a much bigger rôle, indeed the decisive rôle, after victory over *Nazi* Germany. But, while he thus repudiates angelic methods, he is still on the side of the angels. Out of a deep sense of disillusionment he advocates the use of force and coercion and of a preponderance of the great powers, but all this does not mean that he has become an "imperialist" or a "militarist." These are simply the only effective methods of achieving security against Germany. Schwarzschild's book is to be recommended for political adults capable of understanding a veteran of the good cause who has turned pessimist without becoming a cynic.

HANS ERNEST FRIED

*College of the City of New York*

*Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*, by Montague Francis Ashley-Montagu. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. 216. \$2.25.)

With a vastly powerful and marauding segment of the world's population officially embracing race theory, not a few clear-headed scientists have recently rushed to demonstrate the absurdity of these dangerous views. Usually these writers have been specialists in some discipline; Ashley-Montagu is unique in his amazing scientific versatility. The result is an incisive though somewhat unevenly written book.

On the basis of his knowledge as a geneticist, he demolishes the anthropological attempts to develop any fruitful theory of race upon the basis of "an arbitrary and superficial selection of external characters." His is a genetic concept viewing race in terms of "more or less temporary expressions of variations in the relative frequencies of genes in different parts of the species population." Seen in this light, race theory looks even more pathetic than when viewed anthropologically. The fact that observed "race" differences in achievement and character are almost certainly due, not to any basic biological differences in the quality of the genes, but rather to differences in historical and cultural factors, deprives the entire race concept of the special significance it has been given.

It is in his analysis of the causes of race prejudice, or more particularly in his suggestions for its eradication, that the author falters. According to his theory aggression in general arises out of early psycho-analytic frustrations plus the adult frustrations of our economic system.

His scientific sophistication leads, however, to an almost defeatist vagueness of suggestion for cure and an underestimation of the rôle of economic factors as precipitating causes. It is, unfortunately, this point of view which is embraced and inflated in the foreword by Aldous Huxley.

The reader with military interests will find here a careful but spirited refutation of the theory held by Sir Arthur Keith and others that war is "Nature's pruning hook," a valuable biological evolutionary device for eliminating the weaker racial stocks while permitting the stronger to survive.

MAURICE L. FARBER

*Office of Radio Research,  
Columbia University*

*Will Germany Crack?* by Paul Hagen. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1942. Pp. 283. \$2.75.)

The latent civil war fought during the 'twenties in the Germany of the Weimar Republic was expressed to some extent in the vehement discussions about the true reasons for Germany's defeat in the World War. The *Nazis* have profited by the "stab in the back" legend, according to which the revolt of 1918 prevented the "victorious German army" from smashing its enemies. This legend shifted the ground from the "German defeat" to the "German debacle." Today, a very definite danger exists that the *Nazis* may also profit from our misunderstanding of the German collapse at the end of the last war. Thinking in terms of historical "precedents," or what they consider historical facts, both armchair strategists and military experts may overestimate the chances of a German revolt. Such a miscalculation of the internal German situation may unfavorably affect our military decisions.

Analyzing very carefully the present-day German situation, Paul Hagen reduces wishful thinking to sober facts. The author is a German refugee belonging to the younger generation of those leftwing politicians who left Germany in the spring of 1933. As an opponent of the official policy of the Social-Democratic party, he had, long before 1933, organized groups within that party in preparation for an underground struggle against the threatening dictatorship. These groups survived, at least partly, the assault of the *Gestapo* and provided Mr. Hagen and other exiled leaders with valuable information about German developments. The present book is based primarily on this information and on the well-known "Green Reports" published by the German

Social-Democratic party in exile. The author also subjects to critical analysis the facts and figures published by the *Nazi* government. Even during the war he has had opportunities to study German papers and periodicals and to check the German broadcasts.

Mr. Hagen examines the problem of whether or not Germany will crack from its economic and political aspects. Several chapters in his volume deal with the supply of fuel, iron, steel, clothing, and fodder and contain familiar material. There is also little new in the description of the "New Order" in the occupied countries and of the situation of millions of enslaved foreign workers who have been transported to Germany by force. He is at his best when analyzing the attitude of the different classes of the German nation toward the totalitarian state and its total war. With conclusive arguments he destroys the hope that the generals may one day revolt against Hitler and his gang. The antagonism between the army and the party is, of course, as old as the *Nazi* regime, and the opposition of the older officers, who were educated in the old aristocratic tradition, will never be overcome completely. These circles look upon Hitler as the "Bohemian first-class private" just as old President Hindenburg did, but they are as powerless as he was to rid themselves of him. Their opposition is counter-balanced not only by fear but also by the sympathetic attitude of many younger officers toward *Nazi* policies which are responsible for their rapid rise in the army. He is also right in pointing to the "confused patriotism" of the leaders of the German army, an attitude which prevents them from weakening the military strength of the *Reich* by a military *coup d'état* which would mean civil war.

The most active opponents to the *Nazis* must not be sought among the old aristocracy and big business but, rather, among the broad masses of labor. On the basis of excellent information and a thorough analysis, Mr. Hagen comes to the conclusion that the millions of German workers who once built up the strongest trade unions and the most powerful labor party in the world have not been reconciled to dictatorship. This reviewer, who studied these problems for six years inside Germany, can only approve the conclusions of the author. But this opposition alone is by no means strong enough to overcome Hitlerism. It may undermine German morale, however, if the German army becomes weakened on the battlefield. In this war German revolt will be a consequence, not a cause, of German defeat.

ERNST FRAENKEL

*The New School for Social Research*

*Propaganda by Short Wave*, edited by Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1942. Pp. 355. \$3.75.)

The title of this volume suggests some fundamental distinction between short- and medium-wave radio propaganda, but it should be pointed out that censorship and political or psychological expediency determine the differences between programs for foreign audiences and those for domestic listeners rather than any technical considerations. The distances involved make radio propaganda to or from America largely short-wave, however, and the Princeton Listening Center monitored and transcribed only short-wave programs from European stations to America. The eight essays contained in the present study, written by eight former associates of the Princeton Listening Center, are based on their experience before the middle of 1941. A study of radio propaganda as a whole, for both domestic and foreign listeners, and of foreign propaganda addressed to American listeners right up to Pearl Harbor would have been more inclusive and conclusive. One cannot help feeling that there is something accidental or arbitrary in the limitations of time and material accepted by the Princeton Listening Center and in the handling of so many millions of propaganda words in eight loosely coordinated studies, the lack of explicit method of which will often disconcert the critical reader.

In "Techniques of Persuasion" Edrita Fried presents interesting data but discusses propaganda over the radio as if it were something entirely new and peculiar to radio. She disregards accepted terminologies and methods of logic, rhetoric, dialectic, and even psychology and adopts new-fangled, improvised, and ambiguous terms to discuss problems as old as Aristotle. Radio propaganda is still governed by the traditional principles of rhetoric, and its content is as yet barely affected by the techniques of transmission. The author has neglected, however, to distinguish even this slight influence. Bruno Foa, though infinitely more aware of his problems in "The Structure of Rome Short-wave Broadcasts to North America," groups all his excellent information and analysis around a table of twenty "basic themes" which are so vaguely defined that special applications of some of them are listed again as new themes. Philip E. Jacob treats "Atrocity Propaganda" very much as a "supplementary campaign" largely unrelated to strategy in which the war of words is only one of many fronts.

The introductory "Radio in International Politics," by John B. Whitton and John H. Herz, covers rapidly and concisely the history



of radio propaganda and indicates briefly its major problems. The most conclusive examples of radio victories, those in which definite effects can truly be attributed to definite causes, have all been achieved so far on medium-wave broadcasts which reach a maximum audience, such as morale campaigns addressed to domestic listeners and propaganda offensives like Germany's "terror" broadcasts to enemy and neutral audiences at the time of political or military offensives in the Saar, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France. Regions which can be reached only by short-wave offer too few listeners, and too many of them lose interest in programs which are so often submerged in static. The most methodical and scientific study in the book, "America's Short-wave Audience" by Harwood L. Childs, concludes that this audience is very small and could increase to politically dangerous proportions only if our entire present set-up of domestic radio information and entertainment were to break down or ceased to satisfy the demands of the home radio audience within the United States.

EDOUARD RODITI

*New York, New York*

*Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812*, by Eugene Tarlé. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1942. Pp. 422. \$3.50.)

The diplomatic requirements of coalition warfare, as we understand them, need not move us to say that Tarlé's book on Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 is good or sound military history. But it is definitely as good a historical movie as Alexander Nevsky or Tjapatiev, being composed for the same reasons as they—for the requirements of Soviet policy during a definite period of time. From the mere reading of the book a student can easily date the time of its original publication, the year 1938 after the failure of the Litvinov policies, for it parallels the events in Russia's foreign affairs with those of 1812. Napoleon was Hitler, and Hitler is Napoleon soon to be. Kutusov rather than Czar Alexander, who was too much of an internationalist to suit Tarlé, is made "the father of all Russians," hating to spend more soldiers' lives than was absolutely necessary for the best interests of Russia, which lie in Russia and not in Europe where the English wanted him to carry the fight after 1812. Consequently, the English delegate in Kutusov's headquarters is nothing so much as the representative of the English policy of Chamberlain. Kutusov is also the all-Russian general who has no use for outside help on which, in historical fact, the Russian

army of his time simply had to rely for technical assistance; that makes the antagonists of Kutusov in the army either Germans or Trotzkyists. The peasant-partisans of the war of 1812 are depicted as the heroic examples of the guerrillas in the war which was to come sooner or later against the invader from the West; they are spontaneous patriots, even though they are still serfs and though unfree men have usually not amounted to much as soldiers. Only the industrial worker of today and his function in the Russian war economy remains without a parallel, because his like did not exist in the Russia of 1812. Aside from that, the history of 1812 contains most of the recipes for 1941-42, including the scorched-earth policy and the warning to look out for counterfeit money which Hitler would as surely use as Napoleon.

The parallels are plentiful enough to make exciting reading (and perhaps have even had their useful effects among the Russians in making them ready for this war), but there are far too many to make sound history. To illustrate our doubt by one example: a more detailed study of guerrilla warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has convinced us that in practically all warfare of that sort the clergy played a vital rôle, particularly the Catholic clergy; this need not surprise us for a time when there was no other intelligentsia having contact with rural populations even if we disregard theology and its possible effect as a fanaticizer. What about Russia? Who, as a group, established the necessary medium between the illiterate peasant and the events in the outside world? Who knew about Spain and the guerrillas there which Tarlé mentions repeatedly, not without conjuring up a parallel with the Republican Spain of the late 1930's? Tarlé belittles the rôle of the Orthodox clergy just as much as the Soviet historical movies do even when they take place in times and places still strongly religious. Very little is left of the Marxian concept of history from which Tarlé is thought to stem except the theory of Napoleon as an imperialist—not as the great "conquest beast," with which one might agree, but as the agent of the French upper middle-class in whose interests all the wars of France since 1793 have been fought in order to destroy British trade. Another Marxistic survival in this work—which is a publication of the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences and could not, therefore, be more official—may be the use to which the soundest of all judgment on the war of 1812, that of Clausewitz, is put; he, much quoted by Marx-Engels-Lenin, is still largely approved, though perhaps not always rightly understood. About non-Russian personalities and organizations there are misstatements which

might in part be due to the translation. The German *Tugenbund* was not a body of patriotic German students but was composed of people of an older age-group, and Spaniards of 1812 were not subjects of Napoleon's brother Jerome but of Joseph. Some of the originally German or Scandinavian names emerge from the Russian into English almost unrecognizable, such as Shtoll instead of Stahl or Buksgevdén instead of Buxhövdén.

ALFRED VAGTS

*Board of Economic Warfare*

*Justice in Grey: A History of the Judicial System of the Confederate States of America*, by William M. Robinson, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1941. Pp. 713. \$7.50.)

Just as Frederick Jackson Turner compelled a new evaluation of our social development, so Colonel Robinson opens the door to a fuller appreciation of the social and juridicial side of the Confederacy. The present volume is an amazing piece of work, but it is more amazing that no one has studied the subject before. Perhaps the answer may be found in the terrible fascination that military maneuvers seem to hold over historians of the War between the States and in the sparkle that comes from dabbling even remotely in politics. The writing of *Justice in Grey* called for the proper balance of a judicial mind with a disciplined but insatiable intellectual curiosity. It is not a restful sort of book to be recommended to armchair scholars or to those who seek a short cut to knowledge in a difficult field. Colonel Robinson has "endeavored to outline broadly the legal system in the Confederate States," and he has done so brilliantly and smoothly with that charming prose which has characterized his earlier writings. It is to be hoped that he will follow this pioneer work with other studies in the same field.

Colonel Robinson's sense of humor is shown throughout the book, especially where he describes the clash between the military authorities and the bench. It is a pity that he has had to make these discussions all too brief—for example, the famous rebuff of Judge Magrath to ubiquitous General Pemberton. The chapter on the trials and tribulations of the several Confederate attorneys general stands out as one of the best; few historians are acquainted with the chronology of events here woven into such a convincing pattern. And the chapter on the reconstruction of the courts after the collapse in 1865 rivals in quiet

intensity the gripping work of the late Dr. Dunham in which is portrayed the dreadful sequel to Appomattox. The bibliography is in very usable form, the appendix of documents and other exhibits are well arranged, and the index of the courts and the general index are of the same high quality as the text. To say that this book should be on the shelf of all libraries which encourage research in the field is to grossly understate its value. Its price may be an obstacle to a wide ownership by scholars, which is a pity since no American historian should be without it.

DONALD BRIDGMAN SANGER  
*Coast Artillery Corps*

*Cadiz to Cathay: The Story of the Long Struggle for a Waterway across the American Isthmus*, by Commander Miles P. DuVal, Jr. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 1941. Pp. 554. \$5.00.)

There is no doubt of the timeliness of a definitive account of how interest first arose in an Isthmian canal, of how the task of translating that interest into accomplishment was first attempted by European engineering and capital, and, finally, of the circumstances by which the United States, evolving through the nineteenth century a positive hemisphere policy, came to assume control of the project and to carry it to a successful culmination. It is fitting that an American naval officer should write such a work, for to our Navy falls the responsibility of making the channel between the Americas of the greatest possible military use in the days which lie directly before us.

It is a long story which Commander DuVal has to tell; it begins centuries before the lifetime of Ferdinand De Lesseps, Theodore Roosevelt, or Philippe Bunau-Varilla. For it was in 1513 that the intrepid Balboa disclosed how small a distance separated the two oceans—information used shortly after to develop Spanish trade by road construction and harbor improvements at the places he had explored. A part of the present canal, the Chagres River, was actually used by Spanish light-draft vessels as early as 1534. Even before this Saavedra, a lieutenant of Cortez, had prepared plans for utilizing the natural passage from Chagres to Crucés and for digging an artificial channel thence to Panama. By 1530 the advantages of the Nicaragua route were also appreciated, but the Spaniards pursued more avidly the idea of an already existing waterway. Lack of scientific equipment and official preoccupation with Spain's vast colonial and political affairs pushed all these early schemes into the background.



Early in the nineteenth century Spain actually began plans to construct a canal, but revolutions in her American colonies interfered and her speedy eclipse as a great power placed the matter beyond possible action. So, too, did the great liberator Bolivar plan a canal, a project ended by his early death. Holland, in turn, after using the discord existing among the warring republics to obtain concessions for a Nicaragua route, was forced to turn her attention to her own affairs by the Belgian revolution of 1830. From approximately that point can be dated the interest of the United States in the actual construction of an Isthmian canal.

From the days of Andrew Jackson to those of Theodore Roosevelt an amazing parade of personalities thought about, investigated, or inspected various parts of Central America in search of the ideal site. Companies were organized, later to collapse; concessions were granted to individuals, only later to be withdrawn or transferred to other hands—a process complicated by the weakness and frequent disintegration of the governments of Central America. Five possibilities were considered: the Panama route, the Nicaragua route, another via the Tehuantepec Isthmus, one via Honduras, and still another in the Darien area. This list was drawn up by Admiral Davis in 1866 as an official report to the United States Senate. From that time on, the problem was not so much whether to construct a canal, but which one to construct, and when. The later stages of the story—the failure of the French Company, the effort of the United States to purchase a zone from Colombia, and the final coinciding of the Panama revolt of 1903 with the determination of President Roosevelt to take the Zone by treating with the Panamanians—are familiar to American readers.

The merits of Commander DuVal's book lie in the thoroughness with which he has gone through the official material, the objectivity with which he has treated what has been a subject of much controversy, and the large amount of illustrative material such as portraits, maps, and appendices. The maps, while highly important and well selected, are not well reproduced; some are nearly illegible. The author believes that the measure of 1939, providing for the construction of additional locks for the Panama Canal, is not a solution of the physical and commercial problems of the Canal, which, in his opinion, call for construction of a second canal on the Nicaragua route. Another interesting opinion advanced by Commander DuVal, quoting Professor S. F. Bemis, is that the method rather than the fact of taking the Canal Zone was at fault and that a generation of careful "good neighbor"

activity has been necessary to alleviate the distrust and fear occasioned in Latin America by our quasi-seizure of the territory concerned.

COURTNEY R. HALL  
*Adelphi College*

## OTHER RECENT BOOKS

### INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

- A Study of War*, by Quincy Wright. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1942. Pp. 1552, 2 vols. \$15.00.) A comprehensive investigation of the subject of war—its historical development, causes, and control—by a foremost authority on international law and relations.
- The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution, 1763-1789*, by Freeman H. Hart. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1942. Pp. 223. \$3.50.)
- Prologue to Appeasement: A Study in French Foreign Policy*, by Elizabeth R. Cameron. (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs. 1942. Pp. 228. \$3.50.) The relation of French public opinion to foreign policy.
- The Road to Vichy, 1918-1938*, by Yves Simon. (New York: Sheed & Ward. 1942. Pp. 207. \$2.25.) Reflections on the causes of the fall of France.
- The Twilight of France*, by Alexander Werth, edited by D. W. Brogan. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1942. Pp. 368. \$3.50.) An omnibus volume re-issuing *The Destiny of France* and *France and Munich*, otherwise unavailable.
- Europe, Russia, and the Future*, by G. D. H. Cole. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 233. \$2.00.)
- The Guilt of the German Army*, by Hans Ernest Fried. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 426. \$3.50.) Analysis of the relationship between German militarism and National Socialism.
- Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, by Sir Halford John Mackinder, with an introduction by Edward Mead Earle. (New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1942. Pp. 219. \$2.50.) Re-issue of a recognized classic by the author of the "Heartland" theory.

### NATIONAL WARFARE

- Economic Problems of War and Its Aftermath*, edited by Chester W. Wright. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1942. Pp. 197. \$2.00.)
- Lifelines of Victory*, by Murray George Harris. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1942. Pp. 160. \$2.00.) Stresses the importance of communications and supply in over-all strategy.
- Sabotage: The Secret War against America*, by Michael Sayers and A. E. Kahn. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1942. Pp. 266. \$2.50.) Physical, economic, and psychological sabotage.
- Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column*, by George Fort Milton. (New York: Vanguard Press. 1942. Pp. 364. \$3.50.)
- The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads*, by Wood Gray. (New York: Viking Press. 1942. Pp. 224. \$3.75.)

- The Sixth Column inside the Nazi-Occupied Countries*, by Thirteen Representatives of Ten Occupied Nations. (New York: Alliance Book Corporation. 1942. Pp. 313. \$2.50.) Resistance movements in occupied Europe.
- The Black Book of Poland*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1942. Pp. 615. \$3.00.) The second volume of the official Polish account of German occupation from October 6, 1939, to June 1941.
- Soviet Asia*, by R. A. Davies and Andrew J. Steiger. (New York: Dial Press. 1942. Pp. 384. \$3.00.)
- We're in This with Russia*, by Wallace Carroll. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1942. Pp. 264. \$2.00.)
- How War Came: An American White Paper, from the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor*, by Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1942. Pp. 342. \$2.50.)
- Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1933-41*. (New York: Wilfred Funk. 1942. Pp. 634. \$3.75.) A collection of the President's unedited speeches and messages pertaining to foreign policy and national defense.
- The Unrelenting Struggle: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, compiled by Charles Eade. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1942. Pp. 371. \$3.50.) Speeches from November 12, 1940, to December 30, 1941.

## LAND WARFARE

- Principles of War*, by Carl von Clausewitz, translated with an introduction by Hans W. Gatzke. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1942. Pp. 82. \$1.00.)
- The Great Offensive: The Strategy of Coalition Warfare*, by Max Werner, translated by Heinz and Ruth Norden. (New York: Viking Press. 1942. Pp. 360. \$3.00.) Analysis of the Russo-German front and its consequences for the general strategy of the United Nations.
- The War on the Civil and Military Fronts*, by Major General G. M. Lindsay. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 112. \$1.50.) The Lee Knowles lectures on military history for 1942, emphasizing the continuity of military and civil defense measures.
- How Wars are Fought*, by J. E. A. Whitman. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1942. Pp. 120. \$1.75.) Principles of strategy and tactics.
- Guerrilla Warfare*, by "Yank" Levy. (New York: Penguin Books. 1942. Pp. 120. \$.25.)
- Gas Warfare: The Chemical Weapon, Its Use, and Protection against It*, by Colonel Alden H. Waitt. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1942. Pp. 327. \$2.75.)
- School of the Citizen Soldier*, edited by Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Griffin, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald M. Shaw. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1942. Pp. 547. \$3.00.) An orientation text adapted from the educational program of the Second Army.
- The Officer's Guide*. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1942. Pp. 479. \$2.50.) The eighth edition of this handy reference work.

## SEA WARFARE

- Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy*, by Elting E. Morison. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1942. Pp. 548. \$5.00.)

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- What the Citizen Should Know about Submarine Warfare*, by David O. Woodbury. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1942. Pp. 225. \$2.50.)
- Commando Attack*, by Gordon Holman. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1942. Pp. 258. \$2.50.) Description by an English naval correspondent of the training of the commandoes and the raids on the Lofoten Islands and St. Nazaire.

## AIR WARFARE

- Billy Mitchell: Founder of Our Air Force and Prophet without Honour*, by Emile Gauvreau and Lester Cohen. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company. 1942. Pp. 303. \$2.50.)
- The Flying Tigers: The Story of the American Volunteer Group in China*, by Russell Whelan. (New York: Viking Press. 1942. Pp. 224. \$2.50.)

## MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

- The Great O'Neill*, by Sean O'Faolain. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1942. Pp. 374. \$3.75.) A biography of the sixteenth century Earl of Tyrone who fought the troops of Queen Elizabeth.
- Storm over the Land: A Profile of the Civil War*, by Carl Sandburg. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1942. Pp. 440. \$3.50.) Taken mainly from *Abraham Lincoln: The War Years*.
- Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, by Douglas Southall Freeman. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1942. Pp. 773. \$5.00.) Volume I of a new trilogy, covering from Manassas to Malvern Hill.

## World War I

- Americans versus Germans: The 1st AEF in Action*. (New York: Penguin Books. 1942. Pp. 189. \$.25.) Battle descriptions written by soldiers of the last war.

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- Belgium: The Official Account of What Happened, 1939-40*. (New York: Didier. 1941. Pp. 110. \$2.50.) American edition of the *Belgian Gray Book*.
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- Oil, Blood, and Sand*, by Robert L. Baker. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1942. Pp. 300. \$2.50.) The war in the Middle East.
- Queen of the Flat-Tops: The U. S. S. Lexington and the Coral Sea Battle*, by Stanley Johnston. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company. 1942. Pp. 280. \$3.00.) A dramatic eye-witness account of the Coral Sea Battle.
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## RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

## HISTORIOGRAPHY

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"War Finance and Inflation," by R. M. Haig, J. M. Clark, A. F. W. Plumptre, and W. L. Crum, in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, May 1942 (XX, 1-57). A symposium, with discussion.

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## NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

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### WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

BY ELBERT L. HUBER

From the date of its first formal accession of records in January 1936 up to October 15, 1942, The National Archives has received and deposited in its War Department Division 86,619 cubic feet (174,664 linear feet) of records pertaining to the War Department and related agencies.<sup>1</sup> The major part of this figure represents nearly all of the records of the Office of the Secretary of War and the various bureaus of the War Department from its earliest beginning to the first World War<sup>2</sup> and the "archives" of the War Department such as the records of discontinued military commands and the captured records of the Confederacy which were for the most part in the custody of The Adjutant General's Office, the archival agency for the entire Department. The remainder consists of the records of various war-related activities for the World War period and small miscellaneous collections.<sup>3</sup>

The concentration of these records, once scattered in buildings all over Washington and neighboring depositories in Maryland or Virginia and in some instances in places much more remote, affords the student of military history opportunities in research which have hitherto been denied. Many of the records in Washington were partly or wholly inaccessible, and the inadequate facilities for examination of the records, together with the natural reluctance of busy officials to devote time to

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<sup>1</sup>Records of several bureaus such as the Office of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Insular Affairs, and the Office of Public Buildings and Grounds, which were for a time under the jurisdiction of the War Department, are in the Division of Interior Department Archives, and records of the U. S. Signal Service, later U. S. Signal Corps, about 1870-90, are now a part of the records of the Weather Bureau in the Division of Agriculture Department Archives. As indicated later, other records are in the Divisions of Maps and Charts, Photographic Archives and Research, and Motion Pictures and Sound Recordings.

<sup>2</sup>The periods covered are not the same for all bureaus. Very few records prior to 1800 are in existence because of the fire of that year in the War Department, and the records of several bureaus include the World War period.

<sup>3</sup>Several small confidential collections have been omitted from the list below since they are not open to the public.

such purposes, made the task of the researcher almost insurmountable. Although it has been possible in the past for determined scholars to consult some of the records, the greater part of research on military subjects has been done from the records that have been printed and other sources outside the War Department.<sup>4</sup>

The importance of this fact can hardly be overemphasized. The close interrelation between the bureaus of the War Department and the field organizations requires considerable reference to many different registries in following the trail of administrative action, and the difficulties attending this pursuit were formerly such that it was seldom attempted. Today the investigator not only finds himself in ideal surroundings, but he may avail himself of the assistance of trained archivists familiar with the records as well as with the problems to be met in research in military archives.

Although in general the records may be consulted by any responsible investigator, certain records received from The Adjutant General, particularly those relating to military personnel, are restricted. Others may be consulted only under the supervision of personnel attached to his office, but The Adjutant General has recently permitted free access to the records formerly in his custody for the period up to 1861. In many other collections there are no restrictions whatsoever other than the statutory provisions which govern the use of all Federal records.

It is perhaps not too much of an exaggeration to say that much of the history of military activities in the nineteenth century will have to be rewritten, and it is certainly true that there are almost unlimited possibilities in the field. Here, for example, in the archives of the discontinued military commands and western posts is the record of the part played by the Army in the development and growth of the West, or in the records of the Ordnance Department there is the story of World War procurement of armament. The records of the Quartermaster General's Office and related bureaus contain the developments in the now vital task of clothing, subsisting, and transporting the Army, and in the records of each bureau one will find more than a century's experience in the various functions related to the maintenance of the American military establishment.

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<sup>4</sup>Up to the date of its publication, Claude H. Van Tyne and Waldo G. Leland, *Guide to the Archives of the Government of the United States in Washington* (Washington, 1907), pp. 102 ff., contains the best over-all description of War Department records including those available in print. The most ambitious undertaking of recent years which involves the printing of War Department records is *The Territorial Papers of the United States* (Washington, 1934-), which was reviewed by Robert G. Ballentine in *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, V (Winter 1941), 241-44.

The records themselves may be said to fall generally into three groups, namely, the records actually created by the bureaus in the administration of their regular functions, the so-called "archives" formerly in the custody of The Adjutant General's Office, and the records of war-related agencies. This division is a purely arbitrary one made by the writer, and some of the materials in Group II such as the records of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands might also be listed under Group I except that the units that accumulated them have long since been discontinued. The descriptions are necessarily brief, but further information is available in the *Guide to the Material in The National Archives*, the *National Archives Accessions* (a series issued periodically as a supplement to the *Guide*), and other descriptive material which may be examined at The National Archives.

### Group I

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: Correspondence and document files, including decimal correspondence, 1791-1922; letter books, 1800-89; telegrams received and sent by the Secretary, 1861-81; circulars, orders, record cards, indexes, *etc.* Records of the Printing and Advertising Division, 1864-1929; records of the Disbursing Clerk, 1836-1934; records of the Civilian Personnel Division, 1838-1934.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR: Records of the Planning Branch and some of its subdivisions, 1921-39, including correspondence, reports, monographs, and related materials.

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF: Correspondence and document files of the Office of the Chief of Staff, 1903-21; records of some but not all subdivisions of the War Department General Staff and other subordinate agencies, 1899-1939.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE: Correspondence, rolls, returns and orders of the Revolutionary War, of the Volunteer Armies for the various wars of the United States, and of the Regular Army, 1775-1918; correspondence, documents, record cards, *etc.*, of The Adjutant General's Office, 1803-1919, and of the Record and Pension Office, 1890-1904; telegrams and strength returns of the American Expeditionary Forces, 1918-20; orders and circulars, personal reports of officers, *etc.*<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup>This entry hardly does justice to one of the largest and most important bodies of records in the Division, but more than a bare outline was not contemplated. Manuscript maps used in the publication of the "Official Records" are in the Division of Maps and Charts, and glass-plate negative photographic copies of Revolutionary War documents on file in county seats in Virginia are in the Division of Photographic Archives and Research.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS: Correspondence, letter books, reports, journals of proceedings, orders and regulations, returns, deeds, contracts and proposals, and field notes, 1733-1922, including records of the Topographical Bureau.<sup>6</sup>

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF FINANCE: Ledgers, journals, warrant, docket and repayment and deposit books, correspondence and account books, 1800-1925.

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE: Inspection reports, 1814-42; document files, letter books, reports, *etc.*, constituting the records of the Inspector General's Office, 1863-1916; records of the Inspector General's Department, Army of Cuban Pacification, 1906-08; records of the Inspector General of the American Expeditionary Forces and of inspections at various other overseas headquarters, 1917-20.

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFICE: General Court Martial records, 1812-June 30, 1917; records of the Patent Section and predecessor agencies, 1919-31; records of the British Claims Commission, 1932-33; records of the War Transactions Board, 1923-25; records of the Acting Judge Advocate General and of officers of the Department at various headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-19.

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU: Miscellaneous papers relating to state and territorial military organizations, 1825-1903; document files for the periods 1903-06 and 1908-16; account books and related papers, 1916-39; and photographs.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE: Bureau records, 1797-1915,<sup>7</sup> including correspondence and document files, registers, accounting, and other miscellaneous records; bureau records, 1915-35, including the non-current decimal correspondence files of the World War period and after but not including civilian personnel records and prints and drawings; records of the Ordnance Department of the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-19, including correspondence files and photographic glass plate and film negatives.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE: Records of the Quartermaster General's Office and predecessor offices, 1800-1922, including document files, letter books, classified decimal correspondence files, *etc.*; records of quartermaster officers at various stations, 1813-1938; rec-

<sup>6</sup>An important part of this body of records is the map collection in the Division of Maps and Charts. There are also glass-plate negatives of photographs portraying activities of the Corps of Engineers, 1875-1902, in the Division of Photographic Archives and Research. Although the principal body of the records described in this entry extends only through 1894, transfer of the corresponding records from 1894 through the World War period will soon be completed.

<sup>7</sup>Very few of these records antedate 1815.



ords of the U. S. Military Railroads during the Civil War; records of the Army Transport Service from about 1898 to the end of the World War; records of the Motor Transport Corps, 1917-21.<sup>8</sup>

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER: Correspondence and document files, registers of letters received, and letter sent books, 1860-70; a very few records for the period 1870-1901; photographs and negatives, including the so-called Brady Collection of Civil War pictures in the Division of Photographic Archives and Research.<sup>9</sup>

SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE: Letter and document files, classified correspondence files, registers of letters received, and letter sent books, 1818-1927; miscellaneous papers and volumes, 1815-1917; personnel records, 1818-1926; accounts and related papers, 1822-1917; and contracts and related papers, about 1898-1921.<sup>10</sup>

### *Group II*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY: Correspondence and document files, 1827-1903; letters received and forwarded or filed, 1828-1902; press copies of letters sent, 1862-1903; telegrams, endorsements and memoranda, letter books, general and special orders.

DISCONTINUED ARMY COMMANDS: Records of discontinued commands, including document and correspondence files, retained copies of various reports, letter sent books, registers of letters received, orders, and miscellaneous papers. These records include those of post, organizational, territorial and mobile commands, especially those of volunteer organizations during the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, as well as records of certain units of the American Expeditionary Forces, about 1800-1922.<sup>11</sup>

WAR DEPARTMENT COLLECTION OF CONFEDERATE ARCHIVES: Muster rolls, returns, clothing rolls, manuscript rolls, extra-duty rolls, hospital rolls, and slave rolls; paymaster's vouchers; records of Confed-

<sup>8</sup>See also the entries for the offices of the Commissary General of Purchases, Commissary General of Subsistence, and Paymaster General in Group II. Their functions were taken over by the Quartermaster General's Office.

<sup>9</sup>Although not yet formally accessioned, the records of this office for the period 1890-1924 are now in the National Archives Building, and motion pictures relating to World War I are in the Division of Motion Pictures and Sound Recordings.

<sup>10</sup>See also "Medical Records" in Group II. Although once a part of the records of the Surgeon General's Office, this group of records was in the custody of The Adjutant General's Office at the time of their transfer to The National Archives and played an important part in the career of Major General Fred C. Ainsworth, whose contribution to archival science was discussed by Siert F. Riepma in *The Journal of the American Military History Foundation*, II (Spring 1938), 26-35.

<sup>11</sup>Records of a few organizations still active are included here for convenience. Several photographic collections pertaining to World War I are in the Division of Photographic Archives and Research, and the Division of Maps and Charts has a collection of route surveys in the Philippine Islands, 1870-92.

erate War Department bureaus, military departments, and other governmental agencies; Union war prison records, Union Provost Marshal papers, 1861-65; miscellaneous records and memoranda relating to the administration of Confederate records since 1865 by the War Department, 1865-1937.

PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S BUREAU: Correspondence concerning enrollment, deserters, and claims; draft books and papers, enrollment lists, and exemptions; records sent in from discontinued field offices; Slave Claims Commission papers, correspondence, documents, and books of the subdivision of The Adjutant General's Office which served as successor agencies of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau, 1862-89.

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF PRISONERS: Correspondence, telegrams, records of Federal prisoners of war, records of Confederate prisoners, muster rolls, and records of the Federal Military Prisons, letters sent, letters received, record books of the military prisons, 1861-67.

BUREAU OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS: Letters received, letters sent, general and special orders, circulars, station books of officers and civilians, books and papers of the Commissioner at Washington, reports of Assistant Commissioners relative to abandoned and confiscated lands, reports as to schools, bounties, labor contracts, claims and vouchers, 1865-72.

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF PURCHASES: Document files, letter sent books, and account books, 1797-1842.

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE: Document files, registers of letters received, letter sent books, record cards, and other material relating to subsistence matters, 1818-1912.

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE: Document files, registers of letters received, letter sent books, record cards, accounts, and other material relating to pay matters, 1799-1912.

"MEDICAL RECORDS": Medical histories of military posts, registers of physical examinations of recruits, reports of sick and wounded, and other medical records of the Regular Army prior to 1894 and of the volunteer armies, 1846-1912.

### *Group III*

BUREAU OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION: Records of the Chemical Section, Service and Research Division, 1916-19, including papers of H. D.

Gibbs, head of the section.<sup>12</sup>

HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY: Records of former budget officers of the War Department, which were transferred to the Military Budget Estimates Section, Fiscal Division, Headquarters, Services of Supply, including budget justifications, estimates, and related papers, 1918-30.

COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE: Correspondence, minutes, reports, record cards, pamphlets, circulars, news releases of the Advisory Commission, 1916-18; files of subdivisions of the Council and related organizations, 1915-21; records of the War Department as custodian of the records, 1915-37.

WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD: Correspondence, cablegrams, memoranda, minutes, bulletins, circulars, questionnaires, statistical data, record cards of the various units of the War Industries Board together with files of the Allied Purchasing Commission, of liquidating agencies of the War Industries Board, and files assembled for the use of the United States Senate and the Department of Justice, 1916-33.

WAR DEPARTMENT CLAIMS BOARD: Correspondence, reports, statistical summaries, minutes, and case files of the various divisions of the War Department Claims Board, including reference files of materials extracted from the War Industries Board records dealing with certain chemicals and metals, 1918-22, and including files of Benedict Crowell, Assistant Secretary of War and president of the War Department Claims Board, 1919-20.

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, 1917-19: Records of the Provost Marshal General's Office, 1917-19, including papers relating to aliens, appeals to the President, quotas, Students' Army Training Corps, deserters, board personnel and administration, accounts, and other matters; all extant records of the state headquarters, 1917-19; all extant records of the district boards, 1917-19; all extant records of medical advisory boards, 1917-19; docket books and classification lists of local boards, 1917-19.

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, 1940-: Records of the first, second, and third national lotteries and of the Territorial lotteries held in Alaska and Porto Rico, consisting of the original number slips in the order in which they were drawn, and record copies of the national master lists for each lottery; microfilm records of numbers drawn as to the hour,

<sup>12</sup>Several collections of photographic records and films which have been attributed to the Headquarters, Army Air Forces, formerly Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, are in the Divisions of Photographic Archives and Research and of Motion Pictures and Sound Recordings.

minute, and second in the order in which the numbers were drawn for the second and third national lotteries, 1940-42.

STARS AND STRIPES: Administrative files of the *Stars and Stripes*, semi-official newspaper of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 1917-19, including editorial and financial records and War Orphans Fund papers.

## UNITED STATES CAMPAIGN MEDALS

BY HUGH M. FLICK

The custom of wearing medals and ribbons has been adopted by the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in comparatively recent times. Indeed, the wearing of decorations on service uniforms was almost unknown prior to the Spanish-American War. This does not mean that outstanding deeds of heroism and service went unnoticed, but rather that medals and decorations had long been associated with undemocratic principles. Even the Medal of Honor, which had been established by Congressional action in 1861 and which remained for forty years almost the only American decoration, was seldom worn with anything but the full-dress uniform. The last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a departure from this "republican simplicity." That was the period of the rise of patriotic societies, and the custom of wearing insignia attesting the service and valor of one's ancestors became noticeable in both civilian and military circles. Perhaps such an innovation paved the way for the rapid expansion of military decorations which has been one of the characteristic developments of the twentieth century.

Whatever the cause, the Spanish-American War ushered in a new era. On June 3, 1898, only a month after Manila Bay, President McKinley approved an Act of Congress granting a sword to Admiral Dewey and awarding medals to all who had taken part in the battle. This is the first instance in American history that a general decoration was authorized for all officers and men who participated in an engagement or campaign. In 1901 two more medals were created for the Navy and the Marine Corps—one for those who served in the West Indies in 1898, and another for those "who rendered specially meritorious service, otherwise than in battle." Although the Army did not immediately follow this lead, it did not lag far behind. In January 1904 the War Department, by authority of the President, pub-



lished an order that "campaign badges and ribbons will be issued as articles of uniform to officers and enlisted men in the service to commemorate services which have been or shall hereafter be rendered in campaign." Medals were at once authorized for the Civil War, the Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the China Relief Expedition. The wearing of ribbons in lieu of the actual medals was recognized, and in 1909 the Navy adopted a similar regulation. Between 1906 and 1918 seven additional service medals were authorized—the Philippine Congressional Medal, June 29, 1906; the Army of Cuban Pacification Medal, May 9, 1909; the Army of Cuban Occupation Medal and the Army of Puerto Rican Occupation Medal, June 28, 1915; the Mexican Service Medal, December 12, 1917; the Spanish War Service Medal and the Mexican Border Service Medal, July 9, 1918.

With the cessation of hostilities at the end of the World War the question of a fitting recognition for all those who had served was given careful consideration. By that time it was well-established practice to grant awards for service in separate areas and campaigns; but there was also precedent in the Civil War, the Spanish War Service, and the Philippine Congressional medals for granting awards to all who had been in Federal service, regardless of whether or not they had actively participated in any of the campaigns. In establishing the Victory Medal these two different types of recognition were combined. Under the provisions of the Act of April 9, 1919, all who were "on active duty at any time between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918," or were "a member of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, or European Russia, after having entered the service subsequently to November 11, 1918," were entitled to receive the medal. Besides a general service award, it also recognized battle and foreign service through the addition of clasps.

Historically it is of interest to note that the British had used battle clasps as early as the Napoleonic Wars. In 1810 the Peninsula Gold Medal was bestowed upon the officers who took part in the victories of 1808 and 1809. At first a medal was cast for each battle, but in 1813 a general decoration for the campaign was established with bars for the battles. There were two types of this medal. Officers who had seen action in not more than three battles received medals with the name of one engagement on them and the other two on clasps. Those who had served in four or more received gold crosses with the names of the first four battles on the arms of the cross and the others on clasps. Out

of the Napoleonic Wars, likewise, came the first instance of granting the same decoration to both officers and enlisted men. The Waterloo Medal, authorized by Great Britain in 1816, was "to be conferred upon every officer, non-commissioned officer and soldier present upon that memorable occasion." There is also striking similarity between the belated recognition in 1904 of service in the American Civil War and the British Military and Naval General Service Medal of 1847, which was awarded to the survivors of all campaigns between 1793 and 1815.

In the years following the World War there was little occasion for the United States to give much thought to campaign medals. Provision had been made for all campaigns, and the Victory Medal appeared to have established a sound American policy after twenty years of experimentation. The first definite break with that policy came on November 21, 1941, when a separate Army of German Occupation Medal was authorized rather than adding another service clasp to the Victory Medal. A new wrinkle had been added even earlier when, on June 28, 1941, the American Defense Service Medal was authorized as recognition for the large number of men in emergency service during nominal peace, and men began wearing the ribbon before the medal itself was issued or even designed. After Pearl Harbor it might have become the basic service medal, or the first clasp, for the present war, but this was not to be. Instead, on November 6, 1942, the President ordered that

... campaign medals, including certain appurtenances, be established, and that the said medals may be awarded, under such regulations as the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy may severally prescribe, to members of the land and naval forces of the United States including the Women's Reserve of the United States Naval Reserve, and to members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, who during any period between December 7, 1941, inclusive, and a date six months subsequent to the termination of the present war, shall have served outside the continental limits of the United States, in any of the respective areas so indicated in the names of the medals.

The areas mentioned are listed in the title of the order as "American, European-African-Middle Eastern, and Asiatic-Pacific Campaigns." Thus, without yet having recognized the men on duty on the home front, four separate medals have already been authorized. Clasps will doubtless be used for battles in each of the three theaters of war, but otherwise there is little resemblance between the carefully planned Victory Medal and the service awards being devised today as the war develops. Rather, the latter seem to go back to the confused pattern which immediately followed the Spanish-American War.

## INDEX TO VOLUME VI

- Advisory Committee on Records of War Administration, activities of, 191 ff.
- "Age and Field Command," by Alfred Vagts, 13-20
- Agriculture, Department of, records program of, 194-95
- Albion, Robert Greenhalgh, president of INSTITUTE, 36; "The INSTITUTE's Opportunities in Wartime," 130-32; *vita*, 110
- AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE: William L. Rodgers resigns as president of, 36, and as trustee of, 37; Robert G. Albion president of, 36; James Brown Scott resigns as vice-president of, 36; Frank R. McCoy vice-president of, 36; Frederick P. Todd resigns as secretary of, 36, and elected trustee of, 37; Harold Sprout secretary of, 36; Hoffman Nickerson, Oliver L. Spaulding, and John W. Wright complete terms as trustees of, 37; John R. M. Taylor resigns as trustee of, 37; Ralph Henry Gabriel, Thomas M. Spaulding, Alfred Vagts, and Harry E. Yarnell trustees of, 37; change in headquarters of, 37, 109; annual meeting of, 1941, 38, 1942, 226; Robert E. Runser resigns as librarian of, 109; Marie Charlotte Stark librarian of, 109; important additions to library of, 169; opportunities in wartime for, 130-32; development of library of, 227-28; *see also* "MILITARY AFFAIRS"
- American Revolution: *see* "Revolutionary War, American"
- Archives, military: *see* "Source Materials, military"
- Armies: relation of age to field command in, 13-20
- Army: *Austro-Hungarian*, in Austro-Prussian War, 1866, 164-67; *British*, relation of age to field command in, 17, 19-20; *French*, relation of age to field command in, 15 ff.; *German*, economic warfare tactics of, 8 ff.; relation of age to field command in, 16-17, 19; in Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, 1941, 69-76; military strategy concepts in, 153-68; *Japanese*, relation of age to field command in, 19; *Russian*, relation of age to field command in, 19; in Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, 1941, 69-76; *United States*, relation of age to field command in, 16-18; federalization of, 143-52
- Austria-Hungary: in Austro-Prussian War, 1866, 164-67
- Austro-Prussian War, 1866, Moltke's strategy in, 164-67
- "Background of Geopolitics," by Jean Gottman, 197-206
- Badges: *see* "Uniforms, Insignia, and Equipment"
- Ballentine, Robert G., assist. ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 226
- "Battle of the Frontier," by Max Werner, 69-76
- Battles: *see* "Engagements and Campaigns"
- Bell, Aaron, assoc. ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 37
- Bell, Harry H., "Monetary Problems of Military Occupation," 77-88; *Vita*, 110
- Bialystok-Minsk, Battle of, 1941, 69-76
- Bibliography: *see* "Book Reviews," "Books, notices of other recent," "Periodical Literature, recent military," "Source Materials, military"
- Bloch, Kurt, "How Strong Is Japan?" 27-35; *vita*, 39
- Board of Economic Warfare, records program of, 196
- Book Reviews: Childs and Whitton, *Propaganda by Short Wave*, by Edouard Roditi, 234-35; Claussen and Friis, *Catalogue of Maps Published by Congress, 1817-43*, by Jesse S. Douglas, 51; Cranwell, *Destiny of Sea Power*, by Theodore Ropp, 111-12; De Weerd, *Great Soldiers of Two World Wars*, by Henry C. Meyers, 45-46; Downey, *Indian Fighting Army*, by Don Russell, 121; DuVal, *Cadiz to Cathay*, by Courtney R. Hall, 238-40; Ergang, *Potsdam Führer*, by Alfred Vagts, 176-77; Falls, *Nature of Modern Warfare*, by Stefan T. Possony, 173-76; Farrago, ed., *Axis Grand Strategy*, by Theodore H. Von Laue, 171; Francis, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth*, by Maurice L. Farber, 231-32; Green, *William Henry Harrison*, by Freeman Cleaves, 179-80; Grenfell, *Sea Power*, by Theodore Ropp, 41-42; Hagen, *Will Germany Crack?* by Ernst Fraenkel, 232-33; Harris, *Economics of American Defense*, by Albert T. Lauterbach, 43-45; Johnson, *Administration of American Commissariat During the Revolutionary War*, by John W. Wright, 177-79; Johnson and Haven, *Automatic Arms*, by Bernard Brodie, 171-73; Ley, *Bombs and Bombing*, by Calvin Goddard, 50-51; Lorwin, *Economic Consequences of the Second World War*, by Bryce Wood, 42-43; Marshall, *Armies on Wheels*, by Hoffman Nickerson, 46-48; Milton, *Conflict*, by Theodore R.



- Parker, 180-81; Mullendore, *History of United States Food Administration, 1917-19*, by Forrest Wilson, 114-16; Riess, *Total Espionage*, by Stefan T. Possony, 48-50; Robinson, *Justice in Grey*, by Donald Bridgeman Sanger, 237-38; Sargeant and West, *Grand Strategy*, by John C. Campbell, 40-41; Schwarzschild, *World in Trance*, by Hans Ernest Fried, 229-31; Starr, *Roman Imperial Navy*, 31 B. C.-A. D. 324, by Alfred Vagts, 120-21; Tarlé, *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia*, by Alfred Vagts, 235-37; Van Doren, *Secret History of American Revolution*, by Felix Gilbert, 116-18; Vernadsky, *Bohdan*, by C. E. Black, 181-82; Wavell, *Allenby*, by H. A. De Weerd, 112-13; Wildes, *Anthony Wayne*, by James P. Jacobs, 118-20; Zacharoff, *"We Made a Mistake"*, by William O. Shannahan, 182-83
- Books, notices of other recent, 52-55, 122-24, 183-86, 240-42
- Bowman, Isaiah, geopolitical concepts of, 202 ff.
- Campaigns: see "Engagements and Campaigns"
- Campbell, Edward G., "Use of Records of the Last War Today," 63-68; *vita*, 39; new ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 225-26; new Chief, Div. War Dept. Archives of National Archives, 226
- "Challenge to Democracy: An Editorial," 5
- Civil War, 1861-65: composition of Union Army in, 147-48
- Clausewitz, Carl von, influence on Moltke, 156 ff.
- Committee on Records of War Administration: see "Advisory Committee on Records of War Administration"
- "Communications and Strategy," by Stefan T. Possony, 219-24
- Democracy, challenge of war to, 5; control of military affairs in a, 207-18
- De Weerd, H. A., "The Federalization of Our Army," 143-52; *vita*, 170; resigns as ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 225
- Douglas, Jesse S., resigns as manag. ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 225
- Doyle, Wilson K., "Pre-war Democratic Control of Military Affairs," 207-18; *vita*, 228
- Earle, Edward Mead, "The Princeton Program of Military Studies," 21-26; *vita*, 39
- "Economic Factors in Military Action," by Edward S. Mason, 133-42
- Economic Warfare: see "Warfare"
- "Economic Warfare Tactics," by Lowell M. Pumphrey, 7-12
- Engagements and Campaigns: Bialystok-Minsk, 1941, 69-76
- "Federalization of Our Army," by H. A. De Weerd, 143-52
- Flick, Hugh M., "United States Campaign Medals," 254-56; *vita*, 228
- France, German war economy in, 89-96; see also "Army, France"
- Gabriel, Ralph Henry, trustee of INSTITUTE, 37
- General Staff, evolution of United States, 149-50
- Geography: see "Geopolitics"
- Geopolitics, background of, 197-206
- Germany: economic warfare tactics of, 8 ff.; war economy in occupied Europe, 77-78; relation of war economy to unoccupied France, 89-96; military strategy concepts in, 153-68; see also "Army, German"
- Gneisenau, August Wilhelm Anton von, influence on Moltke, 153 ff.
- Gondos, Victor, assist. ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 226
- Gottman, Jean, "The Background of Geopolitics," 197-206; *vita*, 228
- Grancsay, Stephen V., preparing monograph on American powder horns, 170
- Great Britain: see "Army, British"
- Haushofer, Karl, geopolitical concepts of, 204 ff.
- "Headquarters Gazette," 36-39, 109-10, 169-70, 225-28
- Holborn, Hajo, "Moltke's Strategical Concepts," 153-68; *vita*, 170
- "How Strong Is Japan?" by Kurt Bloch, 27-35
- Huber, Elbert L., "War Department Records in The National Archives," 247-54; *vita*, 228
- Insignia: see "Uniforms, Insignia, and Equipment"
- "Institute's Opportunities in Wartime," by Robert Greenhalgh Albion, 130-32
- Irvine, Dallas D., detailed as Assistant to Archivist of U. S., 226
- Japan, military strength of, 17-35; see also "Army, Japan"
- Labor Department, records program of, 196
- Land Warfare: see "Warfare"
- Leahy, Emmett J., "Records Administration and the War," 97-108; *vita*, 110
- MacArthur, Douglas, portrait of, 6
- Mackinder, Sir Halford, geopolitical concepts of, 202 ff.
- Mason, Edward S., "Economic Factors in Military Action," 133-42; *vita*, 170
- McCoy, Frank R., vice-president of INSTITUTE, 36
- Medals: see "Uniforms, Insignia, and Equipment"
- Militia, in United States, 145-48



- MILITARY AFFAIRS: Aaron Bell and Paul W. Thompson assoc. eds. of, 37; Richard P. Stebbins resigns as book review ed. of, 37; alterations in, 37-38; need for back issues of, 109, 169; lack of illustrations in, 110; H. A. De Weerd resigns as ed. of, 225; Jesse S. Douglas resigns as manag. ed. of, 225; Edward G. Campbell new ed. of, 225-26; Robert G. Ballentine, Victor Gondos, Stuart Portner, and Jerome Thomases assist. eds. of, 226; *see also* AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE
- Moltke, Count Helmuth Karl Bernhard von, strategical concepts of, 153-68; portrait of, 157
- "Moltke's Strategical Concepts," by Hajo Holborn, 153-68
- "Monetary Problems of Military Occupation," by Harry H. Bell, 77-88
- Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, geopolitical concepts of, 198-99
- Montry, Jean, "Unoccupied France and German War Economy," 89-96; *vita*, 110
- National Archives: *see* "Source Materials, military"
- National Guard, development of United States, 150-52
- National Research Council, records program of, 196
- Navy Department, records program of, 194-95
- Nickerson, Hoffman, completes term as trustee of INSTITUTE, 37
- "Notes and Antiquities," 63-68, 130-32, 191-96, 247-54
- Periodical Literature, recent military, 56-62, 125-29, 187-90, 243-46
- Portner, Stuart, assist. ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 226
- Possony, Stefan T., "Communications and Strategy," 219-24; *vita*, 228
- "Pre-war Democratic Control of Military Affairs," by Wilson K. Doyle, 207-18
- "Princeton Program of Military Studies," by Edward Mead Earle, 21-26
- Prussia: *see* "Germany"
- Public Opinion, on military affairs in the United States, 210-13
- Pumphrey, Lowell M., "Economic Warfare Tactics," 7-12; *vita*, 39
- Ratzel, Friedrich, geopolitical concepts of, 201 *ff.*
- "Records Administration and the War," by Emmett J. Leahy, 97-108
- Records, federal: *see* "Source Materials, military"
- "Records of War Administration," by Harry Venneman, 191-96
- Revolutionary War, American, 1775-83: composition of American Army in, 145-46
- Rodgers, William L., resigns as president and trustee of INSTITUTE, 36, 37
- Roon, Albrecht Theodor Emil, relations to Moltke, 158-59
- Runser, Robert E., resigns as librarian of INSTITUTE, 109
- Russia: *see* "Army, Russian"
- Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann David von, influence on Moltke, 153 *ff.*
- Scott, James Brown, resigns as vice-president of INSTITUTE, 36
- Smolensk, Battle of, 1941: *see* "Bialystok-Minsk, Battle of"
- Source Materials, military: archives of World War I, 63-68; archives of War Dept. in National Archives, 145, 169-70, 247-54; archives of war administration, 191-96
- Spanish-American War, 1898: composition of U. S. Army in, 148
- Spaulding, Oliver L., completes term as trustee of INSTITUTE, 37
- Spaulding, Thomas M., trustee of INSTITUTE, 37; appointed Director of Records, Adjutant General's Office, 169
- Sprout, Harold, secretary of INSTITUTE, 36
- Stark, Marie Charlotte, librarian of INSTITUTE, 109
- State Department, records program of, 196
- Stebbins, Richard P., resigns as book review ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 37
- Strategy: *see* "Warfare"
- Taylor, John R. M., resigns as trustee of INSTITUTE, 37
- Thomases, Jerome, assist. ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 226
- Thompson, Paul W., assoc. ed. of MILITARY AFFAIRS, 37
- Todd, Frederick P., resigns as secretary of INSTITUTE, 36; trustee of INSTITUTE, 37
- Total Warfare: *see* "Warfare"
- Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, geopolitical concepts of, 199-200
- Uniforms, Insignia, and Equipment: history of U. S. campaign medals, 254-56
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: *see* "Russia"
- United States: federalization of army in, 143-52; control of military affairs in, 207-18; *see also* "Army, United States"
- "United States Campaign Medals," by Hugh M. Flick, 254-56
- "Unoccupied France and German War Economy," by Jean Montry, 89-96

- Upton, Emory, work in American military history, 143-44, 148
- "Use of Records of the Last War Today," by E. G. Campbell, 63-68
- Vagts, Alfred, "Age and Field Command," 13-20; trustee of INSTITUTE, 37; *vita*, 39
- Venneman, Harry, "Records of War Administration," 191-96; *vita*, 170
- War Department archives: *see* "Source Materials, military"
- "War Department Records in The National Archives," by Elbert L. Huber, 247-54
- War Department, records program of, 193-94
- Warfare: challenge to democracy, 5; economic aspects of, 7-12, 133-42; studies on, 21-26; growing interest in study of, 39; suggestions for study of, 130-32; Moltke's concepts of, 153-58; relation to geopolitics, 197-206; relation of communications to strategy in, 219-24
- Werner, Max, "Battle of the Frontier," 69-76; *vita*, 110
- World War I, 1914-1918: publication of list of U. S. agencies during, 39; value of U. S. records of, 63-68; composition of U. S. Army in, 149-51
- World War II, 1939-: economic warfare in, 7 *ff.*; monetary problems in occupied regions during, 77-88; unoccupied France in German war economy during, 89-96; records administration during, 97-108, 191-96; economic factors during, 133 *ff.*; Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, 1941, 169-76
- Wright, John W., completes term as trustee of INSTITUTE, 37
- Yarnell, Harry E., trustee of INSTITUTE, 37